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NUMBER 4

THE WORK OF THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT
FOR THE YEAR 1942
STATISTICAL SURVEY
JACKSON

A. WRIGHT*

In 1942 the total number of cases disposed of by opinion was 293. The
trend of litigation has remained relatively constant over the past eight
years.'
There were 267 majority opinions handed down, and 16 of these disposed
of two separate cases as listed on the docket. There are 4 cases which
have not yet appeared, although listed on the docket for 1942, and 6
opinions which were handed down in 1943. For the purpose of this survey
these will be considered as rendered in 1943.
The following tables were prepared from the reports of the opinions
as published in the Missouri Reports, the Southwestern Reporter, and the
Southwestern Reporter Advance Sheets.
The total number of opinions rendered by the individual judges ranged
from 10 to 23, and by the commissioners from 22 to 29. There were 11
per curian opinions.

Table I indicates the status of the docket on December 31, 1942, and
contains the regular biennial progress report as furnished by the Clerk of
the Supreme Court.
.*Chairman, Board of Student Editors.
1. 1935, 331; 1936, 369; 1937, 277; 1938, 303; 1939, 290; 1940, 282; 1941,
336. See 5 Mo. L. REv. 377 (1940); (1941) 6 Mo. L. REv. 381; (1942) 7 Mo.
L. REv. 327. It further appears that in the biennium 1939-40, the court disposed of a
total of 1380 cases, as against 1171 filed; in 194142, it disposed of 1138 cases, as

against 970 filed.

(223)
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TABLE I
SUPREME COURT DoCKET

1941
1942

1941
1942

January 1, 1941 to December31, 1942
Number of cases filed in 1941 and 1942
Total
Appeals
Writs
505
168
337
............................
465
131
............................
334
Disposed of Total cases
Number of cases disposed of
by motion Disposed of
by opinion
Civil
Criminal
Total
257
638
47
381
..............
334
207
500
293
33
.............. 260

Table II was prepared by a classification of the cases according to the
dominant issue as shown by the opinion. Of course, many cases involve
several issues, but in such instances the case was arbitrarily placed in one
category only.

TABLE II
TOPICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS

Administrative Law .........................................................................
Appeal and Error ............................................................................
Attorney and Client ..........................................................................
Banks and Banking .......................................................................
Bills and Notes .................................................................................
Bonds ..................................................................................................
Certiorari ...........................................................................................
Constitutional Law .........................................................................
.........
Contracts ...................................................................
Courts ...............................................................................................
Creditors' Rights ..............................................................................
Criminal Law ......................................................................................
Domestic Relations ..........................................................................
Elections .........................................
Eminent Domain ...............................................................................
Equity .............................................................................................
Evidence .........................................................................................
Habeas Corpus ...................................................................................

7
8
1
2
2
1
3
6
11
19
4
30
2
3
3
14
5
1

12
2..........
Insurance .......................................................

-Master and Servant ..........................................................................
M ortgages ..........................................................................................
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol8/iss4/3
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Municipal Corporations ....................................................................

4

Negligence (Automobiles) ...............................................................

10

- ---------- 16
Other Negligence --------------------------------------------2
Physicians and Surgeons ....................................................................
Pleading ..............................................................................................

Practice and Procedure ......................................................................

7

13

4
Prohibition -----------------------------------------------------1
Quo Warranto ......................................................................................
20
...................................................................................
Real Property
5
Statutes ........................................................
16
Taxation ................................................................................................

Torts (Other than Negligence) ........................................................
T rusts ...................................................................................................
Unemployment Compensation ........................................................
Wills and Administration .................................................................
Workmen's Compensation ............................................................

10
3

2
10
3

Table III shows the disposition of the cases in which opinions were
handed down by the court. It should be kept in mind that although the
trial court was affirmed in some manner in many more instances than it
was reversed, the appealing party may nevertheless feel that the result
was satisfactory to some extent.
TABLE III
DisPOSITION OF LITIGATION

12
Decrees Affirmed .............................................................................
1
Decrees Reversed --------------------------------------------------

3
Decrees reversed and remanded ....................................................
4
Decrees reversed and remanded with directions ........................
104
Judgments affirmed ..........................................................................
2
Judgments affirmed, cause remanded -------------------------------5
Judgments affirmed on condition of remittitur ............................
3
Judgments affirmed in part, reversed in part ..............................
Judgments affirmed in part, reversed in part, cause remanded
2
with directions ..........................................................................
Judgments affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part .... 4
12
Judgments reversed ..........................................................................
26
................................................
remanded
Judgments reversed and
Judgments reversed and remanded with directions .................. 24
2
Judgments reversed, defendant discharged ..................................
1
Alternative writ modified, made permanent as modified ............
Alternative writ made peremptory ................................................
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1943
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Appeal dism issed ..............................................................................
Application for leave to file en banc a motion to transfer cause
from division to court en banc denied .................
Child remanded to respondent .....................................................
Motion to dismiss appeal sustained ..............................................
Motion to modify judgment overruled ........................................
Opinion quashed ...............................................................................
Order affirm ed .................................................................................
Order ousting one respondent, continued as to other ................
Order set aside, proceedings remanded with directions ............
Ouster entered against respondent ................................................
Petitioner remanded to respondent ..............................................
Preliminary rule discharged ....................... I..................................
Prohibition made absolute .............................................................
Provisional rule affirmed in part, discharged as to part ................
Provisional rule in prohibition discharged ....................................
Transferred to court of appeals ...................................................
Writ denied .......................................................................................
W rit quashed ...................................................................................
Writ made peremptory ....................................................................

(Vol. 8
5
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
3
1
3
18
2
10
1

Table IV shows only those motions which were denied or otherwise
disposed of by the court subsequent to the decision. It is recognized that
in a number of instances, rehearings were granted, and cases were transferred
to the court en banc, but such records are not available.
TABLE IV
MISCELLANEOUS

Rehearings denied ........................................................................
96
Modified on denial of rehearing ...................................................
10
Motion to modify denied ................................................................
1
Motion for rehearing or to transfer to court en banc denied ......
2
Motion to transfer to court en banc denied ...............................
22
Motion for leave en banc to file motion to transfer cause to
court en banc denied ................................................................
1
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APPELLATE PRACTICE
CHARLES

V.

GARNETT*

THE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

During the year under review, the supreme court found it necessary to
transfer no less than seventeen cases to the courts of appeals. It is worthy
of note that these transfers have not resulted from any new construction
of the constitutional provisions controlling appellate jurisdiction, but that,
to the contrary, they are all cases where the application of previously announced and well settled rules have necessitated the transfers.
As pointed out in Home Owners' Loan Corporationv. Caplan,' in order
to vest jurisdiction in the supreme court upon the ground that the issues

involve the construction of the Constitution of the United States or of this
state, 2 the raising of such issues is not a mere matter of form, and the constitutional question must, in fact, exist in order to confer appellate jurisdiction on the supreme court. In that case defendant contended that the Home
Owners' Loan Corporation could not maintain an action in this state because

it was a foreign corporation and had not complied with the law so as to
authorize it to do business in this state; and the constitutional question
sought to be raised was the claim that, to permit it to maintain an action
upon a redemption bond constituted a denial to defendants of the right of
due process. After pointing to prior decisions holding that the HOLC is not
a foreign corporation, 3 the court held that all questions raised could be
determined without reference to either the state or Federal Constitution,
and transferred the cause to the court of appeals.
The due process clause of the Constitution cannot be utilized as the
basis for a constitutional question vesting appellate jurisdiction in the
supreme court where the contention made is that the decision below is
merely erroneous. In Van Emelen v. Van Emelen4 plaintiffs had obtained a
default decree of divorce upon constructive service. At a subsequent term
the trial court set the decree aside. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the
action of the trial court did not accord him due process. The supreme court
*Attorney, Kansas City. LL.B., Kansas City School of Law, 1912.
1. 349 Mo. 353, 160 S. W. (2d) 754 (1942).
2. Mo. CoNsT. ART. VI, § 12, 29 Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. p. 179.
3. Hillis v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 348 Mo. 601, 154 S. W. (2d) 761
(1941); Homan v. Connett, 348 Mo. 244, 152 S. W. (2d) 1053 (1941).
4. 162 S. W. (2d) 272 (Mo. 1942).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1943
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held that the contention made amounted only to a claim that the trial
court's action was erroneous, a matter to be raised and corrected by appeal,
and transferred the cause to the court of appeals.
Similarly, in Findey v. Finley5 plaintiff filed a petition seeking to modify a prior decree of divorce so as to grant plaintiff alimony. To that petition
defendant filed a motion to strike upon the ground that the facts pleaded
were not sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court to grant the relief
sought by the plaintiff. Appeal was taken to the supreme court from an
order sustaining the motion to strike and it was contended that the order
constituted a denial of due process. The supreme court, in holding that the
sole question was whether or not the petition stated facts sufficient to invoke
the court's jurisdiction, points out that the ruling does not necessarily mean
a denial of due process within the meaning of the Constitution, nor does
it call for a construction of any constitutional provision. As said in the
opinion, "If this court should retain jurisdiction of this appeal, then in any
suit where a demurrer to a petition is sustained by the trial court the losing
party can vest this court with appellate jurisdiction by merely stating in
the motion for new trial that the judgment of the trial court violated the
due process clause." The cause was transferred to the court of appeals.
In Jutengel v. City of GlendaleO the appeal was from a decree enjoining
the City of Glendale from enforcing an ordinance regulating and licensing
tourist camps. The ordinance was assailed in the trial court on five separate
grounds, one of which was the ground that its enforcement would deprive
defendants of their property and rights without due process of law. Other
grounds included the claim that the city was without authority under the
statutes to enact the ordinance in question and that the same was unreasonable and arbitrary. In transferring the cause to the court of appeals the
supreme court doubted the sufficiency of the pleadings to raise the constitutional question because the language employed constituted a mere legal
conclusion, but placed its holding upon the well settled rule that, before
appellate jurisdiction can be based upon the fact that a constitutional issue
is involved, it must appear from the record that the construction of the
constitution was essential to a determination of the case and, in fact, controlled the decision appealed from. It affirmatively appeared from the record
that the trial court did not consider the constitutional question at all but
5. 165 S. W. (2d) 417 (Mo. 1942).
6. 161 S. W. (2d) 408 (Mo. 1942).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol8/iss4/3
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placed its decision squarely upon other grounds. Actually, the decision of
the trial court turned upon the construction of the statutory law of the
state rather than the construction of any constitutional provision; thus
appellate jurisdiction was held to be in the court of appeals.
Even in those cases where a constitutional question has been timely
raised, the right to an appellate review in the supreme court may be lost
by the failure to preserve the constitutional question either in the trial court
or in the supreme court. In Red School District No. 1 of St. Charles County
v. West Alton School District No. 2 of St. Charles County 7 a constitutional
question was properly raised in the pleadings, but, after an adverse result in
the court below, the losing party failed to make any reference to the constitutional question in its motion for new trial. It was held that, because
of that failure, appellate jurisdiction was in the court of appeals, and the
case was transferred. Likewise, in Shanks v. St. Joseph Finance and Loan
Company8 a constitutional question, sufficient to give the supreme court
jurisdiction, was raised by the ruling of the court upon a motion to strike
a part of the petition. The motion to strike and the ruling were preserved
by a term bill of exceptions but the point was not renewed in the motion
for new trial, nor was the motion for new trial preserved by any bill of exceptions. Consequently, the court held that no constitutional question was
properly preserved for appellate review and transferred the cause to the
court of appeals. So, also, in Mueller v. KlinhartPthe supreme court declined
to take jurisdiction on the ground that a constitutional question was involved
where the appellant failed to make any reference to that constitutional question in his assignment of errors filed in the supreme court.
In Motchar v. Hollingsworth,1 ° an action in ejectment in which plaintiff relied upon a tax title, the defendant pleaded that plaintiff's tax title
was void because the Jones-Munger law, under which the tax sale was held,
is unconstitutional. The decree below was in favor of defendant and plaintiff's appeal was prosecuted to the supreme court both upon the theory that
a constitutional question was involved and upon the theory that title to
real estate is involved. The court, however, held that the so-called constitutional question was not necessarily essential to a determination of the

7.
8.
9.
10.

159
163
164
162

S. W.
S. W.
S. W.
S. W.

(2d)
(2d)
(2d)
(2d)

676 (Mo. 1942).
1017 (Mo. 1942).
928 (Mo. 1942).
805 (Mo. 1942).
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case and that there were other issues upon which it could have been decided;
that even if a constitutional question had originally been involved it was
not kept alive by reference thereto in the motion for new trial. Responding
to the claim that title to real estate was involved, the court again points
to the rule that, in order to confer appellate jurisdiction upon the supreme
court upon that ground, the judgment appealed from must directly affect
or operate upon the title, and that, as has been repeatedly held, an action
in ejectment is a possessory action and not one for the purpose of having
title adjudicated. The cause was transferred to the court of appeals.
In Harrell v. S'urface," an action to foreclose a deed of trust in which
the trial court found that the lien of the deed of trust had been extinguished
by subsequent tax sales, the cause was transferred to the court of appeals
because the relief sought by the petition was a mere foreclosure and judgment for the deficiency, if any, and the determination of title was not asked
by either side. In that case the court again announced the rule that "an
action to foreclose a real estate mortgage or deed of trust on real estate does
not involve title to real estate within the meaning of Sec. 12 of Art. 6, Constitution, so as to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction of this appeal." So,
also, in Gebauer v. Gebauer, 2 a suit to partition land where the appeal was
from a finding of the trial court that the land could not be partitioned in
kind, the supreme court held that such question in no way involved title
to real estate in the jurisdictional sense and transferred the cause to the
court of appeals.
It is well to note, however, that the courts of appeals do not have
jurisdiction over ejectment actions in every case. The rule is subject to the
exception, as stated in Avddridge v. Spraggin,13 that where an equitable defense is invoked and affirmative title relief is asked for, then the action does
involve title to real estate and the supreme court has jurisdiction. The
right to invoke an equitable defense having been preserved by statute' 4 it
follows that an ejectment action "where defenses either legal or equitable
are invoked and a title determination sought, the judgment or decree may
adjudicate title."

11. 349 Mo. 370, 160 S. W. (2d) 756 (1942).
12. 163 S. W. (2d) 944 (Mo. 1942).
13. 349 Mo. 858, 163 S. W. (2d) 1042 (1942).
14. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1684.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol8/iss4/3
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In Clevenger v. McAfee" the issue before the trial court was whether
or not the plaintiffs, or certain intervenors, were the duly elected and acting
trustees of a church and entitled to control the use and occupancy of
the church property. Holding that the trustees do not own the church
property but merely act and hold title in a representative capacity, the
church itself having control of the property, the case was transferred to
the court of appeals because the judgment appealed from could not in any
event effect the actual title to the church property.
In Rice v. G-riffitk,16 an action by a purchaser to recover damages for
a breach by vendors of a contract for the sale of realty, where the vendors
sought specific performance of the contract, the judgment sought by vendors
and rendered in their favor was held to operate directly on the title to real
estate so as to vest appellate jurisdiction in the supreme court. That case,
also, is an illustration of that class of cases where equitable relief sought
in the pleadings requires an adjudication of title vesting appellate jurisdiction
in the supreme court.
The necessity that title must be directly involved to give the supreme
court jurisdiction on that ground is again emphasized in Mexico Refractories
Company v. Roberts, 7 a suit to enjoin the removal of fire clay from a certain tract of land, where the court, in transferring the case to the court of
appeals, states: "It is true that title to real estate is incidentally or collaterally involved, but it is not directly involved so as to take title from one
litigant and give it to another." The fact that the petition in that case alleged
the value of the fire clay to be more than $7500.00 was unavailing to give
the supreme court jurisdiction, because the undisputed evidence showed
that the value was not more than $4900.00.
Before the jurisdiction of the supreme court can be supported upon the
ground that the appeal involves more than $7500.00, there must be an
affirmative showing in the record that such amount is, in fact, involved.
Thus, in Dyas v. Dyas," a declaratory judgment action for the construction
of a will with respect to a $30,000.00 trust estate, the only question at issue
was the right of temporary control of the trust estate, and, because the value
of that temporary control was not affirmatively shown in the record, the

15.
16.
17.
18.

165
349
161
163

S. W. (2d) 411 (Mo. 1942).
Mo. 373, 161 S. W. (2d) 220 (1942).
S. W. (2d) 420 (Mo. 1942).
S. W. (2d) 557 (Mo. 1942).
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cause was transferred to the court of appeals. Again, in Odom v. Langston,"9
a suit in equity to declare void a certain trust agreement, there was no
affirmative showing of jurisdictional amount and the cause was transferred
to the court of appeals.
The supreme court is clothed with jurisdiction over cases where a county
or other political subdivision of the state or any state officer is a party.
Boards and commissions, created by state law and established as public
corporations, such as the public service commission and others, have been
held to be neither political subdivisions or state officers; but the members
of such board, in their official capacity, are state officers. In Department of
Penal Institutions v. Wymore,20 a suit for a declaratory judgment brought
by the department and the individual members of the commission to construe the Drivers License Act as applied to the plaintiffs while in the performance of their statutory duties, the supreme court retained jurisdiction
notwithstanding the fact that the Department of Penal Institutions is a
quasi public corporation. Holding that the department itself was not a
necessary party and that the question at issue was the responsibility of the
individual commissioners for their conduct as state officers, jurisdiction was
sustained upon the ground that the individual commissioners, state officers,
would be vitally affected by the results of the case. Conversely, in State
ex rel. Handla v. Wilkie Land Company, 21 a proceeding in quo warranto
brought in the name of the attorney general to forfeit a corporate charter,
the court held that the individual making the complaint against the corporation was the real party in interest and the attorney general only the instrumentality necessary to start the action, and that, since the action was
brought at the relation of an individual he, and not the attorney general,
is the real party in interest in the constitutional sense. Consequently, jurisdiction could not be sustained upon the ground that a state officer is a party
-and the cause was transferred to the court of appeals. These two cases illustrate the principle that the jurisdictional status is controlled by the real
party in interest and not by the nominal party in interest.
Incorporated cities are not political subdivisions of the state, and city
officers are not state officers within the meaning of the constitutional provisions relating to the jurisdiction of the supreme court. For that reason
19. 159 S. W. (2d) 686 (Mo. 1942).
20. 165 S. W. (2d) 618 (Mo. 1942).
21. 349 Mo. 666, 162 S. W. (2d) 846 (1942).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol8/iss4/3
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the court transferred the appeals in Stratton v. City of Warrensburg,22 a
suit by a city street commissioner for his salary, and State ex rel. and to
use of Bouckaert Brothers v. Mathews, 3 a suit involving the Merchants
License laws of the City of St. Louis.
ABSTRACTS AND BRIEFS
During the year under review the court found it necessary to dismiss
only one case for failure to comply with its rules. In that case, Kleinschmidt
v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Company24 the appellant's brief contained
twenty-four assignments of error couched only in general language, followed
by eleven paragraphs of points and authorities all of which consisted of
mere abstract statements of law without any attempt to show their relationship to the errors complained of on the appeal. In dismissing the appeal
the court states: "The rule here invoked is promulgated not only to aid this
court in dispatching its work, but also to guard against the disturbance of
nisi prius judgments except upon a full and fair presentation of the whole
record."
The court refused to dismiss the appeal in Smith v. Thompson and
Henwood25 upon respondent's complaint that the jurisdictional statement
required by Rule 15 followed the statement of facts instead of appearing at
the opening of the brief. "We think," said the court, "the objection hypercritical."

In Columbian National Life Insurance Company v. Dubinsky26 the
court sustained a motion to strike certain exhibits from the record because
those exhibits had not been included in the bill of exceptions, either by direct
reproduction therein, or by direction to the clerk to copy the same; but
declined to dismiss the appeal for failure to preserve all the evidence because
"there is enough in the record to show at least some of the material substance of these admittedly executed documents and the whole record plainly
discloses that the result reached by the trial court was wrong."
FINALTY OF DECISIONS

The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Gorman v.
Washington University27 declined to review a decision of Division 1 of the
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

159
159
165
349
349
316

S. W. (2d) 766 (Mo. 1942).
S. W. (2d) 767 (Mo. 1942).
S. W. (2d) 620 (Mo. 1942).
Mo. 396, 161 S. W. (2d) 232 (1942).
Mo. 299, 160 S. W. (2d) 727 (1942).
U. S. 98, 62 S.Ct. 962 (1941).
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Supreme Court of Missouri because no application had been made to transfer
the cause to the court en bane and consequently the decision of Division 1
was not regarded by the Supreme Court of the United States as a decision
of the highest court in which a decision could be had. Prompted by that
ruling in the Gorman case the losing party in Sckeufler v. Manufacturing
Lumbermen's Underwriters,28 desiring to seek a review of a decision by
Division 2 by the Supreme Court of the United States filed duplicate motions
to transfer to the court en bane, one in Division 2 and one before the court
en bane itself. The court en bane, however, refused to depart from its previous ruling to the effect that the court en bane has no power to order a
cause transferred from divisions, analyzing the Gorman decision with care,
and clearly demonstrating the fact that the Gorman decision only requires
that an application to transfer to the court en bane must be made in the
division which rendered the opinion sought to be reviewed.
THE RIGHT OF APPEAL
2
the giving
As pointed out in State ex rel. Yale University v. SartoriuSo

of an appeal bond is not a prerequisite to the right of appeal, and the trial
court has no right to deny an appeal in a case where a party has announced
his intention to appeal without bond merely because the court may be of
the opinion that further proceedings in the cause would be delayed pending
such an appeal. Since the party desiring to appeal is an aggrieved party
within the meaning of the statute, the appeal must be allowed. But, as
stated in the companion case of State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Company
v. SartoriUs3o the question as to whether or not trustees who have sought
directions as to the administration of the trust by a proceeding in equity
are aggrieved parties "presents many interesting features." According to the
opinion in that case it cannot be held that under no circumstances can a
trustee appeal from a judgment or decree determining rights between the
parties entitled to the estate but, in general, a trustee will not be considered
a party aggrieved by a decree determining distributees in a suit brought
by him for instructions in that regard.
There must, of course, be a final judgment before there can be an appeal. In Rowe v. Hizar3l the court held that no appeal would lie from an
28.
29.
30.
31.

349
349
164
163

Mo. 855, 163 S. W. (2d) 749 (1942).
Mo. 1039, 163 S.W. (2d) 981 (1942).
S.W. (2d) 356 (Mo. 1942).
S.W. (2d) 566 (Mo.1942).
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order of the circuit court sustaining a motion to quash a writ of summons
and the sheriff's return, because such an order is not a final judgment in
the case. Again, in Webster v. Sterling Finance Company,32 where the trial
court had rendered a judgment on the pleadings in favor of certain defendants but had entered no judgment with respect to other defendants, the
supreme court dismissed, as premature, an appeal from the judgment so
rendered, holding that the record failed to show that a final judgment has
been rendered disposing of all parties to the litigation.
In Personal Finance Company v. Day,33 an appeal from an order enjoining defendants from engaging in a business competitive with the business
of plaintiff for a period of one year, the appeal was dismissed as moot because the injunction expired by its own terms while the appeal was pending
and before the case was presented for decision upon its merits in the appellate court.

CRIMINAL LAW
LAWRENCE HOLmAN*

During the year 1942, the supreme court was only called upon to decide
twenty-nine criminal appeals as compared with forty-five, during the preceding year. This apparent decline in criminal litigation can probably be
attributed to two factors resulting from war conditions, to-wit: (1) More
prosperous economic conditions; (2) The percentage of our population now
in the armed forces.
There were very few cases decided during the year which contained
new or novel questions, and as usual, most of the cases were disposed of by
the application of established rules of law to the particular factual situations
involved. For obvious reasons, many such cases will not be noted in this
review.
For several years the trend of the decisions in criminal cases has been
towards minimizing the importance of form, and relaxing the great strictness
and technical accuracy required at common law.1 During 1942, the court
continued to make satisfactory progress toward that goal.
32. 165 S. W. (2d) 688 (Mo. 1942).
33. 349 Mo. 1139, 164 S. W. (2d) 273 (1942).
*Attorney, Moberly, Missouri. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1929.
1. (1942) 7 Mo. L. REv. 461.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1943
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INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION

In State v. Joknson,2 complaint was made of the information because
it was not shown in the jurat that the person signing it did so as prosecuting
attorney. The body of the information, however, did allege that such person
was the duly elected, qualified and acting prosecuting attorney. The court
properly held the information sufficient as it did, in fact, show that it was
signed by the prosecuting attorney of the county.
The indictment in State v. Tyler,3 was challenged because signed by a
person alleged not to be prosecuting attorney. The facts were that the
prosecuting attorney was ousted from office by the supreme court by an
opinion filed on September 3; the motion for rehearing, however, not being
overruled until November 9 of the same year. The prosecuting attorney
continued to hold office during that interim, when he signed this indictment.
The court held that he was not a mere usurper or intruder, and whatever
may have been his legal status as between himself and the state, he was at
least a de facto officer during the time between the filing of the original
opinion and the determination of his motion for rehearing, and so far as the
public and third persons were concerned, his acts during said period were
not null and void.
In State v. Darby,4 the information charged larceny of "$300.00 in good
and lawful currency of the United States of America." It will be noted
that this charge did not alleged that the $300.00 was money, or allege its
value, as is usually and customarily done. The court, however, held that
the words "dollars and currency" are words which are generally understood
to mean money or cash, and for that reason the information was held valid.
II. THE TRIAL
A. Jurors
In State v. Butts,5 the trial court refused to sustain a challenge for
cause to a Kansas City police officer on the panel. The trial was held in
Jackson County, and the chief of police was a material witness for the state.
The supreme court very properly followed its previous opinions0 disqualify-

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

349
349
165
349
See

Mo. 910, 163 S.W. (2d) 780
Mo. 167, 159 S.W. (2d) 777
S.W. -(2d) 419 (Mo.1942).
Mo.213, 159 S.W. (2d) 790
State v.Langley, 342 Mo.447,
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ing other law enforcement officers from jury service, and held that the
challenge should have been sustained.
The complaint was made in State v. Clymer,7 that the jurors constituting the special venire were not selected from the various townships of the
county. It was held that the statutes governing the selection of a jury are
directory only, and in the absence of a showing of prejudice, the failure to
follow the strict requirement of the statute will not be considered reversible
error.
In State v. Hailey,8 the court ordered the sheriff to pick up six men
to complete the panel. The defendant alleged error because most of the
prospective jurors came from the same community, and three of the men
were members of an anti-thief association. The evidence disclosed that the
sheriff did not know of their membership in the organization, and that he
had sought good, reputable citizens in complying with the court's order.
There was no showing of partiality or prejudice, and the court refused to
allow appellant's contention that his rights had been prejudiced.
It appeared from the record in State v. Nichols,9 that a general panel
of twenty-four jurors was provided where the statute required thirty. The
question was raised for the first time in the motion for new trial. The court
refused to consider the alleged error, holding that objections to the panel
must be made at the proper time, and exceptions saved. The appellant's
right to a panel of thirty jurors was one which he could and did waive by
his failure to object.
B. Constitutional questions
Notwithstanding the fact that our court has repeatedly held that confessions obtained by means of promises or through fear or violence are
inadmissible in evidence, the court in State v. Butts, supra, commented on
the fact that the number of cases involving this question seem not to be
on the decline. In that case the defendant was charged with having murdered an eight year old girl. It appeared from the state's own evidence that
the defendant was questioned almost continuously for the eighteen hours
following his arrest, and then signed a confession. It appeared that he became greatly fatigued and was twice taken to the scene of the crime, on one
of which occasions a large crowd having assembled there in mob fashion.
7. 159 S. W. (2d) 808 (Mo. 1942).
8. 165 S. W. (2d) 422 (Mo. 1942).
9. 165 S. W. (2d) 674 (Mo. 1942).
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It further appeared that the defendant's family were all arrested, handcuffed, and defendant was permitted to view them in the showup room
and hear the officers questioning his wife. From the state's own evidence,
the supreme court held the confession should not have been admitted, as
same was involuntary as a matter of law, and obtained in violation of the
constitutional provision guaranteeing due process of law.
The defendant, in State v. Wilkerson," was convicted of receiving a
stolen automobile. It appeared that the automobile was obtained from his
premises by the officers, by authority of a search warrant which was illegal.
Motion to quash the evidence was sustained immediately prior to the trial.
At the end of the first day of the trial, the sheriff purported to deliver possession of the automobile to the defendant by giving him the keys (although
defendant was confined in jail). Immediately thereafter, the sheriff purported to re-seize the car where it was held in storage, and the officers made
certain tests revealing that the motor number had been changed, and on the
next day were permitted to testify concerning their examination of said
motorcar, and the result of such tests. It was held that the evidence was
obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure, as the officers were permitted to do indirectly,
exactly what they could not do directly.
C. Evidence

In State v. Clymer, swpra, evidence of threats by the defendant against
the deceased, made four months prior to the homicide, were held not too
remote where they were renewed on the day of the homicide, and which
latter threats referred to the bad feeling originating at the time of the previous threats.
In State v. Simner,11 the court reversed a conviction of manslaughter
as a result of culpable negligence in driving an automobile, because of the
state's failure to produce direct evidence as to the nature of the injuries
sustained by the deceased, and that these injuries caused his death. It
appeared that an automobile driven by the defendant, collided with an automobile driven by the deceased, and that following the collision, the deceased
was found lying in the road, with a bloody spot near him, and that he was
immediately taken to the hospital and died about eight hours later. The
10. 349 Mo. 205, 159 S. W. (2d) 794 (1942).
11. 167 S. W. (2d) 376 (Mo. 1943).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol8/iss4/3

16

et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court

1943]

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1942

239

court stated that proof of deceased's death, as a result of the collision, constituted an element of the corpus delicti, and that failure to prove the
corpus delicti violated an ancient rule for the protection of the accused,
which could not be overlooked. While it would have been easy to have
produced direct evidence as to the nature of the injuries causing the death
of the deceased, it nevertheless occurs to the writer that the circumstantial
evidence on this point should have been ample proof, in the absence of any
controversy on this issue.
A conviction of taking a motor vehicle with intent to embezzle the
same, was reversed because of insufficient evidence in the case of State v.
LaFranoe.12 It appeared that the defendant obtained the car from his employer in the county where the prosecution took place, and sold it in another
county, keeping the proceeds. It further appeared that he had fraudulent
intent at the time he obtained possession. The court held that under these
circumstances the 6rime was larceny and not embezzlement or intent to
embezzle, as such latter crimes require that possession be honestly acquired,
and the decision to convert, be made later. The rule seems to be well
established in this state, although it appears to the writer to be a very
technical distinction.
A conviction for statutory rape was likewise reversed outright, in the
case of State v. McCrackin,s where it appeared that the only evidence was
the testimony of the prosecutrix, who was fifteen years of age and mentally
subnormal. The witness contradicted herself upon direct and cross-examination, upon almost every fact to which she testified. It was held that the
jury should not be permitted to speculate or guess as to which statements
of the witness should be accepted, and that such evidence would not sustain a conviction.
In State v. Herman,1 4 appellant was convicted of obtaining money
under false pretenses. It appeared that on a certain day, he went to a bank
and asked the balance of his account. He was informed by the cashier that
the ledger showed he had written three checks, totaling $120.00, and that
his balance was $105.00. The appellant stated that those were the only
checks he had written, and the cashier then honored his check for the balance
of his account. It developed that a little earlier that morning, another
12. 165 S. W. (2d) 624 (Mo. 1942).
13. 162 S. W. (2d) 853 (Mo. 1942).
14. 162 S. W. (2d) 873 (Mo. 1942).
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employee of the bank had cashed certain of defendant's checks at the window, totaling $51.00, which had not yet been recorded on the ledger sheet.
A judgment of conviction was reversed outright, the court holding that the
banker was under a duty to avail himself of the means at hand, to determine
the truth or falsity of the defendant's representation that he had only cashed
the three checks. The cashier could have examined the files and learned of
the other checks. It was pointed out that the defendant did not make any
direct representation as to the amount of the balance of his account. It
occurs to the writer that the court might have upheld this conviction on
the theory that the cashier relied upon the defendant's representation as to
the number of checks written, and was under no duty to make a thorough
investigation as to the truth of such representation. Of course, the defendant undoubtedly could have been prosecuted and convicted of a misdemeanor under the fraudulent check statute.,
D. Instructions

State v. Kmbroug~l is a leading case on the question of instructions
under the Habitual Criminal Act. In this case there was documentary evidence tending to prove appellant's prior conviction, sentence and discharge,
and in addition to this the appellant voluntarily testified on both direct
and cross-examination in the presence of the court and jury, admitting such
facts. It was alleged that the trial court erred in giving an instruction for
the state which in substance told the jury that if they found that the appellant committed the theft and had previously been convicted, etc., then they
would find the appellant guilty, and assess his punishment at five years (the
maximum), but unless they so found the facts, they would acquit him. The
appellant contended that the instruction should submit the issue of prior
conviction separately or alternatively, authorizing a punishment less than
the maximum if the jury found appellant guilty of the offense but did not
find the facts concerning the prior conviction. The opinion carefully reviews the previous decisions on the point, and admits some of them were
partly wrong and that there was a need for clarification. It was then held
that where the evidence is not conclusive on the question of former conviction, it is proper to submit conjunctively the dual issues of former conviction and guilt of the offense charged, with a direction to assess the maxMo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 4695.
16. 166 S. W. (2d) 1077 (Mo. 1942).

15.
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imum punishment in the event of an affirmative finding, but in such instance, the court must also submit the issue of former conviction alternatively, thereby authorizing a sentence of less than the maximum in the event
they do not find the facts as alleged concerning such former conviction. In

this case, however, it was held that the defendant had made a judicial admission of his prior conviction and therefore, there was no reason for submitting that fact separately and alternatively as it was not an issue for the
jury, and the instruction given was not error.
It was again necessary in 1942 to reverse and remand a case1 7 because

the court gave an instruction to the effect that voluntary statements made
by the defendant tending to establish his guilt, were presumed to be true,
etc. Such instructions have been declared reversible error in a number of
previous decisions by the court.
In State v. Hailey, supra,the defendant was convicted of embezzlement
while serving as a county collector. He complained of an instruction which
in substance told the jury that if they found and believed from the evidence
that the defendant unlawfully converted the money received by him as such
public officer to his own use they would be authorized to infer therefrom the
criminal intent to embezzle same. The court held the instruction proper,
pointing out that the statute relating to embezzlement by public officials
was materially different from other sections relating to embezzlement by
individuals. A higher degree of fidelity is exacted on the part of officers
with respect to public moneys, than obtains where private funds and private
individuals are involved. This opinion squarely holds that there need be
no finding of specific intent to embezzle in such cases, basing its ruling on
the statute which forbids the act, not the act plus a specific intent.
In State v. Jolmnson, supra, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder. Complaint was made that the instruction on second degree
murder was erroneous because it did not refer to the defense of self-defense.
The instruction did refer to another instruction defining, among other terms,
"malice aforethought." That instruction defined malice aforethought as "a
condition of mind which prompts a person-to intentionally take the life of
another without just cause, justification or excuse." The self-defense theory
was submitted in a separate instruction. The court held the principal instruction was not erroneous in omitting reference to self-defense, because
17. State v. Luna, 162 S. W. (2d) 859 (Mo. 1942).
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it did refer to the definition instruction which informed the jury that the
defendant did not commit the act with malice aforethought if he had
justification or excuse therefor. This is a rather extreme construction to
place on the instruction complained of, and it is doubtful whether the opinion was entirely in harmony with previous decisions of the court.
E. Argument of counsel
In State v. Higkfihll,18 the defendant interrupted the prosecuting attorney during his argument, and it appeared that the prosecuting attorney
turned to him and said "you will have your inning when the jury comes in."
The court sustained an objection to the argument and instructed the jury
to disregard the statements, but denied the motion to discharge the jury.
The supreme court upheld the trial judge in his refusal to declare a mistrial.
It properly held that the defendant was in the wrong in interrupting the
prosecuting attorney's argument and the instruction to the jury to disregard
the remarks was sufficient.
The opinion in State v. Collins"9 contains a splendid discussion of the
question of when a witness is considered peculiarly available to one party
as compared with the other. In that case the defendant was arrested by a
constable upon the complaint of one Puckett. Puckett's name was endorsed
on the information and he was subpoenaed by the state and was in the
court room during the trial, but not used. The defendant's attorney in his
argument commented upon the failure of the state to use the witness. The
prosecuting attorney, in his dosing argument, answered this by arguing that
the defendant had a right to put Puckett on the stand had he wanted to.
An objection to this argument was overruled. The supreme court reversed
and remanded the case, holding that under the circumstances, Puckett was
peculiarly available to the state, and the defendant had a right to argue
to the jury, the unfavorable inference that could be drawn from the state's
failure to call the witness, and the state had no right to destroy that inference by arguing that the defendant could have called him.
Another interesting example of improper argument is discussed in State
v. Richardson.2° In that case the defendant was convicted of statutory rape
upon his fourteen year old daughter. In the argument, the assistant circuit
attorney referred to the prosecutrix as a child who was destined to have her
18. 165 S. W. (2d) 642 (Mo. 1942).
19. 165 S.W. (2d) 647 (Mo. 1942).
20. 349 Mo. 1103, 163 S.W. (2d) 956 (1942).
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illusions of morality shattered by her father when only two or three years
older than Mr. Frein's (a juror) daughter. An objection was overruled.
Again during his closing argument, the same counsel told the jury they
owed a duty to their children and the children of society to convict "this
sevual beast." Motion for mistrial was overruled by the trial court. The
supreme court held the argument sufficiently prejudicial to require a reversal. In discussing the situation the court pointed out that this case was
brim full of everything likely to excite human prejudice from the beginning;
that because of the revulsion that naturally would be aroused by the evidence, the state's counsel was under a duty to use particular care and
restraint to refrain from any conduct that might tend to excite more
prejudice.
F. ITsanity after judgment

State v. Brockingtoi21 was not decided on its merits during 1942, but
an interesting opinion was written during the year in ruling upon a motion
to modify, filed by the attorney general. The defendant had been convicted
of murder and sentenced to death. On March 25, 1931, the judgment was
affirmed. Pending the appeal, the governor had advised the sheriff that
he was in receipt of information casting doubt on the sanity of the defendant.
Under proceedings instituted by the sheriff, the defendant was found insane. Thereupon the governor ordered the sentence suspended, and the
defendant committed to the state hospital for treatment, the superintendent
thereof being directed to give notice to the governor when the defendant
was restored to his reason so that the governor could then order execution
of the sentence. The defendant escaped from the state hospital shortly
thereafter and was not apprehended until September, 1941. It appeared that
about a year after the defendant's escape, an order was made by the superintendent of the state hospital, under authority of the president of the board
of managers, to the effect that the defendant was discharged. The attorney
general filed a motion to modify the judgment to provide for defendant's
execution by use of lethal gas rather than by hanging. The court overruled the motion, holding that the hospital officials had no authority to
make an order discharging a defendant admitted under such circumstances.
That the proper procedure is for the hospital authorities to notify the
governor when the patient is restored to reason, to the end that the judg21. 349 Mo. 662, 162 S. W. (2d) 860 (1942).
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ment and sentence of the court, temporarily suspended, be carried into
execution, in accordance with due process of law. The court has previously
held that execution of the death sentence after the effective date of the Act
of 1937, should be by the administration of lethal gas, notwithstanding the
conviction was had while the law providing for execution by hanging, was
22
in effect.

EVIDENCE
WARREN L. WHITE*
There were few opinions rendered by the Supreme Court of Missouri
in 1942 which raised novel questions of the law of evidence or contained
elaborate discussions of the application of previously settled principles to
new fact situations. As a result, a survey of these decisions must consist
largely of a simple statement of the holding of the court in making such
application.
I. JUDICIAL NOTICE

Thus the court decided that it had judicial knowledge of the distance
between cities in this state,1 the ordinary rate of speed at which a man
walks, 2 and the well known habits of domestic animals, e.g., that a dog will
run beside the front wheels of a moving vehicle rather than behind it,3 but
the court does not judicially know that fractured bones are permanent
injuries.4
II. PRESUMPTIONS AND INFERENCES
In Van Brock v. The First National Bank,' the court observed that
an inference cannot be based on evidence which is uncertain or speculative
but must be supported by a proven fact. Any number of inferences may
be drawn by a jury in a given case so long as each has a factual foundation.
And in Missouri Power and Light Company v. Buckling the court pointed
22. State v. Brown, 342 Mo. 53, 112 S. W. (2d) 568 (1937).
*Circuit Judge, Springfield. A. B., Drury College, 1905.
1. Klotsch v. Collier & Sons Corp., 349 Mo. 40, 159 S. W. (2d) 589 (1942).
2. Rosenberg v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 159 S. W. (2d) 633
(Mo. 1942).
3. Lloyd v. Alton R. R., 348 Mo. 1222, 159 S.W. (2d) 267 (1942).
4. State ex rel. Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Shain, 165 S. W. (2d)
428 (Mo. 1942).
5. 349 Mo. 425, 161 S. W. (2d) 258 (1942).
6. 349 Mo. 789, 163 S. W. (2d) 561 (1942).
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out that a presumption would not be allowed where the party seeking its
indulgence had evidence of the fact. Where a presumption may properly
be found, it endures only until evidence of the fact appears, and when
evidence pro and con of the fact is introduced, the presumption, as such, adds
nothing to the weight of evidence, but drops out of the case.7 Thus, there is
a presumption that every person is sane, but this presumption vanishes when
evidence is introduced on that issue, and the instructions should not refer
to it.8

The court held that one who calls by telephone the office of a business
firm, and in a conversation with a person who answers the phone, makes
an appointment for a meeting with an agent of the firm, may testify to such
conversation, although he cannot identify the person with whom he'talked,
the presumption being that the person assuming the authority to transact
such business and with whom he talked was duly authorized. 9
There is a general presumption of proper action by a court but such a
presumption does not arise where an attack is made upon a judgment rendered against a minor based on a contract or stipulation, since the minor's
next friend had no authority to stipulate the judgment.'0
Generally when a condition of continuing nature is shown to exist at
one time, a presumption arises that the condition continues until the contrary is shown; but the presumption diminishes with the lapse of time at a
rate proportionate to the permanence of the fact in question, until it ceases
or is supplanted by an opposite inference."

III. DECLARATION OF AGENTS
In Mattan v. Hoover Company" the court held that the declaration of
an agent, made while in the performance of the principal's business, with
respect to his intention as to the performance of such business, is admissible
against the principal where the intent is a relevant fact in issue. And in
Brinkley v. United Biscuit Company of America 3 a statement made by the
driver of a truck involved in a collision, made a minute or two after the
7. Kellogg v. Murphy, 349 Mo. 1165, 164 S. W. (2d) 285 (1942).
8. State ex rel. United Mutual Ins. Ass'n. v. Shain, 349 Mo. 460, 162 S. W.
(2d) 255 (1942).
9. Mattan v. Hoover Co., 166 S. W. (2d) 557 (Mo. 1942).
10. Campbell v. Campbell, 165 S. W. (2d) 851 (Mo. 1942).
11. Missouri Power & Light Co. v. Bucklin, 349 Mo. 789, 163 S. W. (2d)
561 (1942).
12. 166 S. W. (2d) 557 (Mo. 1942).
13. 349 Mo. 1227, 164 S. W. (2d) 325 (1942).
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collision, to the effect that prior to the collision he had stopped to aid another
truck, was also admissible as part of the res gestae.

IV. DECEASED PERSONS
In Terminal RailroadAssociation of St. Louis v. Schmidt 14 the court held
that declarations made by a deceased person are admissible to show his state
of mind, but not to prove the facts asserted in the declaration.
V.

PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

The testimony given by a party in a former proceeding is not absolutely
binding upon him, but is to be weighed by the trier of facts.1 ,
Where a former proceeding was between the same parties and the same
issues were litigated as in the subsequent case, the testimony of a witness in
the first case who is unavailable in the second, may be read; but if the
issue on which the evidence given was only collaterally involved in the first
case so that there was no occasion to cross-examine the witnesses at that
time, then the record of his testimony may not be introduced in the subsequent litigation. Absolute identity of parties is not necessary to make such
testimony admissible. It is sufficient when there is privity between the
parties to the two cases or where there is an identity of interest. Thus where
a husband and wife were injured in the same accident and sued separately,
the testimony of a witness in the first action who testified only on the issue
of negligence could be read at the trial of the second action, the witness
being out of the state at the later date. The issue of neglect was identical
in both cases although the measure of damages involved different considerations. 16
VI. MISCELLANEOUS

In two cases the court held that unfavorable testimony given by a witness was not binding on the party calling him where there was other evidence

contradicting him,"1 but when a party calls his adversary who gives uncontradicted and unfavorable testimony, the evidence is binding.'
14. 349 Mo. 890, 163 S. W. (2d) 772 (1942).
15. Dent v. Dent, 166 S. W. (2d) 582 (Mo. 1942).
16. Bartlett v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 349 Mo. 13, 160 S. W. (2d)
740 (1942).

17. Summa v. Morgan Real Estate Co., 165 S. W. (2d) 390 (Mo. 1942);
Oetting v. Green, 166 S. W. (2d) 548 (Mo. 1942).
18.

Klotsch v. Collier & Sons Corp., 349 Mo. 40, 159 S. W. (2d) 589 (1942).
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EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES
RusH H.
I.

LIMBAUGH*

CERTIORARI

There was a substantial decline in the number of cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Missouri in 1942 involving the use of the extraordinary
writ of certiorari. Of the total of nine of such cases, eight were finally determined, and the other was transferred to a court of appeals. In one of the
cases the court reviewed a record of a state quasi-judicial tribunal; in two
of the cases the court reviewed on appeal decisions rendered in circuit
courts; and in six of the cases the court reviewed opinions of the courts
of appeals. In the case where the record of a state quasi-judicial tribunal
was reviewed the relator who sought the review was a federal agency.,
A. Used by circuit court and reviewed by supreme court on appeal
1. Jurisdiction of appeals from circuit courts in certiorari cases
In determining what courts have jurisdiction of appeals from circuit
courts in certioraricases the same rules apply as in other cases. Following
a decision in an earlier case, 2 the supreme court held in State ex rel. and to
Use of Bouckaert Bros. v. Matkews,3 that where a circuit court of the City
of St. Louis quashed a writ of certiorari granted by that court to review
a judgment of a municipal court of the City of St. Louis assessing a fine
for the violation of a city ordinance for failure to procure a city license tax,
jurisdiction to determine the appeal was in the St. Louis Court of Appeals,
since that court had jurisdiction to construe statutory enactments and since
no constitutional question was involved, and no construction of the revenue
laws of the state was necessary, and since the case did not involve the duties
of a state officer but only the duties of municipal officers whose duties are
limited to those of municipal functions not coextensive with the state. The
case was transferred to the St. Louis Court of Appeals.
But where the determination of an appeal from a judgment of a circuit
court quashing a writ of certiorariissued by the circuit court to a justice of
the peace to review a judgment by the justice for the recovery of sales taxes
*Attorney, Cape Girardeau. A.B., University of Missouri, 1916. Author of
PLEADING, PRAcTIcE, PRocEDuRE AND FoRMs IN MISSOURI

(1937).

1. State ex el. Ferguson, Federal Housing Administrator v. Donnell, 349
Mo. 975, 163 S. W. (2d) 940 (1942).
2. Fischbach Brewing Company v. St. Louis, 337 Mo. 1044, 87 S. W. (2d)
648 (1935).
3. 159 S. W. (2d) 767 (Mo. 1942).
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involved the construction of the revenue laws of the state, it was held in
State ex rel. and to Use of Berra v. Sestric4 that the supreme court had juris-

diction.
2. Review of decision on appeal by use of writ against inferior tribunal
So long as the writ is used to review the judicial action of an inferior
tribunal to determine whether it has proceeded illegally or beyond its jurisdiction, the remedy is ,available.5 In State ex rel. and to Use of Bouckaert
Bros. v. Matthews6 a circuit court used the writ to review a decision of a
judge of a police court in the City of St. Louis, and its action was reviewed
on appeal by the supreme court. In State ex rel. and to Use of Berra v.
Sestrid the supreme court reviewed on appeal the action of a circuit court
in using the writ against a justice of the peace.
B. To review records of quasi4udicial tribunals

The writ cannot be used to review administrative action,8 but if the
action is of a judicial nature, the writ can be used against the tribunal
exercising it, even though the tribunal is a quasi-judicial agency vested with
extensive administrative powersY Thus the Federal Housing Administrator,
in charge of certain personal property such as a motor bus to transport
tenants living in houses of the Federal Government in Missouri and other
like personal property used in the management of such real estate, used the
writ, though unsuccessfully, by a direct proceeding in the supreme court to
test the authority of the Governor of Missouri and other members of the
State Board of Equalization of Missouri to assess such personal property for
taxes for the State of Missouri in State ex rel. Ferguson v. Donnel. ° The
personal property had been acquired and was being used by the Federal
Housing Administrator in connection with Manhassett Village in St. Louis
County. An act of Congress provided that real property acquired by the
4. 349 Mo. 182, 159 S. W. (2d) 786 (1942).
L.

5. McBaine, The Writ of Certiorariin Missouri (1915) 6 U. or Mo. BULL.

7-8.
6. 159 S. W. (2d) 767 (Mo. 1942).
7. 349 Mo. 182, 159 S. W. (2d) 786 (1942).

SER.

8. McBaine, The Writ of Certiorariin Missouri (1915) 6 U. oF Mo. BULL.
L. SER. 7.
9. The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1941 (Extraordinary Legal Remedies) (1942) 7 Mo. L. REv. 377, 379; Work of the Missouri Supreme
Court for the Year 1940 (Extraordinary Legal Remedies) (1941) 6 Mo. L. REv.
432-433.

10. 349 Mo. 975, 163 S. W. (2d) 940 (1942).
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Administrator was not exempt from taxation by any state. The court held
that by implication that act of Congress authorized a state to tax personal
property held by the Federal Housing Administrator where such personal
property was necessary to the use of such real estate.
C. To review records of courts of appeals
Of the six opinions of courts of appeals reviewed by certiorariin 1942
three were reviewed by Division One of the court, one by Division Two of
the court, and two by the court en, banc. In two of the cases reviewed the
opinions were quashed in part; in four of the cases the writ was quashed. A
less number of decisions were reviewed and a less number were quashed than
has occurred in the last six years. 1
1. Limitations of inquiry as to conflict
In determining whether there is conflict between a decision of a court
of appeals and a prior controlling opinion of the supreme court, decisions
of courts of other jurisdictions may be considered if they aid the court in
deciding issues incident to the question of conflict. But in announcing and
applying this rule the court held, in State ex rel. Mutual Benefit Health,and
Accident Association v. Slzain,'12 that the question of conflict can be determined ultimately by reference only to the controlling decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri.
In State ex rel. Thompson v. Shaim8 and in State ex rel. Tramill v.
Shain,.4 the court adhered to its established rule that on certiorariit will look
solely to the opinion of the court of appeals on review for the facts of the
case decided.1 5
2. Rules observed in determining whether there is conflict
General statements in opinions alleged to be in conflict with the opinion
under review in certiorari are taken and considered in the light of the facts
ruled. If this rule, announced in State ex rel. United Mutual Insurance

11. The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1941 (Extraordinary Legal Remedies) (1942) 7 Mo. L. REv. 380.
12. 166 S. W. (2d) 484 (Mo. 1942).
13. 349 Mo. 1075, 163 S. W. (2d) 967 (1942).
14. 349 Mo. 82, 161 S. W. (2d) 974 (1942).
15. For a more complete statement of the rule as to the limitations within
which the court confines its inquiry on certiorari,see a discussion of the same subject in The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1941 (Extraordinary
Legal Remedies) (1941) 7 Mo. L. REv. 382-383.
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Association v. Shain,6 were not observed, it would be difficult to attain
that uniformity in opinions and harmony in the law which is the purpose
of certiorari. If only a part of an opinion of a court of appeals is in conflict
with a prior decision of the supreme court, that part of the opinion will be
quashed, though such action does not affect the judgment as a whole entered
by the court of appeals. This policy of the court previously announced 7
was followed in State ex rel. Bider v. Hughes.' But if that part of the
opinion of a court of appeals which conflicts with a prior decision of the
supreme court was not necessary to the decision reached by the court of
appeals, and the decision is not in conflict with a prior controlling decision
of the supreme court, that part of the opinion which conflicts, but which
was not necessary for the court to state in reaching its decision will not be
quashed on certiorari. This rule already established", was recognized and
followed in State ex rel. Thompson v. Skain.20
3. Specific instances of conflict
Where a plaintiff sustained injuries and his physician testified that it
was difficult to make a prognosis in a case like his, and that it would be
foolish to say whether plaintiff would be well in two years or twenty years,
the supreme court held in State ex rel. Kansas City Public Service Company
v. Shain2l that the evidence was insufficient to authorize a recovery for
permanent injuries, and quashed an opinion of a court of appeals which
held otherwise.
The supreme court has held2 2 that the purchaser at a sale foreclosing
the state's superior lien for taxes acquires an interest superior to those holding inferior liens, provided that the holders of inferior liens were made parties to the tax foreclosure proceedings. Under the Jones-Munger Act, when

16. 349 Mo. 460, 162 S. W. (2d) 255 (1942).
17. State ex rel. Brigance v. Smith, 345 Mo. 793, 135 S. W. (2d) 355 (1940)
referred to in The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1940 (Extraordinary Legal Remedies (1941) 6 Mo. L. REv. 436, n. 24.
18. 166 S. W. (2d) 516 (Mo. 1942).
19. In State ex Tel. Robb v. Shain, 347 Mo. 928, 149 S. W. (2d) 812 (1941),
and State ex rel. Nevins v. Hughes, 347 Mo. 968, 149 S. W. (2d) 836 (1941), discussed in The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1941 (Extraordi-naryLegal Remedies) (1942) 7 Mo. L. REv. 383, notes 28 and 29, the court referred to such part of the opinions which were in conflict but which were not quashed,
as obiter dictum, and refused to quash such conflicting portions of the opinions on
the ground that they were not decisions of any question before the court.
20. 349 Mo. 1075, 163 S. W. (2d) 967 (1942).
21. 165 S.W. (2d) 428 (Mo. 1942).
22. Richards v. Earls, 345 Mo. 260, 133 S. W. (2d) 381 (1939).
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a tax lien is foreclosed an advertisement gives notice to all persons having
an interest in the land sold, which has the effect of making the holders
of liens parties to the proceedings the same as if they had been joined as
defendants under the former tax foreclosure law. Such parties, however,
have the right to redeem. And, where a court of appeals ruled that a judgment entered for benefits assessed against land constituted a lien superior
to the interest acquired by a purchaser at a sale for general taxes, even
though the court of appeals stated that the lien for general taxes is superior
to the judgment lien, the supreme court in State ex rel. Biuder v. Hughes23
held that that portion of the opinion which was in conflict with the controlling opinion of the supreme court should be quashed. But, finding that
the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial
court in overruling a motion to quash an execution issued on the revived
judgment for benefit taxes was not in conflict with any prior controlling
decision, except as heretofore stated, the supreme court did not otherwise
disturb the opinion of the court of appeals.
4. Cases where there is no conflict
Where an insurance company actively participates in a case, that fact
may be made known if it affects the admissibility of evidence, weight to be
given testimony or credibility of a witness. But a plaintiff cannot mention
to a jury the fact that a liability insurance company is defending a case
merely to avoid anticipated unfavorable inferences because of his intention
not to call as his witnesses physicians who treated him at the instance of
the insurance company. Nor has a plaintiff the right to mention before the
jury that the insurance company is defending the case on ground that the
company had entirely substituted itself as a party defendant in place of the
record defendant. In State ex rel. Tramill v. Shain,24 the supreme court held
that a decision of a court of appeals that upheld these rules was not in conflict with any controlling decisions of the supreme court.
Failure of the administrator of a person named as beneficiary to tender
a refund of the amount paid to the beneficiary pursuant to a settlement of
a claim on the policy did not prevent the administrator from seeking to
escape the effect of the settlement on the ground that the beneficiary was
of unsound mind at the time of the settlement and the insurer knew it. And,
23. 166 S. W. (2d) 516 (Mo. 1942).
24. 349 Mo. 82, 161 S. W. (2d) 974 (1942).
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in action on a policy where the insurer pleaded a settlement with the beneficiary, and the beneficiary's administrator alleged that the settlement was
made when the beneficiary was not of sound mind, the giving of an instruction to the effect that the law presumes every person is sane was error,
since the evidence was conflicting as to beneficiary's sanity. In State ex rel.
United Mutual Insurance Association v. Shain,25 it was held that an opinion

of a court of appeals which announced these conclusions was not in conflict
with a prior controlling decision of the supreme court.
In State ex rel. Thompson v. Shain,28 it was held that where a court
of appeals decided in a case involving a railroad crossing accident that contributory negligence as a matter of law had not been established, but said
that evidence "which the jury was compelled to believe," was required to
overcome the presumption of due care on the part of the deceased, there
was no conflict because the decision of the court of appeals was correct,
though the stated ground on which it reached its decision was erroneous.
A statement and discussion of the principles of law controlling cases involving accidents at crossings is embraced in this opinion.
Where a court of appeals in a case involving an insurance policy finds
language in such policy ambiguous and construes the meaning of the ambiguous language, the supreme court on certiorariwill not quash the opinion
of the court of appeals, unless it has construed differently similar language
of a policy in a prior controlling opinion. And where a health and accident
policy provided for payment of benefits for disability resulting from disease,
but the policy did not cover death, disability, or other loss the insured may
have sustained while suffering from insanity or mental illness, a court of
appeals decided that insanity was not an excepted risk, the supreme court
in State ex rel. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Association v. Shain, 7

held that the decision was not in conflict with any prior decision of the
supreme court.
II. HABEAS CORPUS
The validity of an ordinance providing for smoke regulations in the
City of St. Louis was tested in a habeas corpus proceeding in Ballentine v.
Nester.2 8 The petitioner was convicted and fined for violating the ordinance.
25.
26.
27.
28.

349 Mo. 460, 162 S. W. (2d) 255 (1942).
349 Mo. 1075, 163 S. W. (2d) 967 (1942).
166 S. W. (2d) 484 (Mo. 1942).
164 S. W. (2d) 378 (Mo. 1942).
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After he refused to pay his fine, he was ordered into the custody of the
city marshall. He then filed in the supreme court a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in which he charged that the ordinance under which he was
convicted and was being held was in conflict with certain specified provisions
of the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of
Missouri and the Charter of the City of St. Louis. In discussion more
pertinent to other subjects of this review, the court decided the charges of
the petition adversely to the petitioner and ordered the petitioner remanded
to the city marshall.
Habeas corpus was used to test the validity of an order of a juvenile
court committing the custody of an illegitimate child to his maternal grandparents under the supervision of the probation officer of the court in Label
v. Sullivan.29 Although a prior similar proceeding by the same parties for
the same purpose and having the same result was had in the St. Louis Court
of Appeals,30 the question of res adjudicata was not discussed in the case
in the supreme court.
The case is important as to the procedural and substantive points decided. In a habeas corpus proceeding specific pleadings do not serve the
same purpose as in the ordinary civil case. There is first the petition for the
writ. Ordinarily the petition drops out of the case when a return to the
petition is filed. The return becomes the first or principal pleading. This
return can be traversed by the petitioner only by a reply. If petitioner does
not join issue by a reply, the facts alleged in the return are, by virtue of the
statute,31 taken as true. If no reply is filed, the respondent is entitled to
judgment, unless the parties agree to submit the case on 'the petition, the
return and agreed facts. If respondent does not take advantage of petitioner's failure to file a reply, he waives it. Where habeas corpus is used to test
the validity of a judgment or order of court under which a petitioner is held,
the court which issues the writ will not retry issues of fact or law on the
merits presented in the court whose judgment is questioned, but it will limit
its inquiry to jurisdictional issues.
The court held that since the petition in the juvenile court alleged and
the court found that the parents of the child of tender years had failed to
provide for it to such an extent as made him a neglected child, the court
29. 165 S. W. (2d) 639 (Mo. 1942).
30. Ex parte Label, 156 S. W. (2d) 37 (Mo. App. 1941).
31. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 1617.
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had jurisdiction, and since the court had jurisdiction to enter the order
committing the custody of the child, the supreme court remanded the child
to those having the right to its custody under that order.
III. MANDAMUS

Portions of what is generally known as the Jones-Munger Act, relating
particularly to the collection of delinquent taxes, were construed by the
supreme court in State ex rel. McGhee v. Bausmann and State ex rel. Becker
v. Baumann.3 2 Relators bought lands at sales under the Jones-Munger Act
and received certificates of purchase. After the expiration of the redemption
period they applied to the Collector of the Revenue for deeds to the lands
they had purchased. On the refusal of the collector to make and deliver
the deeds, they applied for writs of mandamus to compel the collector to
give them deeds. The court held that the alternative writs issued should
be quashed for the reasons that judgments against the same lands had been
rendered for taxes levied and due prior to the date of the taxes for which
the lands were sold under the Jones-Munger Act, and the collector was right
in refusing to deliver the deeds to relators until the relators paid him all
prior unpaid general taxes.
Mandamus was successfully used against a county clerk to compel him
to place relators' names on the ballot for a primary election"in State ex rel.
Hse v. Haden and State ex rel. Scott v. Haden. 33 A statute 4 prohibits the
printing of a candidate's name on an official ballot at a primary election unless the candidate files a written declaration at least sixty days prior to such
primary. Relators sought to file their declarations from 7 p. m. until midnight on the last day for filing, but, being unable to find the county clerk
or his deputy, they deposited their declarations in the post office addressed
to the clerk at about five minutes before midnight. The clerk received them
the next day and refused to file them. When the petitions for writs of
mandamus were filed, the clerk entered his appearance, waived the issuance
of alternative writs, consented that the petitions be taken for such writs
and filed his returns. The court appointed a special commissioner to hear
the evidence and report his findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
court confirmed the report of the special commissioner, held that relators
32. 349 Mo. 232, 160 S. W. (2d) 697 (1942).
33. 349 Mo. 982, 163 S. W. (2d) 946 (1942).
34. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 11550.
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substantially complied with the law in filing their declarations and ordered
that the alternative writs be made peremptory.
In State ex rel. Kansas City v. State Highway Commission,35 a petition
for nandamus was filed by the state at the relation of Kansas City and Clay
County against the State Highway Commission to compel a refund to
relators of sums they had spent in the acquisition of a bridge across the
Missouri River at Kansas City. The bridge was originally owned by a private
corporation, but as a result of a movement to make it a free bridge the city
and county paid the owner a certain amount for the bridge, and the State
Highway Commission, in consideration of receiving title to the bridge, agreed
"
perpetually to maintain it. By the provisions of a statute passed in 1929, 3
when a county, city or other civil subdivision has out of public funds purchased a bridge that forms a part of the state road system, the county, city
or civil subdivision may receive reimbursement from the State Highway Commission in cash or roads. A special commissioner heard this case and recommended that the alternative writ be made peremptory, and he fixed the
amount of the refund and apportioned it between the two relators. The
court modified and made permanent the writ of mandamus and held that
the statute vested the State Highway Commission with sole jurisdiction to
fix the amount of the refund and the time of its payment, and that the court
could not substitute its judgment for that of the commission, but would
require the commission to perform its statutory duty.
Where an administrative body erroneously refuses to exercise power
vested in it by law, it will be compelled to perform its legal duty by the
use of the writ of 'mandamus. The fact that the administrative agency has
not completed its organization, or that it lacks facilities to comply immediately with relator's demand, is not sufficient ground for refusing a peremptory writ. Thus, in State ex rel. Pedrolie v. Kirby,3 7 where discharged employees of the City of St. Louis sought to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, which refused to consider such appeals, the court made its alternative writ of mandamus peremptory, commanding the commission to hear the
appeals within a reasonable time after it is prepared to do so because it
was the duty of the commission to hear such appeals.

35. 349 Mo. 865, 163 S. W. (2d) 948 (1942).
36. Mo. Rav. STAT. (1939) § 8777.
37. 349 Mo. 1010, 163 S. W. (2d) 964 (1942).
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Where a circuit judge enters an order in a cause denying a party an
appeal, the remedy is mandamus to compel the court to allow the appeal.
The remedy may be invoked regardless of whether relator has the right to
have the judgment from which he seeks to appeal reviewed by an appellate
court by a writ of error. And, in determining whether the writ of mandamus
should be made peremptory, the court will not require that the relator show
that the judgment from which he seeks to appeal was erroneous. Nor will
the remedy be denied on the ground that no appeal bond was furnished
because, under the statute, an appeal bond is not a prerequisite to the right
of appeal. Deciding these points, the supreme court in State ex rel. Yale
University v. Sartorius,38 made its alternative writ of mandamus peremptory
to compel a circuit judge to allow an appeal from a judgment in proceedings
for the construction of certain trust instruments. The same remedy was
used for the same purpose in the companion cases of State ex rel. Madden
40
v. Sartorius"° and State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Company v. SartoriUS.
In the last cited case the court discussed the contention made in behalf
of the respondent as to one of the orders denying an appeal that relator was
not a party aggrieved by the judgment, and held that since the writ of
mandamus does not issue in doubtful or other than clear cases, and since it
did not clearly appear from the record that relator was an aggrieved party
within the meaning of the statute granting the right of appeal, the alternative writ should be quashed. The action of the court on that branch of the
case applied to trustees who commenced proceedings for instructions as to
the identity of the heirs of a deceased beneficiary. The trustees disclaimed
representation of any interest other than their own. The judgment of the
court determined the heirs. It was held that trustees were not parties aggrieved by such decree and were not entitled to appeal.
IV. PROHI3ITION
In six of the nine cases where the writ of prohibition was used by the
supreme court in 1942, the writ was directed against a judge of a circuit
court. In one of the cases the writ was used against judges of a county
court; in another it was used against the Board of Election Commissioners
of Kansas City; and in another it was directed against the members of the
Efficiency Board of St. Louis. In four of these cases the relator was an
38. 349 Mo. 1039, 163 S. W. (2d) 981 (1942).
39. 349 Mo. 1054, 163 S. W. (2d) 987 (1942).
40. 164 S. W. (2d) 356 (Mo. 1942).
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individual. In three of the cases the relator was a foreign corporation. On
one of the cases the relators were trustees of a railroad corporation and in
another case the relators were certain judges and clerks of an election in
Kansas City. In five of the cases the provisional rule was discharged. In
two of the cases the preliminary rule was made absolute. In one case the
preliminary rule was discharged as to one party and made absolute as to
another. In another case the writ was denied.
In State ex rel. Kenosha Auto Transport Corporation v. Flanigan,41 a
foreign corporation engaged in transporting property in interstate commerce
in Missouri sought to prohibit a circuit judge from proceeding in a case
against it in which it had been sued in Missouri and had been served with
process through the Public Service Commission of Missouri. It contended
that the statute authorizing service of process in that manner was unconstitutional. Pointing out that in order for a constitutional question to be raised
the facts constituting a violation of the constitution must be alleged, the court
held that no such facts were alleged and no constitutional question raised.
Although prohibition is a discretionary writ and should not be invoked
if there is another adequate remedy, it was held in State ex rel. Stone v.
Tlhomas42 that the action of a board of election commissioners of a city in
construing statutes to have the effect of abolishing election offices when
precincts were redistricted and boundaries changed was a judicial act beyond
the jurisdiction of the board and that prohibition would lie to prevent it.
3
In State ex rel. Auchincloss, Parker & Redpatk, Inc., v. Harrs,4 where
a provisional rule in prohibition was issued upon the filing of relator's petition and the respondent in his return raised issues of law only, it was held,
on relator's motion for judgment on the pleadings, that the legal questions
raised by the pleadings were all that were before the court. The legal questions thus raised pertaining to whether an appearance in an attachment
or garnishment proceeding constituted a general appearance having been
determined, the court made its provisional rule absolute as to one of the
parties and discharged same as to another.
44
In State ex rel. Northwestern Mutual Fire Association v. Cook, prohibition was used to determine whether a circuit judge had authority to

41.
42.
43.
44.

349
349
349
349

Mo. 54, 159 S. W. (2d) 598 (1942).
Mo. 22, 159 S. W. (2d) 600 (1942).
Mo. 190, 159 S. W. (2d) 799 (1942).
Mo.225, 160 S.W. (2d) 687 (1942).
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proceed to hear a case in which a mutual insurance corporation organized
under the laws of the State of Washington was served with process in Missouri through the Superintendent of the Insurance Department of Missouri
in a case involving an insurance policy executed in the State of Oregon
on property located in that state. The court decided that the circuit court
had jurisdiction of the defendant and the cause and entered an order that
the provisional rule in prohibition be discharged.
In a case in which the court reviewed historically the question as to
whether a judge of a circuit court who is called into the military service
of the United States vacates his judicial position, a writ of prohibition was
denied in State ex rel. McGaugkey v. Grayston.4 After a regularly elected
circuit judge entered military service a special judge was elected by the
members of the bar to hold a regular term of court. When the special judge
was about to hear a case pending, one of the litigants questioned his authority to hear the case. The court held that the special judge had authority
to proceed under the existing law, and said "and until either the legislature
or the people do adopt some new provision applicable to such situation, all
the court can say is: Let no citizen be penalized because he is a patriot. Let
us keep faith with those who fight for us. The motto on the great seal of
state proclaims this, 'Let the Safety of the People be the Supreme Law.'"
In a case involving procedure in the operation of the Amendment to the
Charter of the City of St. Louis forbidding discrimination or discharge of
employees for political reason, the writ of prohibition was used to stop
members of the Efficiency Board of the city from hearing appeals of certain
discharged employees. In State ex rel. Pedrolie v. Hertenstei, 40 the court
held that according to its opinion expressed in another case decided at the
same time, 47 jurisdiction to hear the appeals in question was vested in the
Civil Service Commission of the city, and since the court had ordered the
commission to hear the appeals and since the Efficiency Board did not have
jurisdiction to hear the appeals, the temporary writ should be made absolute.
Where members of a county central committee furnished a county
court a selected list of proposed election judges, but it was not shown by
certificate or otherwise that a quorum of the committee was present when
the list was made, or that a majority of those present voted for those pro45. 349 Mo. 700, 163 S. W. (2d) 335 (1942).
46. 163 S. W. (2d) 963 (Mo. 1942).
47. Supra n. 37.
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posed, and where other members of the committee challenged the authority
of those who furnished the list, the county court had power, under the
statute, to select judges in their own discretion, and the supreme court will
not, under its decision in State ex rel. McCrate v. Rlodes,48 stop the court
by a writ of prohibition from thus exercising its power.
In State ex rel. Kurm v. Wrigkt,49 the supreme court refused to stop a
circuit judge from proceeding to try damage suits pending against trustees
of a railroad company as relators, in which suits an attempt was made to
collect from relators actual and punitive damages for their alleged wrongful
refusal to give service letters to the plaintiffs in such actions upon their
discharge from service. In this case the court held that where an attempt
was made to restrain a judge from proceeding in a judicial capacity, costs
will not be taxed against respondent even where the writ issues.
The court also refused to stop a circuit judge from proceeding in suits
for the collection of taxes brought against relators by a sewer district of St.
Louis County in State ex rel. Jones v. Nolte.50 In that case the validity of the
proceedings for the incorporation of the sewer district was challenged, as
were other proceedings in the operation of the district. All of the questions
raised were decided against the relators, and the court held that the judges
of the circuit court had jurisdiction to proceed.
V. QUO WARRANTO

The writ of quo warranto was used by the supreme court three times
during 1942 at the instance of the Attorney General of Missouri to try the
title to a public office. In a fourth case the writ was used at the instance of
the Attorney General to require a forfeiture of a corporate charter or franchise. Later the case reached the supreme court by appeal from a circuit
court where the information was originally filed.
In State ex inf. of McKittrick v. Wiley, " - the Attorney General filed an
information against two respondents, alleging that each was purporting to act
as Prosecuting Attorney. The information charged that it would be in the
public interest for the court to determine who is entitled to the office. A
special commissioner heard the case and recommended that one of the
respondents be enjoined from exercising the powers of the office because he
48.
49.
50.
51.

349
349
165
349

Mo. 1071, 163 S. W. (2d) 978 (1942).
Mo. 1182, 164 S. W. (2d) 300 (1942).
S. W. (2d) 632 (Mo. 1942).
Mo.239, 160 S.W. (2d) 677 (1942).
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was not the duly elected, qualified and acting Prosecuting Attorney, and
that the proceeding against the other respondent be dismissed. The case
arose because a vacancy occurred in the office, and the governor filled the
office by appointment. At the following election one of the respondents
claimed that he was elected, but his right to the office was disputed on the
grounds of certain alleged disqualifications. The court held that under the
information each respondent was called on to show his own title to the office,
and that the court had a right to determine which of the two persons claiming the office has a right to the office. The court discussed the respective
rights of the claimants to the office, and entered an order that the respondent
claiming the office by election was not entitled to the office because he did
not possess the requisite qualifications based on residence. The court continued the case as to the other respondent and granted relator leave to amend
the information in accordance with the admitted facts and evidence appearing in the record.
A further interpretation of the Civil Service Amendment to the Charter
of the City of St. Louis was announced in State ex inf. v. McKittrick ex rel.
Ham v. Kirby.52 In two other cases decided by the supreme court in 1942,"5
certain controversial proceedings under this amendment were considered.
But in State ex inf. McKittrick ex rel. Ham v. Kirby, the constitutionality
of the amendment was considered in a quo warranto proceeding brought to
determine the right of members of the Civil Service Commission appointed
under the provisions" of the amendment to hold their offices. The opinion
contains a profound discussion of some of the fundamental principles of constitutional law and government in America, and points out how the challenged amendment does not violate any of those principles. The court denied relator's petition for a writ of quo warranto.
Another case involving the right of a person elected to public office to
continue in such office after he engages in military service is State ex inf.
McKittrick v. Wilson.24 In State eF rel. McGaugkey v. Grayston,",the question arose on prohibition against a special judge elected to serve in place of
the regularly elected circuit judge who had left for military service. Here
the question arose on quo warranto to determine the right of a person to
52. 349 Mo. 988, 163 S. W. (2d) 990 (1942).
See cases referred to supra n. 37 and n. 47.
54. 166 S. W. (2d) 499 (Mo. 1942).
55. Supra n. 45.
53.
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hold the office of circuit clerk under an appointment of the governor to fill
an alleged vacancy in that office caused by the absence of the regularly
elected circuit clerk in military service. The elected clerk left the office when
he was inducted under the Selective Service Act into the Army of the United
States as a private. His deputy performed the duties of the office until
threatened with contempt of the circuit court unless she turned over the
office to the person commissioned by the Governor" to fill the vacancy in
the office." Distinguishing the difference in the law applicable in the Grayston case, 6 the court held that there is nothing in the law, constitutional,
statutory or common, which requires that a person elected to the office of
circuit clerk forfeits his office by becoming a soldier in the army. Since
the office was not vacant, the person appointed had no right to the office,
and a judgment of ouster was entered against him.
In a qu~o warranto proceeding instituted by the Attorney General, at
the request of an individual as relator, to forfeit a respondent's corporate
charter and franchise, the individual relator is the real party in interest. \
The Attorney General is the instrumentality necessary to start the action.
After the Attorney General exercises his discretion as to whether the action
should be brought, he cannot dismiss the proceeding without the consent of
the individual relator, who controls the action. Thus, where the action is
brought in a circuit court, the supreme court does not acquire jurisdiction
of an appeal on the ground that the action is one on the part of a state
officer, and, where there is nothing in the record to show that more than
$7,500 was involved and no constitutional question is raised, the case should
go on appeal to the court of appeals having jurisdiction. In such a case
where the appeal went to the supreme court, it was transferred to a court of
appeals in State ex inf. McKittrick ex rel. Handlan v. Wilkie Land Com5
pany.
THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
WmLIAM H. BECKER, JR.*

There were few decisions in 1942 dealing with the humanitarian doctrine. There were no decisions in Division Number 1. The court en bane
rendered one opinion, a very significant one. The significance lay in the
56. 349 Mo. 700, 163 S. W. (2d) 335 (1942).
57. 349 Mo. 666, 162 S. W. (2d) 846 (1942).
*Attorney, Columbia. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1932
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fact that no judge voting in the case was able to agree fully with the principal opinion adopted. Division Number 2 rendered three opinions concerning the humanitarian doctrine.
z decided by the court en banc illustrates
The case of Krause v. Pitcain.
the lack of agreement in the supreme court concerning the reasoning involved in the application of the true humanitarian doctrine as distinguished
from the common law last clear chance case. In a conventional type of
railroad case an elaborate opinion by Commissioner Bohling was published
as the principal opinion of the court with Judges Gantt and Hays not sitting.,
No one of the five judges sitting joined in the opinion. Two separate concurring opinions by Judges Ellison and Tipton were rendered. Apparently
we will have to wait until two automobiles collide at a right angle intersection with each driver oblivious of the imminent danger of collision. Then
when each sues the other for personal injuries under the humanitarian rule
the present court will have to decide the limits and bases of the humanitarian rule which it has inherited for administration.

The judgment of the court en banc in the Krause case indicates that
the judges of the present court are anticipating this situation and are reserving the formulation of their opinions for the day of decision.
I. THE CouRT EN BANc
Krause v. PitcairiOwas a death action resulting from the killing of the
plaintiff's intestate when struck by the defendant's train at a highway railroad grade crossing. The collision occurred on a clear day. The automobile
approached the crossing on the fireman's side. The case was submitted upon
the humanitarian doctrine in failing to warn or slacken the speed of the
train. The engineer was unable to see the automobile as it came into a
position of imminent peril. The fireman testified that he had started to
fire the locomotive sometime prior to the time that the plaintiff's intestate
came into a position of imminent peril, and was just getting up onto the
seat box when he felt the impact of the collision.
The principal opinion was written by Commissioner Bohling, with the
concurrence of Commissioners Westhues and Barrett. It is recited that
the opinion was adopted as the opinion of the court en banc. However, no
judge of the court concurred fully in the opinion. Judges Leedy, Clark and
1. 167 S. W. (2d) 74 (Mo. 1942).
2. Ibid.
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Douglas concurred in the result without opinion. Judge Ellison concurred
in result in a separate opinion as did Judge Tipton.
The principal question involved was whether or not any humanitarian
case was made in view of the fact that the engineer had neither actual or
constructive notice of the peril of plaintiff's intestate, while the fireman did
not discover the peril because he was engaged in firing the locomotive.
The principal opinion by Commissioner Bohling holds that a case of
humanitarian negligence was made on the ground that the fireman had
constructive notice of plaintiff's peril in time to have given an effective warning. Constructive notice of the imminent peril of plaintiff's intestate was
charged to the defendant because the fireman had a duty to be in his seat
to keep a lookout at intersections with public highways. This is a true
humanitarian case as distinguished from a common law last clear chance
case.
The principal opinion held that there was no humanitarian case made
upon the ground that the defendant failed to slacken the speed of the train.
In this respect the evidence was said to fall short of establishing that timely
action to set the brakes after the plaintiff's intestate came into a position
of imminent peril would have averted the collision.
The principal opinion also holds that Section 3652 of the Revised Statutes (1939), dealing with death actions, does not permit contributory negligence to be asserted as a defense to a humanitarian case because of the
language in the statute saying that a defendant "may show as a defense
that such death was caused by the negligence of the deceased."
In a concurring opinion Judge Ellison criticized the prindipal opinion
for injecting antecedent negligence or primary negligence into the consideration of the case under the humanitarian doctrine. Judge Ellison holds that
a recovery under the humanitarian doctrine cannot be based on the failure
of the fireman to be in a position to see travelers upon the highway, if in
fact the fireman was not in position to see at the time the imminent peril
arose; even though the failure to be in such position was in itself primary
negligence. It is the position of Judge Ellison that under the humanitarian
doctrine the defendant owes no duty of any kind prior to the time that
the situation of imminent peril comes into existence. From this Judge Ellison reasons that the negligence of the fireman in being at the fire box instead
of upon his seat cannot be considered in allowing recovery upon the humanitarian doctrine. In effect he holds that the plaintiff was not entitled to have
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1943
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the case considered as if the fireman were in his seat where he should have
been, but the case must be considered in respect of the ability of the fireman
to act to avoid the casualty in view of the assumption that the fireman was
down at the fire box when the imminent peril arose. In this connection
Judge Ellison said:
"Nothing here said is to be understood as denying that if the
fireman was bound to be on the lookout when the deceased's peril
began, then he was chargeable with constructive notice-that is, a
duty to make timely discovery of the peril, as the Fleming case
says. But if, by being down at the firebox he had put it out of his
power to act and warn the engineer as quickly as if he had been up
in his seat, that delay caused by his antecedent negligence cannot be
counted against him. That was the precise holding in the Fleming
case, and in Spoeneman v. Uhri, 332 Mo. 821, 830, 60 S. W. (2d)
9, 11, where a motorist by driving too fast had put it out of his power
to save the plaintiff after the latter's peril arose. With the time element as close as it is in this case, the above factor might make some
difference; but the differentiation and limitation of the Fleming case
as an authority is the point to which this concurring opinion is
addressed." (Italics theirs.)2a
Judge Tipton in his concurring opinion avoided discussion of the point
of issue between Judge Ellison and Commissioner Bobling by holding that
the only testimony concerning the position of the fireman at the fire box
instead of upon his seat came from the defendants' witnesses. Judge Tipton
held that the jury could disbelieve this testimony and believe that the fireman was in his seat. If one assumes, as did Judge Tipton, that the fireman
was in his proper position, the discussion of antecedent negligence would be
immaterial.
This case is authority for only one proposition, namely, that a submissible case was made by the plaintiff.
II. DIVISION NuMBER 2
Brown v. Kuri is an action which arose out of an automobile-train
crossing collision near a railroad station in Sikeston, Missouri. The case was
submitted only on humanitarian negligence in failing to warn and in failing
to slacken the speed of the train. The train was southbound and the plaintiff
was a passenger in the automobile which was westbound. The collision
2a. Id. at 84.
3. 161 S. W. (2d) 421 (Mo. 1942).
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occurred in clear daylight. The fireman saw the automobile approaching
the track at approximately twenty miles per hour and stated that he thought
the driver was going to stop until the car was approximately twenty feet
from the crossing. The driver testified that he did not see the train until
it hit the car. The court held that a submissible case on failure to warn was
made saying:
"... we are of the opinion that the jury might infer that the
fireman could reasonably have come to the conclusion that the driver
might not stop when the car was well short of the minimum stopping
distance, and when a prompt warning would have afforded the
driver an opportunity to stop the car before reaching the crossing.
The whistle was located in such position that it could be operated
by the fireman, and he had watched the approach of the car for a
considerable period so he could have been prepared for prompt
action .... ,,3a
In this case the court further held that the term "place of imminent
peril" was synonymous with "position of imminent peril" as the first term
was used in the instructions in the case at bar.
Frailey v. KurnA is an action involving injury to the plaintiff, a young
man who was wrongfully riding upon one of defendant's freight trains.
Plaintiff and his companions had boarded defendant's freight train to ride
it for sport. While riding on the ladder of a moving box car the plaintiff
was seen by a brakeman three car lengths distant. The brakeman took several steps in plaintiff's direction and gestured toward plaintiff with his fists
clenched. The plaintiff moved around between two box cars where his foot
was crushed by the coupling, after which he threw himself from the moving
train and was injured. When the brakeman was asked why he did not
attempt to move toward plaintiff's companions who were riding in coal
cars, he stated: "My life would have been in danger, wouldn't it?" He
was speaking of the necessity of climbing over a number of coal cars to
reach plaintiff's companions. .This statement was submitted by the plaintiff
as evidence of his imminent danger. Under these circumstances the court
held a submissible case under the humanitarian doctrine was not made.
The ruling was placed upon the ground that the plaintiff was not in imminent peril while riding on the ladder of the box car and that his condition

3a. Id. at 422.
4. 349 Mo. 434, 161 S. W. (2d) 424 (1942).
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after his foot had been crushed and while standing between the cars was
not known actually or constructively, to the defendant railroad. The opinion contains a possibly misleading statement that "a greater duty is owed
to one rightfully on the cars of a moving train than is owed a trespasser."
This statement is made in connection with a discussion of the duty owed
the plaintiff by the defendant under the humanitarian doctrine. Under the
humanitarian doctrine the status of the plaintiff is of no consequence, after
actual or constructive notice of imminent peril, though the statement might
be applied to the duty of keeping a lookout. See Krause v. Pitcairie discussed infra.
Wells v. Raber6 arose out of an injury to the plaintiff, an infant, who
was struck by the defendant's truck in a public alley as he ran into the alley
from a passageway while playing a game with other children. The case was
submitted to the jury upon the humanitarian doctrine in failing to warn
the plaintiff, to slacken speed, to stop or to turn aside the car. The defendant contended that the plaintiff emerged from the passageway (out of the
vision of the defendant) and into the alley (into the vision of the defendant)
too late for the defendant to have avoided the collision in the exercise of
ordinary care. The following instruction on behalf of defendant was held
to be without error:
"The Court instructs the jury that if you find and believe from
the evidence that on the occasion mentioned in evidence Ann Raber
(the driver of the car) was operating an automobile northwardly
through the alley described in evidence, without negligence on her
part, and Ray Wells then and there walked or ran into the said
alley from a gangway through a shed or building which bordered
on the east side of the alley, if you so find, and that the shed or
building prevented Ann Raber from seeing Ray Wells until it was
too late for Ann Raber to avoid his injury, then you will find your
verdict in favor of the defendants."
The case of Shields v. Keller7 disapproving a similar instruction was
distinguished. Discussing the Shields case, the court said:
"An instruction may be proper under one state of facts and
improper under another and different state of facts."8
5.
6.
7.
8.

167 S. W. (2d) 74 (Mo. 1942).
166 S. W. (2d) 1073 (Mo. 1942).
348 Mo. 326, 153 S. W. (2d) 60 (1941).
166 S. W. (2d) 1073, 1076 (Mo. 1942).
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The court also approved the following instruction given on behalf of
the defendant.
"The Court instructs the jury that if you find and believe from
the evidence that Ann Raber (the driver of the car) was not guilty
of any negligence contributing to the collision described in the evidence, as such negligence, if any, is defined in other instructions,
then your verdict will be in favor of the defendants."
The approval of this instruction was limited to the facts of the particular case. An instruction given on behalf of the plaintiff was held to justify
its giving.

INSURANCE
ORIN

B. EVANS*

I. JURISDICTION
A. Substituted service
The recent amendment of the statute permitting service on the Superintendent of Insurance in certain actions against foreign insurance companies'
eliminated a number of vexatious questions existing under the earlier wording.2 In State ex rel. Northwestern Mutual Fire Association v. Cook 3 the
Missouri Supreme Court gave a common sense, if somewhat liberal, construction of its language to hold that a Delaware corporation, licensed to do
business and having its principal place of business in Missouri, was a resident of this state which could, by the substituted service there authorized,
bring the insurer within the jurisdiction of the Missouri court.
B. Of tke Supreme Court
The anomalous doctrine by which the jurisdiction of the Missouri Supreme Court may be invoked whenever the interpretation of an insurance
contract made by a lower court fails, in the opinion of the supreme court,
to give unambiguous language its plain meaning, although the particular
language may never before have been the subject of judicial scrutiny, proved
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A. B., University of
Wisconsin, 1931, LL.B., 1935; J. S. D., Yale University, 1940.
1. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 6005.
2. See Comment (1940) 5 Mo. L. REV. 336.
3. 349 Mo. 225, 160 S. W. (2d) 687 (1942)..
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one of the most prolific sources of appellate litigation. However, Commissioner Dalton's assertion that "in determining conflict, general statements
in opinions are to be taken in the light of the facts ruled," 4 was more
accurately descriptive of the judicial process in 1942 than it would have
been in some previous years, and no conflict with the supreme court decisions ennunciating the very general rule of construction (that unambiguous
language, etc.) was found in the interpretation of novel policy provisions
which had been made by the lower courts. In declining jurisdiction on this
ground the court very properly observed that the fact that courts of other
states had declared the policy unambiguous but of contrary purport was
irrelevant5 If the case involves policy language never considered by the
supreme court, it has no business with reviewing any construction made
below. On the other hand, if this doctrine of simulated conflict is to be
recognized, foreign decisions in accord with the decision of the lower court
should be persuasive that unambiguous language had not been denied its
plain meaning.
The cases are included under the next heading.
II.

CONSTRUCTION OF POLICIES

A health and accident policy promised definite indemnity for confining
illness, but in small type excluded liability for "death, disability, or other
loss ... while suffering from insanity or mental infirmity." The Kansas City
Court of Appeals construed the policy to cover disability from mental disease
and the supreme court found this not to conflict with any of its prior holdings.6 The opinion points out that the "exclusion clause" may be limited
to death or disability from extrinsic causes, the hazard of which may be
increased by mental illness, as distinguished from the disability caused by
the mental disease itself, intended to be covered in the "insuring clause."
The St. Louis Court of Appeals construed a personal liability policy,
protecting the assured against liability to persons "not employed by assured"
for injuries sustained on his premises, to promise indemnity against liability
to a casual employee, toward whom the assured did not maintain a typical
master-servant relationship. The supreme court pointed out there were
4. State ex rel. United Mutual Ins. Ass'n. v. Shain, 349 Mo. 460, 468, 162
S. W. (2d) 255, 259 (1942).
5. State ex rel. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Ass'n. v. Shain, 166
S. W. (2d) 481 (Mo. 1942).
6. Ibid.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol8/iss4/3
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numerous types of employment (e.g.-a client is said to "employ" an attorney, but the attorney is certainly not a "servant," probably not an "employee," of the client), held the phrase was ambiguous, and refused to review
7
the case.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals also construed a liability policy protecting the assured, who was in the business of leasing construction machinery, against liability for injury "caused by equipment rented or leased by
the assured ... whether the equipment may be delivered by the assured or
by the contractor," to cover liability to a workman, an employee of a leasing
contractor, who was injured when a pump fell upon him while he was unloading it from a truck belonging to assured, so as to exonerate a seconded
insurer whose liability policy on the truck was by its terms voided if assured
carried other insurance "directly or indirectly" insuring against loss "caused

by or arising out of the loading or unloading of" the truck. The first insurer
contended unsuccessfully that its policy covered only injuries resulting from
the defective condition or operation of the machinery. The supreme court
held there was no conflict with its decisions, it not having construed identical
language and the decision below not being contrary to the plain meaning of
the policy."
In one sense almost all insurance cases involve construction of policies.
This is particularly true of suits to obtain benefits from the accumulated
reserve on life insurance policies, but the problem is so large as to deserve
special treatment. Reference is made to the cases discussed under the next
heading.

III.

NON-FORFEITURE PROVISIONS

Without doubt the most interesting and most litigated questions of
insurance law before the Missouri Supreme Court every year for the past
decade have centered about the calculation and application of the reserves
of level premium life policies. That the problems are complex and varied
cannot be denied but the persistent recurrence of decisions on closely related
facts suggests an unsatisfactory and inadequate treatment of the subject in
the opinions, as well as the limited utility of the doctrine of stare decisis.
Take the case where the policy is delivered and the first premium paid
some time after the "policy date," and the policy further provides that it
7. State ex r'el. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hughes, 349 Mo. 1142, 164 S. W.
(2d) 274 (1942).
8. Avery v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 166 S. W. (2d) 471 (Mo. 1942).
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shall not be effective until delivered to the insured in good health and the
first premium paid. When are subsequent premiums due, for the purpose
of determining lapse? If nothing else appears, the rule is reasonably well
settled that premiums are payable on the anniversary of the policy's becoming effective, but something else usually does appear. Where the insured
had reached an age, at the time the policy first became effective, for which
the premium, calculated as of the date of issue of the policy, was inadequate,
the supreme court, in Tabler v. General American Life Insurance Co.,0 held
the policy date to be the premium date. The opinion based the decision
squarely upon the essential justice of holding the insured to the premium
date appropriate to the premium he was paying. However, in Howard v.
Aetna Life Inurance Co.,10 the Tabler decision was said to be based upon
the presence of a policy provision specifically stipulating that in the event
of delay in accepting the policy the date of issue should control. This was
an acceptable explanation of the case but definitely a nunc pro tunc rationalization. The Howard case involved the peculiar fact that the insured had
apparently overstated his age, which was prominent in the opinion, but it
was not altogether clear what was the controlling factor in the decision that
the anniversary of the acceptance of the policy was the premium date.
The Howard case was retried and evidence introduced that the policy
date had been deliberately inserted to, hold the age of the applicant, who
was then approaching the median line between birthdays, and that by subsequent payments the insured had recognized the anniversaries of the policy
date as the premium dates. The trial court thereupon directed a verdict for
the insurer and an appeal was taken again. This time' the supreme court
positively held that there was no room for evidence of the intent of the
parties or their construction of its meaning, that the policy was clear and
unambiguous that it should not be effective until delivered in good health
and the first premium paid, and that subsequent premiums were not payable
until the anniversaries of the effective delivery. The Tabler case was now
distinguished on the ground that there had been no application for the policy
and the insured must have decided to accept it on the basis of its terms (an
unsatisfactory distinction). Apparently the evidence of overstatement of
age in the Howard case was not so conclusive as was assumed on the first

9. 342 Mo. 726, 117 S. W. (2d) 278 (1938).
10. 346 Mo. 1062, 145 S. W. (2d) 113 (1940).
11. Howard v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 164 S. W. (2d) 360 (Mo. 1942).
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appeal, for the court, after brief reference to the point, dismissed it as
immaterial.
But if, in the application, the words "to hold age" are inserted after
the date, and it appears that the applicant is approaching the median line
between birthdays which will cause an increase in premium, and the policy
is actually received and takes effect when the insured is of an age for which
the premiums stipulated would be inadequate, the policy date is the true
premium date.12 While the opinions do not compare and distinguish the two
cases, it appears to be an application of the parol evidence rule.
Two cases involved "preliminary term" insurance. An increasing number of policies provide for level premium payments through the whole life of
the insured, but further stipulate that the insurance for the first year is
"term insurance" only, the policy being automatically converted into a whole
life policy at the same level premium on payment of the second annual
premium. A level premium policy charges a premium which during the
earlier years of coverage is higher and during the latter years is lower than
the natural cost of insurance under the mortality tables for the particular
years. The excess premiums of the first years constitute a reserve which,
if the insurer is to be solvent, must be sufficient, when added to the expected
future premiums, to pay off the liabilities certain to accrue on the policies if
kept in force. Term insurance is simply coverage for a shorter period than
the whole life of the insured. Five year, or two year, term insurance may be
written on a level premium plan as truly as whole-life, and if so written, as
truly requires the accumulation of reserve values. An insured who cancels
his level premium policy prior to the termination of the risk it covers, relieves
the insurer of any future liability in regard to it and the necessity of preserv2
ing a reserve as to it. It is the philosophy of the non-forfeiture statute a
that the reserve-after the allowance of one-fourth to the insurer as a surrender charge-should be returned to the insured in the form of paid up extended insurance for such term as the reserve is sufficient to buy.
We have no statutory regulation of maximum premiums. Competition
must take care of that. Two types of statutes have the effect of requiring
adequate minimum premiums, one providing for state supervision and examination of insurers to eliminate those actuarially insolvent and one guaran12. McQueeny v. Mutual Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 166 S. W. (2d) 461 (Mo.

1942).

12a. Mo.

REv. STAT.

(1939) § 5852.
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teeing the reserve values to the insured. As the statute provides its own
method for computing the reserve, it is apparent the insurer must have collected enough premiums to be certain of having it.
It should be obvious that a one year term policy requires no reserve and
the insurer, no matter how excessive his premium, carries none on his books.
Neither does a longer policy for which increasing premiums adequate to
increasing mortality risks are charged. In either case there is no future risk
for which future income will be inadequate. This is still true where the
policy offers preliminary term insurance convertible to whole life insurance,
so long as, once the conversion has been accomplished, future premiums
under the policy are appropriate to the whole life coverage, and our insurance code, in the sections dealing with appraisement of solvency and the
computation of surplus available for dividend distribution, recognizes and
authorizes preliminary term insurance. 13 Thus, a large mutual company
offers a two year preliminary term policy on which the premiums for the
first two years are $10.96 per thousand, and for succeeding years $25.75
per thousand, if taken out at age 30. The premiums are simply for a two
year term policy, level premium plan, age 30, and a whole life policy, level
premium plan, age 32. Each is sufficient unto itself.
There is no magic in the word "term" insurance. The question is, can
the insured by acts exclusively within his control, prolong the contingent
liability of the insurer. If so, it is not a true "term" policy and reserves
must be accumulated as of the date of issue unless there is a step-up in the
premiums. Thus the mutual company just referred to could not write "preliminary one year term" insurance at a level premium, beginning at age 30,
of less than $24.38 per thousand, its regular premium on an ordinary whole
life policy at that age, and unless the level premium from the beginning
equalled $25.05 per thousand, which is the rate for a whole life policy at age
31, it would have to accumulate reserve from the first year's premium, no
matter how denominated. (The figures I have given are for a participating
policy and obviously contain a leeway which makes the illustration inexact.)
In Doty v. Americaz National Insurance Co.. 3a the question was, should
the reserve under the non-forfeiture statute be computed from the date of
issue or the date of conversion to a whole-life policy, and the treatment by

Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 5831.
13a. 165 S. W. (2d) 862 (Mo. 1942).
13.
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the court, while evincing a clear understanding of the significance of reserves
in term policies and whole life policies, is quite inadequate for the problem.
It is not sufficient to say that preliminary term policies are permissible and
are recognized by the "valuation" statute. Nor is it enough to say, as did
the court in remanding the case for new trial on that issue, that the policy,
providing for level premiums and bearing the title "Whole Life Policy," was
ambiguous in meaning. The amount of premium charged is an essential
element in determining whether the reserve accumulated at once, on the
principles just discussed. Moreover, if the insured had the power, from the
issuance of the policy, to extend the contingent liability of the insurer
beyond the so-called "term" by paying the same premium, it would seem
that the "net value"' of the policy (the statutory language, held in Magers
v. Northwestern Mutuial Life Insurance Co.'14 to be the equivalent of "reserve") should be calculated from the mortality tables at the age of insured
from the date of issue. The supreme court held otherwise, thus allowing
the insurer to increase substantially the twenty-five per cent of the net
value allowed him by statute for administrative costs and surrender value.
The statutory requirement is a minimum. Whenever the policy guarantees more than the statute demands, the statute becomes irrelevant and
the policy stipulation of the amount of reserve controls, even though the
method employed by the insurer in calculating his reserve should give a
higher figure if carried to its logical conclusion or though the method itself
is not in harmony with the statute. Thus, in McQueeny v. Mutual Fidelity
Life Insurance Co.,' 5 the issue of the "preliminary term" policy was avoided
because the guaranteed surrender values, though excluding consideration of
the first premium, were more than three-fourths of the reserve calculated
by the statutory method, even including the first premium.
Where the policy and the statute conflict, the latter controls, of course,
but only the inconsistent portions of the policy are invalidated.' 6 To illustrate, the policy may contain a table of reserve values more favorable to
the insured than the law requires, but they may not be available to the
insured upon default in the manner mandatory under the statute. In this
situation, the insured or beneficiary may insist upon the application of the

14. 348 Mo. 96, 152 S. W. (2d) 148 (1941).
15. 166 S. W. (2d) 461 (Mo. 1942).
16. Gooch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 333 Mo. 191, 61 S. W. (2d) 704
(1933).
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reserve declared in the policy to the form of benefit (extended insurance)
provided for in the statute. However, a table of the amounts of the face
value of paid-up whole life insurance for which the policy may be exchanged
during its life may not be used to calculate the company's estimate of the
reserve upon the policy, to determine the duration of statutory extended
insurance after lapse.17 The statute applies only after lapse, there is no
policy provision at all for use of the reserves after lapse, and the only remedy
is that provided entirely by the statute. (In the instant case, one involving
"preliminary term" insurance, the insured could have surrendered his policy
while still in force for a paid up whole life policy in an amount for which
the single premium (i.e., the accumulated reserve on the old policy) must
have included some part of the first-or term-premium. However, when
the policy lapsed, the reserve was calculated without regard for the excessive
premium for the first year's insurance.)
In Wilkins v. MetropolitanLife Insurance Co.,18 the supreme court held
that the reserve on a lapsed policy providing "double indemnity for accidental
death while the policy is still in force" should be used to extend the policy
so long as actuarially possible for the face amount not including the double
indemnity feature, rather than for the shorter period for the greater amount.
It was a hard case, as the reserve on the lapsed policy was ample to carry
the insurance in either amount well beyond the insured's accidental death,' 0
and the decision is at least questionable. The non-forfeiture statute originally
stipulated that the extended insurance should be "for the full amount written
in the policy." In 1923, it was changed to its present form, and reads that the
extended insurance "shall be such as is specified in the policy, but never less
than the face amount insured by the policy." The amendment of the statute
seems to have been the paramount factor in the court's decision, but as there
17. Doty v. American National Ins. Co., 165 S. W. (2d) 862 (Mo. 1942).
The case overrules Finnigan v. American National Ins. Co., 235 Mo. App. 332,

137 S. W. (2d) 698 (1940).
18. 165 S. W. (2d) 858 (Mo. 1942). Accord, Doty v. American National
Ins. Co., 165 S. W. (2d) 862 (Mo. 1942), decided the same day.

19. The company had added the double indemnity provision subsequent to
the issuance of the policy and for no increhse in premium. Superficially this
might seem to indicate that the feature cost nothing and should not shorten the
period of extended insurance, hence the beneficiary should have the benefit in
any event The truth, is that the original premium was too large, additional

benefits were added to the policy for competitive reasons, and in a suit based

upon the statute, under which the amount of the reserve is computed by prescribed formula, insurance cannot be extended for the same period with added

coverage.
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were no decisions under the earlier language, it is at least arguable that the

change was made to forestall just such an interpretation as this. The reference to "never less than the face amount" indicates an intention to include
more than the flat face amount, payable in any event, within the words,
"such as is specified in the policy." That the double indemnity feature was,
by the policy, applicable only while the policy was in force, is irrelevant.
The case is not on the policy, but on the statute, which was designed to provide benefits from lapsed policies despite their terms and does not take
effect until lapse. Obviously, the statutory phrase "such as is specified in
the policy" cannot incorporate a provision that there should be no benefit
if the policy lapses.
IV. SETTLEMENT

In a suit upon insurance policies which had been surrendered and a
release given by the beneficiary, plaintiff sought to avoid the release by
evidence of beneficiary's mental infirmity, but without tendering back the
compromise sum paid as consideration for the release. The ruling that such
tender was unnecessary where the defendant, at the time of obtaining the
release, knew or should have known of the mental infirmity of the bene20
ficiary, was held not in conflict with decisions of the supreme court.
V. TRIAL PRAcTIcE

It appears to be the settled law of this state that where an insurance
company is actively participating in the case, that fact may be made known
if it affects either the admissibility of evidence, the weight to be given testimony or the credibility of a witness. Under this principle, the rulings of
the trial court permitting the introduction of evidence that an examining
physician was employed by the insurance company conducting the defense
and permitting the explanation to the jury that other examining physicians
were not called by the plaintiff for the same reason, were not in conflict with
21
decisions of the supreme court.

20. State ex rel. United Mut. Ins. Ass'n. v. Shain, 349 Mo. 460, 162 S. W.
(2d) 255 (1942).
21. State ex rel. Tramill v. Shain, 349 Mo. 82, 161 S. W. (2d) 974 (1942).
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PROPERTY
G. V. HEAD*
Andrews v. Metropolitan Bldg. Co.- involves the interpretation of a
building restriction in a deed to the effect that "said land shall be occupied
and used by said second party and its assigns, including tenants, for residence purposes only," and that there shall not be "more than one residence
or dwelling house" on an undivided lot at any one time. Maintenance of a
rooming and boarding house on the lot covered by the deed is held to be a
violation of the restriction, notwithstanding the fact that the occupants of
the rooming house were permanently located there and regarded the house
as their residence, and that the proprietress, who resided on the premises,
furnished meals only for the occupants of the house and not for the public
generally.
The decision seems sound. The deed, by restricting the property to
"residence purposes only," very evidently denies the grantee the use of the
property for business or commercial purposes. The proprietress, although
residing on the premises, made a commercial or business use of the property.
The fact that her roomers used the premises for residence purposes only is
immaterial.
The court's opinion, unfortunately, contains some out-moded language
to the effect that "if there is no ambiguity, there is no room for construction."
Auldridge v. Spraggii2 is a suit to quiet title to the eastern 14 feet of Lot
80 in Taylor's Second Addition to the City of Joplin. Plaintiff is the record
owner of Lot 79, and defendant is the record owner of Lot 80, adjoining. In
1901 one Crockett, plaintiff's predecessor in title, owned Lot 79, and his sonin-law, Oldhausen, defendant's predecessor, owned Lot 80. Crockett built a
house on Lot 79, which, however, encroached on Lot 80. The father and sonin-law, with a knowledge of the true boundary line between Lots 79 and 80,
built a fence between the two properties 14 feet west of the line between the
two lots. Oldhausen said, "Let him have all the land he needs." The two
properties thereafter were described, in the various conveyances in the respective chains of title, simply as Lots 79 and 80.
*General Counsel, Farm Credit Administration of St. Louis, formerly
Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A. B., University of Missouri, 1914;
LL. B., Harvard, 1917; S. J. D., Harvard, 1932.
1. 349 Mo. 927, 163 S. W. (2d) 1024 (1942).
2. 349 Mo. 858, 163 S. W. (2d) 1042 (1942).
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Plaintiff prevails in the suit, on the theory that Oldhausen made a parol
gift of the 14 foot strip to Crockett, that possession under a parol gift is
adverse and not permissive, and that plaintiff's adverse possession, and that
of his predecessors, had ripened into title.
There seems to be some question whether the evidence establishes a
parol gift as distinguished from a permissive use of the 14 foot strip. If
there was a gift, possession was clearly adverse.
An interesting question is involved as to the right of the plaintiff and
his predecessors in title to tack their periods of adverse possession. The
court states that where land adversely held is included in the same enclosure
with land owned and conveyed by the grantor, the taking of possession by
the grantee of the entire enclosed area creates a privity with the grantor as
to the portion not conveyed, and that therefore tacking is permissible in such
a case. This result would seem to be sound, on the theory that under the
circumstances outlined a deed purporting to describe Lot 79 conveyed, as
between the parties, Lot 79 and the east 14 feet of Lot 80, since the entire
premises, including the 14 foot strip, were known and described as Lot 79.
Krick v. ThompsonP is a suit to quiet title. Defendant filed a cross bill
to reform a deed given by defendant to plaintiff in lieu of foreclosure of a
deed of trust. The deed of trust and the deed covered the southeast quarter
of section 22. Both parties were mistaken as to the southern boundary of
section 22. They thought a certain county road constituted the boundary,
whereas the boundary was in fact several hundred feet south of the road,
with the result that the deed conveyed more land than either party thought
it conveyed. The court denies reformation, since there was no mistake in the
wording of the deed. The parties intended to use the identical description
which the deed contained.
The decision is correct, and the case is a valuable one. In a reformation
case, the understanding of the parties as to the meaning or effect of the
language used is immaterial, so long as the wording of the contract was
agreed upon.
Petty v. G-riffitl 4 is a suit brought for the construction of certain deeds
executed by Lucina B. Franklin, and to quiet title, and for partition. One
of the deeds in question grants, bargains and sells the land therein described
to Belle Ford Griffith, her heirs and assigns, and, immediately following the
3. 349 Mo. 48S, 162 S. W. (2d) 240 (1942).
4. 165 S. W. (2d) 412 (Mo. 1942).
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description of the land, contains this statement: "The intention of grantor
herein being to convey to the said Belle Ford Griffith, grantee herein, a life
estate only, and at her death to revert to G. M. Beal, of Fremont County,
Iowa, and his legal heirs." The habendum clause recites that the grant is
unto "the party of the second part" (Belle Ford Griffith), "her heirs and
assigns forever." The second deed, covering a different tract, is similar,
except that the statement following the description is in the following form:
"This deed conveying a life estate only in said lands and at the death of said
Belle Ford Griffith title to revert to G. M. Beal, or to his heirs at law in case
of his death prior to that of Belle Ford Griffith." The court holds the deeds
to convey only a life estate to Belle Ford Griffith. The contrary contention
was that the clause following the description is repugnant to and contradictory of the words of conveyance contained in the deed and is therefore
void. It was also contended that Beal cannot take title by reversion, since
he is not the grantor; that there are no words of conveyance as to Beal; that
he is not named as a grantee; and that at most the clauses indicate an unexecuted intention to convey an interest to Beal.
The court's position is that the deeds, view as a whole, clearly evidence
the grantor's intention to give Belle Ford Griffith a life estate only, with
the remainder to G. M. Beal or his heirs. The court states that G. M. Beal
is named as a grantee in the deeds, even though his name does not appear
in the clauses which usually designate the grantee. The court concedes the
improper use of the term "revert," but states that the grantor's intention to
use it as a word of conveyance is clearly manifest.
The court's decision is sound. The opinion, however, stresses unduly
the actual intention of the grantor. Great importance is attached to the
following language in one of the deeds: "The intention of grantor herein
being to convey to the said Belle Ford Griffith, grantee herein, a life estate
only." The proper basis for the result reached by the court is that the deeds,
construed as a whole, convey only a life estate to Belle Ford Griffith.
That the court was seeking to ascertain the actual intention of the
parties rather than the proper interpretation, under all of the circumstances,
of the language used in the deeds, is indicated by the fact that the court, in
part, looked to sources other than the contents of the deeds. The court comments upon the circumstance that some time after one of the deeds was
executed the grantor wrote a letter to Belle Ford Griffith, advising her that
the grantor had made a will, devising the land in question to Belle Ford
Griffith for life, with remainder to the heirs of G. M. Beal; and upon the
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fact that still later, Belle Ford Griffith executed a trust agreement in which
she described her interest in the land as a life estate. Evidence of this character as to the actual intention of the parties was clearly improper.
Woodbury v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company' is an action
to cancel and set aside a deed of trust executed by Charles P. Woodbury,
brought by the sole beneficiary under the residuary clause of the will of Rufus
P. Woodbury, deceased, of which will Charles P. Woodbury was executor.
Plaintiff established the fact that the executor purchased the real estate
covered by the deed of trust with funds belonging to the estate. The issue
was as to whether the defendant, who made Charles P. Woodbury a loan
on the property, was charged with notice of the fact that Woodbury used
funds of the estate in acquiring the property. It was brought out in evidence
that Charles P. Woodbury had told one of the tenants of the property of his
use of funds of the estate in the acquisition of the property. Plaintiff contended that defendant was under a duty to make inquiry of persons in possession, and that if such inquiry had been made of the tenant in question
defendant would have learned the facts.
The court denies plaintiff's contention. The court states that one dealing with the property is charged with notice of the rights of persons in possession, but not with notice of all facts which might conceivably come to
light from an interview with persons in possession. The decision is clearly
correct.
Napier v. Eigel' is a suit brought against the executor of the estate of
Amalie M. Napier by Clara Napier, a sister of the testatrix, for the recovery
of certain bonds and currency found in the safe deposit box of the deceased.
The bonds were in envelopes, each indorsed in the handwriting of the deceased "Property of Amalie M. Napier-Clara Napier." The currency was
in a large envelope marked, in the handwriting of the deceased, "Emergency
property of Dr. Amalie M. Napier and/or Clara Napier." Some of the cash
was loose in the envelope, and the remainder was in a number of smaller
envelopes, respectively endorsed as follows: "Clara or Amalie Napier in case
of sickness"; "Clara and Amalie Napier"; "Clara or Amalie Napier"; "Emergency, Amalie Napier." Plaintiff does not claim as the donee of a gift, nor
as-beneficiary of a trust, but on the theory that the decedent created a joint
tenancy in the property, for the benefit of herself and sister, with right of
5. 166 S. W. (2d) 552 (Mo. 1942).
6. 164 S. W. (2d) 908 (Mo. 1942).
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survivorship. Plaintiff's claim is denied. The court distinguishes Bunker v.
Fidelity National Bank and Trust Co.,7 Commonweatlz Trust Co. v. Du
Montiners and In re Martin'sEstate,9 upon which plaintiff relies. The court
disapproves a statement contained in the opinion in the Bunker case to the
effect that where one person gives another a joint interest in property with
himself, no delivery to the donee is necessary, the possession of the donor
being also that of the donee. The court states that while delivery necessary
to complete a gift of a partial interest in personal property may be a constructive delivery, the same principles which govern a gift of the entire
property govern the grant of an interest therein; and that some action on
the part of Amalie Napier, indicating a change in the character of her possession from that of sole owner to that of co-tenant, was necessary in order
for the sister to be vested with an interest in the property.
State v. Blair" is a proceeding to review by certiorari the decision of
the Springfield Court of Appeals in Idle v. Union National Bank.1 That
decision was to the effect that Mary J. Carroll had created a valid gratuitous
trust in certain bonds in favor of George H. Idle. The bonds in question
were found in Mrs. Carroll's safe deposit box following her death. Each
bond bore an endorsement made thereon by Mrs. Carroll in her life time,

substantially as follows: "This $1,000 Springfield City Water Company
bond, No. M-1638, is the property of George H. Idle." The evidence showed
that Mrs. Carroll made the endorsements after inquiring as to the proper
way "to hand things over to someone else," and after being advised by
someone who purported to know the proper procedure to be followed in
such cases. The Springfield Court of Appeals concluded that, for want
of delivery, the transaction did not constitute a gift; but the court was of
the opinion that the evidence showed an intention on the part of Mrs.
Carroll to create a trust, and that the language used was sufficient for the
purpose. The supreme court holds the dicision to be in conflict with prior
decisions of the court, particularly with Cartall v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co.12 The court's position is that the endorsement on the bonds contains
no words of conveyance; that it does not state that Mrs. Carroll was in

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

335
193
219
166
156
348

Mo. 305, 73 S. W. (2d) 242 (1934).
Mo. App. 290, 183 S. W. 1137 (1916).
Mo. App. 51, 266 S. W. 750 (1924).
S. W. (2d) 1085 (Mo. 1942).
S. W. (2d) 941 (Mo. App. 1941).
Mo. 372, 153 S. W. (2d) 370 (1941).
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possession for Mr. Idle's benefit; and that it expresses no intention on the
part of Mrs. Carroll to become trustee.
Napier v. Eigel and State v. Blair are refreshing. In recent years there
has been a tendency to get around the requirement of delivery in these safe
deposit box cases on the theory of trust or joint tenancy. 13 Delivery should
be necessary, whether the subject matter of the gift is legal title, equitable
title, or an interest as joint tenant. Although one joint owner may hold
the property for the benefit of all joint owners, it does not follow that delivery is unnecessary to consummate the gift of a joint interest. And although
a trust may be created without communication to the beneficiary of the
trustee's intention to hold the property in trust, something in the nature of
delivery should be required in the type of case under discussion.
The confusion evidenced by the cases on the point is doubtless due to
the lack of understanding as to the reason for and exact nature of the requirement of delivery in gift cases. Perhaps "delivery" is not the proper term
to apply to the process or transaction. One senses a weakness in the traditional statement of the rule by reason of the fact that the donee's acceptance
of delivery is often "presumed": which is another way of saying that acceptance is not necessary. One wonders whether the requirement of delivery in
the gift cases means anything more than that there must be an actual,
present, completed transfer, evidenced by some act of the grantor outwardly
manifested. A cannot transfer to B legal or equitable title, or any portion
thereof or interest therein, simply by intending to do so. He must go
through certain formalities prescribed by law, of a nature such that the
existence of the transfer is subject to proof. The only difference between
the gift of all of the donor's legal rights in an article and the gift of part
of those rights is that in the latter transaction the donor retains something
for himself. Obviously no delivery or other outward manifestation of transfer is necessary as to the portion of the title retained by the donor. No
reason is apparent, however, why an outward manifestation should not be
required as to that portion of the title transferred. If the donor, by reason
of his retained interest, is entitled to retain custody of the article, then he
must outwardly manifest the transfer by some method comparable to the
transfer of custody. If he merely makes an endorsement on an envelope,
13. See Bunker v.
S. W. (2d) 242 (1934),
Mo. 640, 89 S. W. 629
S. W. 750 (1924), cited

Fidelity National Bank and Trust Co., 335 Mo. 305, 73
cited supra note 7; Harris Banking Co. v. Miller, 190
(1905); In 're Martin's Estate, 219 Mo. App. 51, 266
supra note 9.
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and retains the envelope in his own control, he has done nothing comparable
to delivery, whether the endorsement purports to declare a trust or to convey
an undivided or joint interest. He should be required irrevocably to divest
himself of the dominion over and control of the subject matter of the gift.
There would seem, in the present case, to be no valid gift of the beneficial
interest in the bonds, regardless of the particular wording of the endorsement.

TAXATION
PAUL

G.

OCHTERBECK*

During the year 1942 there were a number of cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Missouri which are of great interest and importance to
most practicing attorneys.
A widow's inheritance tax exemption was clearly defined.' An administrator's duty with respect to the collection of inheritance and estate taxes
was stated.2 Some of the rules used to determine the taxable income of
domestic corporations were reaffirmed. The corporate entity of a holding
4
company was disregarded to permit a taxpayer to take an income tax credit.
Sales of gas by an interstate pipe line company to users in Missouri were
held subject to sales tax.5 The state inspector of oils was not permitted to
cut down a statutory exemption by an administrative interpretation. A
decision rendered in 1936 relating to the Ralph Sewer Law was overruled. 7
The liability of the Federal Housing Administrator for personal property
taxes was stated." Grossly inadequate consideration alone was held to amount
to a fraud which would require tax sales to be set aside." All general taxes
were held to be on an equal basis and dicta that general taxes were superior
in the reverse order of their accrual was overruled. 10 Collectors were relieved

*Attorney, St Louis. LL.B. University of Missouri, 1931.
1. See. I, A, infra.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

I, B, infra.
III, infra.
III, infra.
IV, infra.
V, infra.
VI, infra.
VII, infra.
IX, infra.
IX, infra.
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of any duty to make any inquiry or search other than that disclosed by the
records as to the ownership of deeds of trust and notes secured thereby."
I. IN-ERITANCE TAXES
A. Exemptions to which surviving spouses are entitled
Section 576 of Missouri Revised Statutes (1939) provides that the
surviving spouse shall have an exemption of $20,000.00, "said exemption to be
in addition to the 'maritalright of the widow or widower." In the case of
In re Deans Estate, 2 the testator provided foi a number of specific bequests
totaling $11,000.00 and then left the entire residuary estate, valued at $354,780.54, to his wife. The estate consisted entirely of personal property. The
widow was also testator's only heir because he left no children, or their
descendants, and no father, mother, brother or sister, or their descendants.
The widow did not file any election under Missouri Revised Statutes (1939),
Sections 327, 329 or otherwise and she did not renounce the will. The widow
claimed she was entitled to an inheritance tax exemption of $177,390.27 (in
addition to other exemptions) under Section 325, Missouri Revised Statutes
(1939). The supreme court sustained her claim of exemption and held:
first, that the will did not show an intent that the widow should not take
a one-half interest in the personalty under the above statute; second, that
the common law rule that a widow takes under both her statutory and
testamentary rights in the absence of intention on the part of the testator
that widow elects between such rights has been modified by statute only as
to realty; third, that the widow got one-half of the personalty pursuant to
Section 325, Revised Statutes of Missouri (1939) without prejudicing her
right to the remainder of the residuary estate under the will; and fourth,
that the one-half of the personalty received pursuant to the above statute
was a part of the widow's "maritalright" and thus exempt from inheritance
m
taxes. This decision affirms the rulings in the Rogers s and Berna
' cases,
but at the same time states that the concurring opinion in the Bernay case
is not sound.
B. Duty of administratorto collect inheritance and estate taxes
In the case of,,State ex rel. Madden v. Sartorius,15 the supreme court
held that an administrator must preserve and collect the estate for all per11.
12.
13.
14.
(1939).
15.

See IX, infra.
166 S. W. (2d) 529 (Mo. 1942).
In re Roger's Estate, 250 S. W. 576 (Mo. 1923).
In re Bernay's Estate, 344 Mo. 135, 126 S. W. (2d) 209, 122 A.L.R. 169
349 Mo. 1054, 163 S. W. (2d) 987 (1942).
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sons interested in it; that the state and federal governments by virtue of
estate and inheritance taxes were interested persons as well as the heirs;
that it was the duty of the administrator to collect inheritance and estate
taxes; and that in carrying out such duty he could contest the validity of
certain trust instruments to subject the trust funds to inheritance and estate
taxes even though the same persons take in the same proportions either as
remaindermen under the trust instruments or as distributees under the statutes of descent and distribution.
II.

UNEMPLOYMENT

COMPENSATION

TAXES

In the case of Kellogg v. Murphvy,'6 the court held that the evidence
sustained the commission's finding that the publishing company (having four
employees) and the printing business (having seven employees) were both
actually controlled by the owner of the printing business who owned 70 per
cent of the capital stock in the publishing company so as to make both
employers taxable as one employing unit under the provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Law. The court refused to rule that proof of the
fact that one person owned a majority interest in two businesses was sufficient to sustain a finding that the two businesses should be treated as one
employing unit where there was evidence as to their history, location and
nature which disproved substantial unification of the two businesses by
actual joint control. The opinion contains a learned discussion on the question of presumptions and reviews many similar cases.
In Murplhy v. Menke,' 7 the court held that actors residing on a showboat who furnished entertainment for the show and rendered incidental
service to the crew in the case of a storm while the boat was moving from
one city to another were not "members of the crew" so as to be excluded
from the Unemployment Compensation Law. In Murphy v. Mid-West
Mushroomw Co.,:8 the court held that the labor involved in the corporation's
activities of raising and canning mushrooms, where the labor requirements
were seasonal and the work with the soil was similar to that required for
the production of other plants and where only its own mushrooms were
canned, was "agricultural labor" exempted from the Unemployment Compensation Law.
16. 349 Mo. 1165, 164 S. W. (2d) 285 (1942).
17. 165 S. W. (2d) 653 (Mo. 1942).

18. 168 S. W. (2d) 75 (Mo. 1942).
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III. INCOME TAXES

In the case of Petition of Union Electric Co. of Missouri19 the supreme
court en banc reaffirmed the earlier decision of Union Electric Company v.
Coale,20 and again held that income received by a domestic corporation from
dividends on shares of stock in foreign corporations which derived such income from expenditures of labor and use of capital outside the State of Missouri was not received from sources within this state so as to be taxable
within the provisions of the Missouri Income Tax Law governing corporations. The court also held that interest received by a domestic corporation
on a foreign corporation's bonds was not taxable where the foreign corporation earned the interest by expending labor and using capital outside of
this state. The review of the Missouri Supreme, Court cases on Taxation
for the year 1940 contains a good discussion of the law and principles in21
volved in this case.
In the case of Wood v. Deuser,22 the supreme court held that where a
Delaware corporation held all of the stock of a Missouri corporation and
merely acted as a holding company, that it would ignore the corporate entity
of the Delaware corporation and permit an individual income taxpayer receiving dividends from the Delaware corporation to take the same tax credit
as if the dividends had been received directly from the Missouri corporation.
In this case as in the Union Electric cases, the supreme court penetrated
beneath the cloak of legal fiction and sought the substance of the economic
situation.
IV.

SALES TAX

In Mississippi River Fuel Corporation v. Smith, 2s sales of natural gas
to customers in Missouri by company buying and transporting gas in pipe
lines from the State of Louisiana were held taxable under the provisions
of the Missouri Sales Tax Law. The Fuel Corporation maintained a laboratory building, dispatcher's office, two meter regulator houses and an office
to send out monthly statements and to collect bills in this state. It also
reduced the pressure of the gas before same was placed into the branch lines
for distribution to its Missouri customers. These facts were held to justify

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

349 Mo. 73, 161 S. W. (2d) 968 (1942).
347 Mo. 175, 146 S. W. (2d) 631 (1940).
(1941) 6 Mo. L. REv. 476-479.
349 Mo. 1187, 164 S. W. (2d) 303 (1942).
164 S. W. (2d) 370 (Mo. 1942).
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the application of the "broken package rule." The opinion contains a review
of many similar cases from other states on the same subject. In the discussion it is stated that a sales tax is an "excise tax." In the case of State ex rel.
Berra v. Sestric,2 4 the court holds that justices of the peace have jurisdiction
over suits against "sellers" for failure to make collections, monthly returns,
and remissions of the taxes collected to the state auditor, when the amount
of the tax involved does not exceed the jurisdiction of the justice court.
V.

MOTOR VEHICLE FUEL TAX

In the case of State ex rel. Bell, State Treasurer, v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 25 the court very properly held that the Petroleum Company was entitled to take a three per cent (3%o) deduction authorized under the Motor
Vehicle Fuel Tax Law and that the administrative interpretation of the
statute by the state inspector of oils would not be given any weight inasmuch
as the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous. This decision
will be helpful to keep the administrative agencies from "legislating" by
administrative interpretation.

VI.

DRAINAGE AND SEWER TAXES

In the case of Jacoby v. Missouri Valley Drainage District of Holt
County,28 the court en bane held: first, that the laws governing Drainage
Districts2 7 in so far as preliminary and organizational expenses were concerned were so nearly identical with similar provisions of the Ralph Sewer
Law28 as to require the same construction; second, that the majority opinion
in the case of State ex rel. Hotchkiss v. Lemay Ferry Sewer District of St.
Louis County 29 should be overruled and the dissenting opinion of Judge
Ellison adopted; third, that the apparent limitation of fifty cents per acre for
preliminary and organizational expenses contained in one section was not a
limitation when read and construed with another section; and fourth, that
all such expenses would have to be paid prior to dissolution in accordance
with the other section. This case should prove helpful and interesting to
members of the bar in their attempts to construe inconsistent statutory

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

349 Mo. 182, 159 S. W. (2d) 786 (1942).
349 Mo. 360, 160 S. W. (2d) 764 (1942).
349 Mo. 818, 163 S. W. (2d) 930 (1942).
Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 12333, 12362.
Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) §§ 11037, 11062.
338 Mo. 653, 92 S. W. (2d) 704 (1936).
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the court en banc

upheld the constitutionality of the Ralph Sewer Law and the law31 authorizing the appointment of liquidators. The method by which the governor
appointed the liquidators was also held to be valid.
32
In Little River Drainage District v. Fredlein,
the court held that the

bond issues and the refinancing thereof by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation were valid; that levies for interest are to be excluded in determining
whether or not the total levies for capital expenditures exceed the total
benefits assessed; that the taxpayer's remedy for discrimination on the
part of the supervisors was a suit to strike at the illegal action; and that the
taxpayers could not wholly defeat the collection of taxes legally levied even
though the supervisors did not make the same levy on cut over timber land.
VII.

LIABILITY OF FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATOR FOR REAL
AND PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES

The National Housing Act33 provides a method for making credit avail-

able for financing additions, etc., to real property and the purchase and
installation of equipment and machinery on such real property. The act defines a mortgage to be "a first mortgage on real estate, in fee simple or on
a leasehold.... ." The act also provides that real property acquired and held
by the Federal Housing Administrator shall not be exempt from taxation.
The court in State ex rel. Ferguson v. Donnell,34 held that the National

Housing Act impliedly authorized the Federal Housing Administrator to own
such personal property as was necessary in the management of the real property; and that the provision that "real estate" should not be exempt from
taxation included personal property necessary to the use of the real estatethus the administrator was held liable for both real and personal property
taxes.
VIII. GENERAL RULES
A. Strict construction

Tax statutes must be construed as favorably as possible to the taxpayer
and strictly against the taxing authority.3 5
30. 165 S. W. (2d) 632 (Mo. 1942).
31. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 12682-12685.
32. 165 S. W. (2d) 396 (Mo. 1942).
33. 48 STAT. 1246, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.
34. 349 Mo. 975, 163 S. W. (2d) 940 (1942).
35. Petition of Union Electric Co. of Mo., 349 Mo. 73, 161 S. W. (2d) 968
(1942).
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B. Exemptions from taxation
Statutes granting exemption from taxation are strictly construed against
the person claiming to be exempt thereunder, and no presumption will be
indulged in favor of an exemption.35
C. Legal fictions v. economic realities
In the field of income taxation in particular, it is important to penetrate beyond legal fictions and academic jurisprudence to the economic
7
realities of the cases.3
D. Double taxation
Double taxation is not favored and is not to be presumed. 8
E. Effect of administrative interpretation
The administrative interpretation of a tax statute by those charged
with the duty of enforcing it is only entitled to weight where the meaning
of the statute is uncertain. If the statute is clear and unambiguous the administrative interpretation will be disregarded.39

IX.

TAX SALES AND TITLES

During the year 1942, the supreme court rendered four decisions holding
that the considerations paid at the tax sales in question were so grossly inadequate and unconscionable as to amount to fraud and required that the
sales be set aside, notwithstanding the fact that the former owners had
failed to take advantage of the rights given them by the Jones-Munger Law
to redeem. In Bussen Realty Co. v. Benson,40 a consideration of $11.00 paid
for land worth at least $2,000.00 was held so inadequate as to amount to
fraud. In Mahurin v. Tucker,41 a consideration of $2.50 paid for land worth
between $400.00 to $700.00 was held so inadequate as to constitute a fraud
on both the state and the landowners. In J. C. Nichols Investment Co. v.
Roorback',42 a consideration of $40.00 paid for land worth at least $1,000.00
was also held so grossly inadequate as to amount to fraud. In Ken'nen v. McFarling,43 a consideration of $1.00 for land worth at least $500.00 was also
36.
37.
(1942);
38.

Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Smith, 164 S. W. (2d) 370 (Mo. 1942).
Petition of Union Electric Co. of Mo., 349 Mo. 73, 161 S. W. (2d) 968
Wood v. Deuser, 349-Mo. 1187, 164 S. W. (2d) 303 (1942).
Wood v. Deuser, 349 Mo. 1187, 164 S. W. (2d) 303 (1942).
39. State ex rel. Bell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 349 Mo. 360, 160 S. W. (2d)
764 (1942).
40. 349 Mo. 58, 159 S. W. (2d) 813 (1942).
41. 161 S. W. (2d) 423 (Mo. 1942).
42. 162 S. W. (2d) 274 (Mo. 1942).
43. 165 S.W. (2d) 681 (Mo.1942).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol8/iss4/3

66

et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court

19431

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1942

289

held so grossly inadequate as to amount to fraud. In Kelso v. Hubble,"
defendants paid a consideration of $72.29 for land worth $1,000.00 and after
the sale told the plaintiff not to redeem the land, but to pay defendants their
costs and $25.00 extra and they would deed the property back to the plaintiff. This evidence was held sufficient to justify a decree in favor of the
plaintiff setting aside a collector's tax deed, subject to the payment of
$143.08 to the defendants. In Hobson v.

ElMer,45 the

court held that a pur-

chaser acquiring title after the date of the tax sale was not in a position to
take advantage of the foregoing rule.
The case of Hobson v. Elmer, supra, also announces the rule that under
the Jones-Munger Law, the owner has an absolute power of redemption
which cannot be defeated by the purchaser during the two year period commencing with the date of sale; that during the next two years the purchaser
can obtain a deed by complying with certain statutory requirements; and
that after the initial two year period and before the purchaser has complied
with the statutory requirements, the owner or transferee still has a right
of redemption which will be lost when the purchaser meets the statutory
requirements.
In State ex rel. McGhee v. Baumnn," the court en bane held that a
purchaser at a sale on the first or second offering held pursuant to the JonesMunger Law must pay all prior unpaid general city, town and school taxes
which are still a lien upon the real estate. The court refused to hold that
general taxes are superior in the reverse order of their accrual and thereby
overruled dicta contained in several cases.
48
In Edwards Land & Timber Co. v. Richards,4 and Gee v. Bullock,
the supreme court held that where the owner, the trustee of the deed of
trust, and the beneficiary thereof as disclosed by the record were made
parties to the tax foreclosure suit, the assignee of the note was concluded
by the judgment and sale even though not made a party. The court warns
holders of deeds of trust that they should place the transfer of record if they
desire notice of tax suits. The collector is relieved of any duty to make a
search other than that disclosed by the records. In Bullock v. Johnson,"
the plaintiff failed to prove that it was the actual owner of the land, however
44. 163 S. W. (2d) 926 (Mo. 1942).
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

349 Mo. 1131, 163 S. W. (2d) 1020 (1942).
349 Mo. 232, 160 S. W. (2d) 697 (1942).
349 Mo. 758, 163 S. NV. (2d) 581 (1942).
349 Mo. 1154, 164 S. W, (2d) 281 (1942).
166 S. W. (2d) 573 (Mo. 1942).
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it was assumed that if plaintiff had proved that it was the actual owner
of the land and that this fact was known to the collector the tax proceeding
would have been void because the actual known owner was not joined as a
party.
In Diekrogerv. McCormick,0 a tax judgment based on service of notice
by publication was held to be void because the petition in the tax suit did
not contain an allegation of non-residence of the defendant and no affidavit
as to non-residence was filed.
In suits attacking a tax deed, the plaintiff must recover on the strength
of his own title and must show that he or those under whom he claims had
some title at the time of the tax sale. Plaintiff will not be permitted to recover on account of defects in defendant's title.5 '
In State ex rel. Buder v. Hughes," the court in quashing part of an
opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals held that a purchaser at a sale
foreclosing the state's superior lien for general taxes acquires an interest
superior to those holding a benefit judgment.
During the period of redemption allowed by the provisions of the
Jones-Munger Law, title may be transferred by the record owner subject
53
to the rights of the certificate holder.
X.

PROCEEDINGS TO SET ASIDE TAX ASSESSMENTS

In Ferguson v. Board of Equalization of Madison County,5 4 the land-

owner took an appeal from the County Board of Equalization to the circuit
court. The supreme court held that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction of the appeal and that the circuit court's action in dismissing the appeal
was proper. In Kennen v. McFarling,15 the court states that the County
Board of Equalization acts judicially; that its findings as to valuations become a part of the final judgment of assessment, which if permitted to stand
cannot be collaterally attacked; that such judgment of assessment may be
reviewed by the State Tax Commission, subject to the approval of the State
Board of Equalization which completes the assessment judgment; and that
the assessment judgment may be reviewed by certiorarion the record proper
50. 349 Mo. 1098, 163 S. W. (2d) 927 (1942).
51.

Gee v. Bullock, 349 Mo. 1154, 164 S. W. (2d) 281 (1942).

52. 166 S.W. (2d) 516 (Mo. 1942).

53. Hobson v. Elmer, 349 Mo. 1131, 163 S. W. (2d) 1020 (1942); State
ex rel. Buder v. Hughes, 166 S. W. (2d) 516 (Mo. 1942).

54. 164 S. W. (2d) 925 (Mo. 1942).
55. 165 S. W. (2d) 681 (Mo. 1942).
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or directly attacked by a suit in equity. Members of the Bar interested in
such proceedings will find the cases cited in last year's survey on Taxation516
helpful.
TORTS
GLENN A. MCCLEARY*
While the number of tort cases continued to occupy a large portion
of the court's time, the number of decisions in this field during the period
under review was only a little more than half the number of the preceding
year. There was during this period an unusually large number of well written
opinions in this field of the law. However, there were few situations calling
for new principles or for an extension of old ones. A new advance was
made in throwing further light on the interest of privacy which is emerging
to take its place along with the more settled legally protected interests.
The writer has on previous occasions called the attention of the bar to
the influence of the Restatement of the Law of Torts in the decisions as a
very persuasive source of law, especially where new ground is being broken
in the development of legal principles or in their application to new situations. In the Annual Report of Judge Herbert F. Goodrich, Adviser on Professional Relations, to The American Law Institute at its last meeting, 1943,
a compilation is made of the number of citations to the Restatements by
the various courts. Only the courts of California, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin have cited the Restatements more frequently than the courts of Missouri. In the field of
Torts, only the courts of California, Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania have made more frequent use of this authoritative statement
of legal principles.1
I. NEGLIGENCE
A. Duties of persons in certain relations
1. Possessors of Land
The principles underlying the liability of a possessor of land to his
business visitors were quite fully discussed in the case of Hudson v. Kant56. (1942) 7 Mo. L. REv. 424-425.
*Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, University of Missouri.
A.B.. Ohio Wesleyan University, 1917; J.D., University of Michigan, 1924; S.J.D.,
Harvard, 1936.
1. This report shows that the Missouri courts up to April 1, 1943, cited the
various Restatements in the following frequency: AGENCY, 50; CONFLICr OF
LAWS, 15; CoNAcrs, 37; PROPERTY, 9; RESTUTION, 6; TORTS, 97; TRusTs, 28, a
total of 242 citation paragraphs.
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sas City Baseball Club, Inc. 2 The plaintiff sued for damages for injuries
received while a spectator at a baseball game in the defandant's baseball
park, alleging as negligence the failure to protect with wire netting the
portion of the grandstand lying directly in the line between the seat
occupied by the plaintiff and the batter's box at home plate, from which
the foul ball in question was hit. The plaintiff's contention was that, a duty
being owed by the proprietor to his business visitor, the only defense
was assumption of risk. Here the burden would be on the defendant.
The defendant's contention was that no duty was owed to the plaintiff
in the first instance. The case came up on demurrer to the petition
which the court sustained, on the ground that the invitee was owed no
duty by the proprietor to warn where the invitee has as much knowledge
of the danger as the proprietor has and, thereafter, he assumes the risks
and dangers incident to the known condition. But this is not to be confused
with the defense of assumption of risk. The two theories are quite distinct
when one considers the burden in the case.
In Van Brock v. First National Bank in St. Louis' and Sum=a v.
Morgan Real Estate Co.,4 the plaintiffs suffered injuries from slipping and
falling on the floors of business houses as a result of slippery substances
for which the proprietors were responsible. Here, the dangers were not
due to a permanent condition inherent in the nature or construction of
which the plaintiff had knowledge or in a condition widespread, such as a
large floor space wet or waxed. The spots in the instant cases were not
easily discoverable and in places of business where the plaintiff might reasonably expect a safe condition. In Long v. F. W. Woolworth, Co.,5 the
plaintiff's heel caught in a hole in the floor, and in Devine v. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co.,6 the hole was in the doorsill of the store. There is
nothing particularly new in these decisions, but when they are all put together they do cover quite fully this phase of liability. Furthermore, they
are all written by the same judge, and show an extended and careful study
of the field. The differentiations in situations are well noted.
In Fassi v. SchUler,7 the possessor was held responsible for injuries
received by the plaintiff who jumped from an upper floor of a burning
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

314
349
165
159
349
349

Mo. 1215, 164 S. W. (2d) 318 (1942).
Mo. 425, 161 S. W. (2d) 258 (1942).
S. W. (2d) 390 (Mo. 1942).
S. W. (2d) 619 (Mo. 1942).
Mo. 621, 162 S. W. (2d) 813 (1942).
Mo. 160, 159 S. W. (2d) 774 (1942).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol8/iss4/3

70

et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court

1943]

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1942

293

rooming house. The injuries were alleged to have been caused by the
defendant's failure to provide fire escapes as required by statute.
The liability of a subcontractor for injuries sustained by contractor's
employee, when he stepped backward into an unguarded drain hole cut
in the floor of a building for a floor drain to be installed by the subcontractor, was established in Pettyjohkn v. Interstate Heating & Plumbing

Co.8 The principle of law governing this situation is that one who on behalf
of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition
is subject to the same liability, as though he were the possessor of the land,
for harm caused to others on the premises, while the work is in his charge,
by the dangerous character of the structure or condition. Here one business visitor is liable to another business visitor for a condition of danger
created on the premises.
In the absence of concealment it is well settled that a lessor of land
is not liable for bodily harm caused to his lessee or others upon the land
with the consent of the lessee by any dangerous condition which existed
when the lessee took possession. An exception to this principle is found
where land is leased for a purpose involving the admission of large numbers of persons as patrons of the lessee, if the lessor knew or should have

known of the danger and realized or should have realized the risk therein,
and had reason to expect that the lessee would admit his patrons before
the premises were put in a reasonably safe condition for their reception.
In Brown v. Reorganization Investment Co.,9 this exception was applied

to make liable the proprietor of a place of public amusement for injuries
received when a patron of a wrestling show, presented in the building
leased by the promoter, was caused to trip and fall over the extended
portions of a wooden horse, used at the spot and in the manner intended
by the lessor to make aisles to the entrance doors. The lease was for a
one night show. The lessor not only furnished the "horses" to be used
in aisles to the entrance doors but actually set them in front of those
doors. Since, however, the plaintiff sought to hold liable both the lessor
and lessee as joint tort feasors for a single injury and there had to be one
final judgment in the same amount against both, if both were found liable,
the cause had to be remanded with directions to hold the verdict in abey8. 161 S. W. (2d) 248 (Mo. 1942).
9. 166 S. W. (2d) 476 (Mo. 1942).
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ance against the lessor until the case was disposed of as to the liability
of the lessee.
Where the lease stipulated that "the Lessor shall keep in repair the roof
and exterior of the building . . . and the elevator or elevators," with a

provision for reimbursing the lessee for repairs in the event of the lessor's
failure timely to make the same, and the lessor's employee continued to
occupy quarters in the building and to use the freight elevator in connection with his workshop, the lessee did not have such exclusive control of
the premises as to relieve the lessor of liability to the lessee's employee for
injuries sustained when the freight elevator fell.10
2. Automobiles
While no new principles pertaining to liability arising out of automobile accidents were developed in the period under review nor were the
factual situations out of the ordinary, there are several decisions which
may be reviewed together as being helpful in the drafting of instructions.
In Jones v. Central States Oil Co.," the court attempts to instruct the

drafter as to what he must do to avoid giving the jury "a roving commission," in requiring that the instructions should hypothesize the essential
facts which would constitute negligence under the evidence. Thus to instruct that the defendant "negligently caused" the transport to run into
the rear end of the pickup truck is too general without requiring the further
findings from the evidence in the case "that the transport truck was being
driven behind plaintiff's car, and that his car was 'west of the center line'
when struck." In Swain v. Anders,1 2 one of the instructions on contributory negligence told the jury that if the deceased "failed to exercise for his
own protection from danger that degree of care usually exercised by an
ordinary prudent person of his age, intelligence and discretion, and by
such failure to so exercise such degree of care . . . helped to cause and
bring about the collision.., he would be guilty of contributory negligence."
Another instruction told the jury that if both the deceased and the defendant were negligent and the deceased died as the result of the concurring negligence of both, and if the negligence of the deceased contributed
to or combined with any negligence of the defendant to cause the deceased's
death, the plaintiff could not recover. There was still another instruction
10. Bland v. St. Louis, 349 Mo. 597, 162 S. W. (2d) 822 (1942).
11. 164 S. W. (2d) 914 (Mo. 1942).
12. 349 Mo. 963, 163 S. W. (2d) 1045 (1942).
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of the same general nature. All failed to hypothesize any act of negligence
on the part of the deceased. Whether or not he was contributorily negligent depended to some extent upon the speed and distance of the respective
vehicles, the width of the road, the location of the cars, and other circumstances in evidence which could be considered by the jury in the determination of the issue of negligence. Also, in Lewis v. Zagata,13 the same objection was found to an instruction "that where one, without fault of his own,
is placed in a position of great mental stress, or sudden emergency, the
same degree of judgment and care is not required of him as is required
of one who is acting under normal conditions." The jury was given no
guide to determine whether the defendant's driver's position was "without
fault of his own," and required no finding concerning his position when the
alleged emergency arose. It also left the jury free to determine the meaning of the words "without fault on his part," and as to the existence of
"a position of great mental stress and sudden emergency." The court
pointed out that the jury might fiind that certain facts created "great
mental stress or sudden emergency" which the court as a matter of law
might hold to be no evidence of either, or which were in fact, as a matter
of law, insufficient to make out a case of either. Also, the instruction
further directed a verdict for the defendant if, while placed in a position
of sudden emergency and great mental stress "did or attempted to do,
what any very prudent person would have done under the same or similar
circumstances." The jury could only understand how to reach a correct
general verdict by being told what facts must be found under the evidence
to reach this result.
In contrast with the general instructions in the two preceding cases is

Brinkley v. United Biscuit Co. of America,14 where instructions that the
decedent's negligence would not bar recovery unless it was a proximate
cause of the accident, and that defendants had the burden of proving by
the preponderance of the evidence that the decedent was negligent, and
that his negligence was the proximate cause of his death, were held not to
give the jury a "roving commission." Merely to state the ultimate facts

13. 166 S. W. (2d) 541 (Mo. 1942). But an instruction which covered the
whole case was not erroneous for failure to hypothesize facts, excusing contributory
negligence, where street railroad did not plead contributory negligence. Lanio v.
Kansas City Public Service Co., 162 S. W. (2d) 862 (Mo. 1942). And see Easterly
v. American Institute of Steel Construction, 349 Mo. 604, 162 S. W. (2d) 825
(1942).
14. 349 Mo. 1227, 164 S. W. (2d) 325 (1942).
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of causation and burden of proof is about as specific as can be framed.
Likewise all instructions must be read together and the more general
statements are cured by the specific requirements.',
To show willful and wanton misconduct within the meaning of the
Illinois guest statute authorizing a recovery by the guest against the
driver of an automobile for injuries caused by such misconduct, the
party acting or failing to act must be conscious of his conduct, and,
though having no intent to injure, must be conscious from his knowledge of the surrounding circumstances that his conduct will naturally and
probably result in injury. In Taylor v. Laderman,'0 evidence that the
driver of the automobile was driving late at night at an excessive speed
in the center of the highway, despite repeated protests by the occupants
of the automobile that he drive more carefully, warranted a finding of
willful and wanton misconduct, within the meaning of the statute, where
injuries were caused to a guest sustained in a head-on collision with
another automobile.
3. Railroads
In State ex rel. Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Shain,17 the plaintiff,
a member of the Kansas City fire department, sustained injuries when
the car in which he was riding with an assistant fire chief and with the
siren sounding, in response to a fire call, collided with defendant's street
car at a street intersection. An ordinance of Kansas City provided that
"the operator of every street car shall immediately stop such car clear
of any interesction and keep it in such position until the authorized emergency vehicle ...

shall have passed. . .

."

The ordinance also specified that

fire department vehicles were in the emergency class. An instruction which
stated that it was the motorman's duty to exercise the highest degree of
care to discover the fire department vehicle, and that upon discovering
such vehicle it was the motorman's duty immediately to stop, was held to
impose no higher duty than required by the ordinance, and that the opinion of the Kansas City Court of Appeals holding the instruction proper
did not conflict with any ruling of the supreme court' 8
15. Dove v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 349 Mo. 798, 163 S. W. (2d) 548
(1942), and see State ex tel. Thompson v. Shain, 349 Mo. 1075, 163 S. W. (2d)
967 (1942).
16. 349 Mo. 415, 161 S. W. (2d) 253 (1942).
17. 165 S. W. (2d) 428 (Mo. 1942).
18. The opinion was quashed as to its holding that there was sufficient evidence to sustain damages for permanent injuries within the rule of previous
decisions of the supreme court.
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In Smith. v. Thompson,' an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for the death of lessee railroad's brakeman against both the
lessor and lessee railroads, the plaintiff predicated her right to a recovery
on a finding that the lessee railroad negligently permitted its headlight
to give forth a blinding light in violation of the rules of the lessee railroad,
and against the lessor railroad on its statutory liability in case of leases
to other railroad companies. The lessor railroad contended that the rules
of the lessor railroad control and not those of the lessee railroad as to
dimming or extinguishing the headlights in the night time under certain
conditions, and hence the plaintiff could not predicate negligence against
the lessor railroad on violation of the rules of the lessee railroad. The case
was remanded to determine whether or not the plaintiff may be able to
recover under the rules of the lessor railroad or of the Interstate Commerce
Commission covering this matter, the court recognizing that an applicable
rule of a railroad niay be evidence in the nature of an admission of what
should be done.
There were other decisions involving facts peculiar to the liability of
railroads for personal injuries, but nothing new was contributed by the facts
20
or by the decisions sufficiently noteworthy to be discussed here.
4. Supplier of a chattel
The liability in negligence of a manufacturer of an automobile to the
ultimate purchaser was recognized in Gibbs v. General Motors Corporation,21 where the plaintiff alleged injuries resulting from defective brakes.
This is the first application in Missouri of the liability for negligence of a
manufacturer to the ultimate purchaser of an automobile. There has been

19. 349 Mo. 396, 161 S. W. (2d) 232 (1942).
20. In Pashea v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 165 S. W. (2d) 691
(Mo. 1942), an action by a brakeman for injuries sustained when he fell from
the top of a freight car when the freight train allegedly stopped with an unusual
and sudden jerk, on the question whether the court should have directed a verdict
for the defendant, the testimony of the brakeman that he fell in a direction
opposite from that in which the train was traveling was not to be disregarded
on the ground that it was in violation of physical law and impossible. The court
recognizes other forces arising subsequently to the sudden stop which may cause
one braced fog a force in one direction to be thrown in the opposite direction, at
least for consideration by the jury. In Miller v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n. of St. Louis,
349 Mo. 944, 163 S. W. (2d) 1034 (1942), employees operating a train of another
railroad over the tracks of the defendant's railroad were employees of the defendant
under Illinois law, so far as concerns responsibility for negligence under the
Federal Employees Liability Act.
21. 166 S. W. (2d) 575 (Mo. 1942).
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a steady growth of authority holding the manufacturer liable to the ultimate
user of other products, so that this holding was not unexpected. In this case
the plaintiff brought suit against both the manufacturer and the dealer from
which she purchased the car. Demurrers to the petition were sustained,
however, because specific negligence was not alleged.
5. Physician and surgeon
In an action against an osteopathic physician and surgeon for malpractice, it was held in Waters v. Crites22 that if the defendant knew, or in the

exercise of ordinary care would have known, that the operation to remove
dark circles under the plaintiff's eyes was unnecessary and likely to result
in injury, he was guilty of negligence as a matter of law if he advised the
operation and performed it. The fact that the surgeon required the plaintiff
to sign a release was thought by the court to show that the defendant had
doubts about the results of the operation, and to show that he thought it
would likely result in injury.
B. Breach of duty established through,violation of statute

Negligence may be shown through the violation of a statute which was
intended to protect persons of the class to which the plaintiff belongs against
the kind of harm which he has received. Thus the neglectful failure of the
owner of a building to comply with statutes requiring a building to be
equipped with fire escapes was held to be negligent per se in Fassiv. Schider.2 3
There the plaintiff was injured by dropping from a third floor window of a
burning house after finding the stairway smoke filled and no fire escape
attached to the building. On the other hand, an Illinois statute penalizing
every druggist who sills and delivers any "arsenic" or "other substance
usually denominated as poisonous" without having the word "poison" was
held, in McClaren v. G. S. Robins & Co.,24 not to include carbon tetrachloride,
which is not a drug, but a grease solvent. Hense the sale of such substance
by the manufacturer without labeling it as poison did not constitute negligence under the statute in an action for the death of a workman from carbon
tetrachloride poisoning while using the grease solvent to clean the inside of
a boiler. In construing the statute, the court applied the "ejusdem genferis'
rule that where a statute contains general words only, such general words are
to receive a general construction; but where it enumerates particular classes
or things, followed by general words, the general words so used will be ap22. 166 S. W. (2d) 496 (Mo. 1942).
23. 349 Mo.160, 159 S.W. (2d) 774 (1942).
24. 349 Mo.653, 162 S.W. (2d) 856 (1942).
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plicable only to things of the same general character as those which are
specified.
C. Res ipsa loquitur
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur received no extended application in the
25
decisions of the period reviewed. In Gibbs v. GeneralMotors Corporation,
the manufacturer of an automobile and the dealer who sold and made inspections of the automobile to the purchaser were not liable under the
doctrine for injuries sustained by the purchaser after the automobile had
been in use about two months and had been driven 1,530 miles without any
indication it was defective, except when the automobile went violently to the
left of the highway, due to apparently defective brakes, and collided with
another automobile when the purchaser applied her foot to the brake pedal.
The court pointed out, except where bottles exploded, the doctrine has not
applied where the instrumentality or thing complained of was not in the
possession and control of the defendant. Consistent with the Missouri rule
that pleading specific facts of negligence waives the benefit of the doctrine,
which forces the plaintiff to stand on the doctrine against a demurrer to his
petition, the cause was remanded with direction to the trial court to set
aside the order of dismissal if the plaintiff desires to proceed upon allegations
of specific negligence.
On the other hand the res ipsa.rule was held applicable in Miller v.
Terminal R. R. Ass'n. of St. Louis,26 in an action under the FederalEmployers'

Liability Act for the death of a switchman occurring in the defendant's Illinois yards when a passenger train operated by another railroad ran into the
rear of defendant's freight train on which the deceased was standing. The
passenger train was using the defendant's tracks with the latter's consent.
Under the law of Illinois the employees of the company using the defendant's
railroad were the employees of the defendant in so far as concerns responsibility for negligence under the Act. Furthermore, the dispatch office employees of the defendant controlled the movement of both trains. Therefore,
the instrumentalities were under the exclusive control and management of
the defendant to make the res ipsa rule applicable.
D. Imputed Negligence
In Devine v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.,ST a customer brought an
action for injuries received in a fall because of a defect in the doorsill of a
25. 166 S. W. (2d) 575 (Mo. 1942).
26. 349 Mo. 944, 163 S. W. (2d) 1034 (1942).
27. 349 Mo. 621, 162 S. W. (2d) 813 (1942).
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store operated by the defendant. Joined with the defendant in the suit was
the manager of the store. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the manager and against the defendant. The latter contended on appeal that the
petition stated a cause of action based upon principles of respondeat superior
and, therefore, the jury's verdict exonerating the manager also absolved and
exculpated it from liability for the negligence alleged. But the plaintiff,
while joining the defendant and the manager, pleaded an instance of two
distinct torts causing her negligence, or concurrent negligence, and not an
instance of single negligence, dependent upon respondeat superior. The
pleadings, the instructions and the evidence showed that each defendant
was under a different and separate legal duty, and the liability of each of
them to the plaintiff was on a different theory. The defendant's liability was
was based upon a duty owed as an owner or occupier of premises to its business visitors, while the manager's liability would be based upon certain
specific acts of negligence. It was not the type of tort which may be sustained against the employer solely upon a finding of negligence on the part
of the employee. Whether he was or was not negligent with respect to the
condition complained of, liability rested on the defendant for its own wrong
which did not depend on respondeat superior.
That a substantial detour may be made in time as well as in space, to
relieve the employer from liability for the negligence of his employee in the
operation of an automobile, was held in KlotsclL v. P. F. Collier & Son Corporation.28 The employee was employed as a collector of subscriptions to the
defendant's publications and to verify new subscriptions. The place where
the collision occurred was in his territory and he received a mileage allowance on that trip. But he started out on Saturday to spend the weekend with
his wife's parents and had no intention of transacting any business for his
employer until the following Monday morning thirty-six hours later. The
court said: "If a servant having business to transact for his master at a given
point, unnecessarily and unreasonably, so far as the master's business is concerned, starts out several days ahead for his own purposes (such as private
business, sports, vacationing, visiting relatives, etc.) we can see no reason
why the master should be liable for his negligence on the way, even though
the servant took his business paraphernalia with him and was allowed mileage for the trip." There was no business reason for him to start out thirty-

28. 349 Mo. 40, 159 S. W. (2d) 589 (1942).
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six hours ahead. Therefore, no case was made for the jury on these facts as
/
against the defendant.
A corporation distributing credit reports by route boys, one of whom
negligently pushed revolving doors, constituting the only entrance to a subscriber's office, against the plaintiff who was attempting to leave the office
as the route boy entered it to deliver the report, causing the injuries complained of, was held liable in Salmons v. Dun & Bradstreet29 for the employee's negligence. The Kansas City Court of Appeals had distinguished the
case from an earlier supreme court decision, Pkillips v. Western Union Telegrape Co.,30 where a messenger boy snatched a newspaper from a bundle of
papers under the arm of a newsboy and ran, looking over his shoulder and
colliding with the plaintiff causing serious injuries, on the ground that here
the employee was not upon a public sidewalk at the time he committed the
negligent act and was using not merely his health and strength but an instrument which he was required to use in order to enter the building. The
court's opinion casts considerable doubt as to whether the Phkillips case is
sound.
The question as to whether a person was an employee or an independent
contractor was presented in two cases. In Corder v. Morgan Roofing Co.,31
one engaged by a roofing company to supervise building and repair work at
an hourly wage, who had charge of men working on the various jobs to be
supervised, and who was allowed train fare whether he took a train or used
his on automobile when making trips on behalf of the company, was held to
be an employee and not an independent contractor in an action for personal
injuries sustained by the plaintiff in a collision between the automobile in
which she was riding and an automobile owned and driven at the time by
the employee. At the time he was making a trip in his own automobile from
the place where he was supervising a job to the city in which the company
was located for the purpose of making a report on the progress of the work,
and there was substantial evidence that the trip was not only to make
a report, which could have been sent by mail, but also to discuss in a personal conference with the officers of the defendant company the future
progress of the work and to decide what additional men and materials would
be necessary to complete it. Under these facts, it was for the jury whether
at the time of the collision causing the plaintiff's injurids he was in the service
29. 349 Mo. 498, 162 S. W. (2d) 245 (1942).
30. 270 Mo. 676, 195 S. W. 711 (1917).
31. 166 S. W. (2d) 455 (Mo. 1942).
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of the corporate defendant and was acting within the scope of his employment.
A closer question on the relationship of a salesman to the corporate
2
There, whether a cleaner
salesman, employed on a commission basis under contract whereby the manufacturing company did not expressly reserve the right to control or direct
the salesmen in the methods to be employed in making sales, was an independent contractor or a servant, for whose negligent operation of his own
automobile the corporate defendant might be held liable to third persons,
was held for the jury under the evidence. At least it cculd not be ruled
as a matter of law that the vacuum cleaner salesman employed on a commission basis under a contract whereby the employer did not expressly reserve the right to control or direct the salesmen in the methods to be employed, who was taught the basic methods to be used in demonstrating merchandise, was required to keep an activity card, and was directed by the
supervisor where to make demonstrations, was an independent contractor
so as to relieve the employer for the salesman's negligence in the operation
of his own automobile.

'defendant was presented in Mattan v. Hoover Co.

E. Defenses in negligence cases
Where injuries are received in collisions with trains at railroad crossings,
in the absence of evidence that the injured persons proceeded over blind or
known dangerous crossings without looking or in other instances in which
there was no evidence what the injured person saw or was doing, there is a
presumption of fact (an inference) that he was exercising due care. 33 However, in Dove v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry.,8" it was error to include
in an instruction for the plaintiff that it was to be presumed the deceased
was in the exercise of ordinary care unless the presumption was overcome
by the greater weight of evidence, as this made the instruction more favorable to the plaintiff than they were entitled. The court pointed out that
presumptions usually concern the shifting of evidence and are for the court
rather than the jury, therefore they should not be stated in the instructions.
In Bland v. St. Louis,3 5 where an employee of a tenant of a warehouse
who had no knowledge of the mechanism of an elevator drove an automobile
32.
33.
34.
35.

166 S. W. (2d) 557 (Mo. 1942).
Borrson v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R., 161 S. W. (2d) 227 (Mo. 1942).
349 Mo. 798, 163 S. W. (2d) 548 (1942).
349 Mo. 597, 162 S. W. (2d) 822 (1942).
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part way onto a freight elevator which dropped six inches, and, after he had
assisted again to level the elevator and reset the elevator brake, drove the
automobile almost entirely onto the elevator, which then fell severely injuring the employee, it was held that the danger was not so glaringly apparent
as to take the question of contributory negligence from the jury. 6
F. Busrden of proof
As good an example of a standardized instruction approved by the
court is found in an instruction on the burden of proof in negligence cases.
Several years ago the court stated in clear language what this instruction
should contain. Yet each year cases are reversed because counsel seek to
give a little different shading. The type of instruction which the court approves is again set forth: "A short, simple instruction, telling the jury that
the burden is on plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance or greater
weight of the credible evidence, and that unless he has done so the jury must
find for defendant, ought to be sufficient to inform the jury what plaintiff
is required to do. A plain declaration to that effect will be easily understood
by a jury. The more the instruction is elaborated upon, the more complex
it becomes and the more it is likely to be misunderstood ....
Certainly all
that ought to be required, in addition to such a statement ... should be a
clear definition of preponderance of evidence, informing the jury that what
is meant thereby is evidence which is more convincing to them as worthy
of belief than that which is offered by the opposition."3 7
In Seago v. New York Central R. R.,s8 the following instruction was
not specifically ruled upon, since another was found bad to cause a reversal
of the case, but the court pointed out that "what we have said of this instruction ought to be a sufficient warning to the bar and trial courts to observe the admonition in the Rouchene case, supra, as to burden of proof instructions": "The court instructs the jury that unless plaintiff has proven to
36. The defense of assumption of risk under the Federal Employer's Liability
Act, prior to the amendment practicaly abolishing that defense, was involved in
Finley v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 349 Mo. 330, 160 S. W. (2d) 735 (1942),
and Smith v. Thompson, 349 Me. 396, 161 S. W. (2d) 232 (1942). However,
they are not sufficiently noteworthy on this point to discuss here.
37. Rouchene v. Gamble Const Co., 338 Mo. 123, 134, 89 S. W. (2d) 58,
63 (1935). Also emphasized with approval in Nelson v. Evans, 338 Mo. 991, 93
S. W. (2d) 691 (1936); Mengel v. St. LouiS, 341 Mo. 994, 111 S. W. (2d) 5
(1937). A rather complete annotation since 1936 on this instruction may be
found in the annual survey of the work of the supreme court in the November
Issues of this Review under the title "ToRrs."
38. 349 Mo. 1249, 164 S. W. (2d) 336 (1942).
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your satisfaction by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence that
defendant did not give a proper hand lantern signal before said engine was

started, then plaintiff cannot recover in this case and your verdict must
be for the defendant." (Italics the court's.) The complaint was on the phrase
"to your satisfaction" which was generally condemned by the court. A careful reading of the case is necessary to appreciate the reasoning of the court.
In Wallace v. Herman Body Co.,39 the trial court had by other instructions specifically and also generally informed the jury that the burden of
proof was upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
the negligence charged and that such negligence was the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injuries. The following instruction was also given: "The
Court instructs the jury that the burden of proof is not upon the defendant
to show that it is not liable for the negligence charged, but the burden so
upon the plaintiff to prove that the defendant is liable for such negligence,
and this rule as to the burden of proof is binding in law and must govern
you in deciding this case. You have no fight to disregard said rule or to
adopt any other in lieu thereof, but in considering the evidence and coming
to a verdict you should adhere strictly to this rule." The trial court was held
justified in granting the plaintiff a new trial, in view of the other instructions,
because this one overemphasized the burden of proof. "It is certainly a lecture to the jury," says the reviewing court.40
II. RIGHT OF PRIvAcY

The most interesting development in the field of Torts was the decision
in Barber v. Time, cnC., 41 where the plaintiff recovered against the defendant for publishing in its weekly news magazine plaintiff's picture in connection with an article concerning a physical ailment for which she was being
treated in a hospital. The plaintiff had gone to the hospital complaining of
an insatiable appetite which could be appeased only by eating very fre-

quently. The article was entitled "Starving glutton" and underneath the
picture was printed: "Insatiable-Eater Barber" and "She eats for ten." The
article also published temporary findings of the doctor as to the possible
cause for the plaintiff having eaten enough in the past year to feed a family
of ten, although she had lost twenty-five pounds. The picture was taken of
39. 349 Mo. 1093, 163 S. W. (2d) 923 (1942).
40. Dove v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 349 Mo. 798, 163 S. W. (2d) 548
(1942), also involves burden of proof instructions but contributes nothing noteworthy on this question.
41. 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S. W. (2d) 291 (1942).
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the plaintiff as she lay in bed in hospital garb. The defendant's evidence
showed the purpose of its department in the magazine entitled "Medicine"
was to give the public medical news and developments in terms which could
be understood by and in a way which would be interesting to lay readers.
In an earlier decision a Missouri court had recognized this right of
privacy. 42 There the plaintiff's picture was used in an advertisement without
consent. Since that decision, which was one of the earlier decisions on the
question, there has been considerable development of the tort, both in the
nature of the interest to be protected and the limitations to be imposed.
Since this decision is quite fully discussed elsewhere in the Review,48 and
due to limitations of space in a survey of tlis character, only the most
general treatment is permissible here. The court points out that liability for
the invasion of this interest is a matter of harmonizing individual rights
with community and social interests, and thinks that they can be harmonized
on a reasonable basis without abridging the freedom of the press. Just what
is a matter of public concern is thought by the court to be similar in principle to qualified privilege in libel and is for the court to determine whether
the occasion is one of proper public interest. If the court finds that the matter is outside the scope of proper public interest, on the showing of sufficient
evidence of an unreasonable interference with another's private affairs, the
case is for the jury. Applied to the facts of this case, the court held that
this rule did not interfere with the freedom of the press or its effective
exercise, but only limited its abuse. It was not necessary to state the plaintiff's name or to publish her picture in order to give medical information to
the public as to the symptoms, nature, causes or results of her ailment.
III. LIBEL

A thorough analysis of the defense of absolute privilege in defamation
is set forth in Laun v. Union Electric Co. of Missouri." The petition alleged
that the defendants acting together communicated certain defamatory matter regarding him to two other cbmpanies and caused those companies to
publish the statements in separate amended complaints filed in judicial
proceedings, the purpose of those suits being to secure an accounting of and
judgment for misappropriated funds from the present plaintiff who was one
42. Munden v. Harris, 153,Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911).
43. (1943) 8 Mo. L. REv. 74. For other notes, see (1941) 6 Mo. L. REv. 233;
(1940) 5 Mo. L. REv. 343.
44. 166 S. W. (2d) 1065 (Mo. 1942).
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of the defendants in those proceedings. The trial court in the present action
sustained demurrers to the petition on the defendant's theory that the defamatory matter was relevant to the cause and contained in pleadings in a
court having jurisdiction, and on this theory absolute privilege was a complete defense even though the matter was false and maliciously pleaded. The
plaintiff's theory was that the defendants were not parties to the suits in the
earlier cause and in maliciously procuring someone else to publish the
allegedly defamatory matters were not protected by the absolute privilege
accorded to litigants or parties to the cause.
Having alleged that the defendants caused the defamatory matter to
be published by one who was then a party to a judicial proceeding the court
found the petition stated facts to make the defendants publishers along with
the actual publisher. But the defense of absolute privilege, while available
to the actual parties who made the defamatory statements in the complaints
in the earlier proceedings, could not be taken advantage of by the present
defendants because they were not in the character as parties or pleaders to
that privileged occasion.
One of the present defendants further contended that, since it appeared
in the plaintiff's allegations that the defendants were holding companies or
otherwise owned and controlled the companies which had filed the suits
containing the defamatory matters, they were parties interested in, though
not actual parties to the suit, and for that reason the absolute immunity
extended to them. But the court held that this interest from having control
of the parties in the earlier proceedings could not give them more than a
conditional privilege. This .is the privilege accorded inter-company communications, in which case the privilege is lost if the words were not used in
good faith.45

45. In Kvasnicka v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 166 S. W. (2d) 503 (Mo.
1942), there is a very full evaluation of the evidence bearing on whether or not
there was a want of probable cause to sustain an action for malicious prosecution
in the face of an indictment returned by a grand jury in the earlier proceedings
which in itself was "prima facie evidence" of probable cause.
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ExPREss TRuSTS

A. Creation
In State ex rel. Union National Bank of Springfield v. Blairl the court
held there was a failure to establish a trust in a bond which was found in the
safety deposit box of the deceased, and which bore the notation that it was
the property of the plaintiff below, because of lack of delivery of the property. The court of appeals had held the transaction did not constitute a gift,
for want of delivery, but it said the deceased intended to create a trust in
herself for the benefit of the plaintiff.
On certiorari the supreme court quashed that opinion and stated that
there must be some words of conveyance, some expression of intention to
become a trustee, for one to become a trustee of his own property. The court
pointed out that the notation on the bond that it was the property of the
plaintiff contained no words of conveyance, did not indicate that the deceased
ever owned the bond, did not declare that she was in possession for the
benefit of the plaintiff, and did not suggest that her position as owner had
changed to that of trustee. It said the policy of the law requiring a delivery
to effect a transfer of title should not be evaded by calling the transaction
a declaration of trust.
B. Retention of investments
Boland v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank and Trust Co. 2 involved the

liability of trustees for retaining investments which were a part of the estate
when the trust was established and which later declined in value.
The trust instrument provided that the trustees should keep the funds
invested "in safe income-bearing securities or other property" and should
"have further power to continue to hold any stocks or other securities or
investments which they originally receive hereunder, so long as they may
consider the same desirable investments regardless of whether such stocks,
securities or investments are in law proper investments of trust funds."
When the trust was created in 1919 the securities were worth some
$20,000.00. Their market price advanced until they were worth more than
*Attorney, Columbia. A.B., University of Missouri, 1933, LL.B., 1936.
1. 166 S. W. (2d) 1085 (Mo. 1942).
2. 349 Mo. 731, 163 S. W. (2d) 597 (1942).
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$60,000.00 in 1929, but their value then dropped to approximately $2,500.00
in 1935, the year in which this suit was instituted. The beneficiaries, seeking to surcharge the trustees for the resultant loss to the estate, contended
that the trust instrument permitted the trustees to hold only such stocks
and bonds which could be classified as "safe income-bearing securities" and
that the securities in question were not of that class. The trustees denied
any breach of trust and answered that the securities were to be held by
them until they should in their sound discretion deem it advantageous to
sell, and that in retaining the securities they exercised such discretion in
good faith and with due care and diligence.
The lower court found for the beneficiaries but the supreme court reversed that judgment on appeal. It pointed out that the trust agreement
empowered the trustees to continue to hold any securities which they had
originally received so long as they considered such to be desirable investments, regardless of whether those securities were in law proper investments
of trust funds, and that the real issue in the case was whether the trustees
acted in good faith and reasonably exercised the discretion vested in them.
The court approved the rule stated in Fairleigk v. Fidelity National Bank
and Trust Co.8 and in Restatement of Law of Trusts4 to the effect that a
trustee is required only to act with good faith and with ordinary prudence
in the exercise of a discretion conferred on it by the trust instrument and is
not liable for mere errors of judgment. It held that the defendant trustees
had so acted in the instant case.
The court added that it was not called on to substitute its judgment
for that of the trustees or to test their action in the light of what happened
afterwards, but it was required to look at the circumstances as they existed
from time to time to determine whether the trustees reasonably exercised
their discretion in the light of existing facts and circumstances.
C. Right of appeal by trustee
In State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Sartoriouss the court passed
on the right of a trustee to appeal from a decree determining the rights of
the beneficiaries of the trust. It is a case of first impression in Missouri on
this point.
3. 335 Mo. 360, 73 S. W. (2d) 248, 250 (1934).
4. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 187, p. 479.
5. 164 S. W. (2d) 356 (Mo. 1942).
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The successor trustees under the trust established by Robert Campbell
had sought instructions as to the distribution of the estate. After a judgment and decree in that action they filed a motion for a new trial. It was
overruled and appeal was denied. They then instituted mandamus proceedings to compel the respondent judge to allow appeals from the decree determining the identity of the heirs and from the partial order of distribution.
The court held that the trustees were not parties "aggrieved" by the
judgment and decree so as to be entitled to an appeal from the decree under
Section 1884, 'Missouri Revised Statutes, 1939. It held that the decree
protected the trustees, who had properly sought the aid of the court when
they were in doubt as to the identity of the beneficiaries, because the subject
matter of the suit was within the jurisdiction of the court and there was
proper notice. It stated that the great weight of authority was that executors
or administrators as such are not aggrieved by a decree determining the
rights of the beneficiaries, and that there is no real distinction between such
a situation and one where trustees of an inter vivos trust ask for instructions, at least where non-residents and unknown parties may be brought in
under constructive notice by publication. The court expressly overruled
a prior decision holding that an administratrix could appeal from an order
of distribution.6
As to the appeal from the order of partial distribution the court held
it should have been granted inasmuch as two claimants to the estate had
been allowed appeals from judgments adverse to their claims and a reversal
of the decree as to their rights would subject the estate to such claims.
II. IMPLIED TRUSTS
A. Constructive trusts

Tobin v. Wood 7 involved the degree of proof required to establish a
constructive trust.
Action was instituted by a real estate investment company to establish
a constructive trust in certain lots and to cancel a deed of trust on the property. The company had purchased the land from one Wood and had given
a note, secured by a deed of trust, as part of the purchase price and that note
was pledged by Wood to the defendant bank as. collateral for a pre-existing
debt. After default in payment of this note the deed of trust was foreclosed
6. Messersmith v. Messersmith, 264 Mo. 610, 175 S. W. 914 (1915).
7. 159 S. W. (2d) 287 (Mo. 1942).
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and Wood bought in the property, immediately giving the bank his note
secured by a deed of trust on the lots, to secure his prior indebtedness to
the bank. When that note matured and was unpaid the deed of trust was
foreclosed and the bank purchased the property.
In the instant action the company charged that the first foreclosure
was fraudulent because Wood had said he would take care of the note and
the bank president had allegedly stated that Wood would keep his word.
The chancellor found in favor of the bank, dismissing the petition, and his
finding was affirmed the court holding that the plaintiff had failed to meet
the standard of proof required to sustain its charges and to establish a constructive trust-that the proof must be of such a positive and definite character as to convince the mind of the chancellor.
Lucas v. Central Missouri Trust Company,8 a case involving the doctrine of constructive trusts, came to the supreme court on appeal from a
judgment for the defendant bank in an action by the Superintendent of Insurance to recover that part of the impounded 16% per cent increased insurance premium funds which had been withdrawn from the defendant bank
on the order of the Circuit Court of Cole County to compensate the court's
custodian of the funds. The money had been deposited by the superintendent in conformity to the order of the circuit court and the checks drawn on
the fund were also in accordance with its orders.
After the supreme court held that the impounded funds had been illegally
collected and that the Circuit Court of Cole County had no jurisdiction
to administer them or to order fees paid to its custodian, this action to have
the bank account to the superintendent for that part of the funds which
had been paid out on orders of the court, and not returned to him, was instituted. The superintendents theory of recovery was that if the circuit
court had no jurisdiction to administer the fund, its deposit of the money
in the defendant bank was illegal and defendant's acceptance of the deposited fund, with constructive knowledge of the fact that the court was
acting unlawfully, constituted it a trustee ex maleflcio, and the bank became
liable when it honored the checks drawn on the fund under order of the
court.
The court defined the words "trustee ex maleficio" and "trust ex maleficio." It stated that the better authorities classified situations where one
unlawfully or inequitably holds property justly belonging to another as con8. 166 S. W. (2d) 1053 (Mo. 1942).
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structive trusts rather than as trusts ex maleficio. "Where a person holding
title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on
the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain
it, a constructive trust arises." 9
The court held that the conduct of the defendant bank did not give
rise to a constructive trust because (1) there was neither such unlawful,
tortious or fraudulent conduct on its part as to call for the application of
that doctrine, nor (2) was the bank unjustly enriched, there being no allegation or proof that it was a party to the unlawful'withdrawals, or that it
received part of the funds, or that it was a party to a scheme whereby
another was to receive the benefit of the unlawful withdrawals.
The plaintiff 'also relied on the preference cases, but the court distinguished them by pointing out that constructive trusts were allowed in those
cases only where the assets of the bank were augmented by the unlawful
deposit, and such was not the situation in the instant case.
B. Resulting trusts
Hernandez v. Prieto° was an action by the former wife of the defendant
seeking a decree that defendant held legal title to certain real estate for her
use. The defendant had 'entered into a contract to purchase the property,
paying for it in installments, the contract providing that he and his wife
were entitled to a deed when the full purchase price was paid. Later a deed
was executed to the husband alone.
The lower court found the wife was entitled to an interest in the property amounting to one-half of the investment therein during the time the
parties were living together.
In affirming this judgment the supreme court held that when the husband put his wife's name in the contract of purchase an equitable estate by
the entirety was created and on their divorce this became a tenancy in common. The court denied the husband's contention that a resulting trust arose
in his favor, stating that would not be the case even if he paid the entire
purchase price, because he did not claim it was not his intent to put his
wife's name in the contract.
Weatherford v. Spiritual Christian Union Clurch" was a proceeding
to review the overruling of defendant's motion to set aside a judgment
in an action to declare a resulting trust in certain real property. Defendant
9. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION (1937) § 169, p. 640.
10. 349 Mo. 658, 162 S. W. (2d) 829 (1942).
11. 163 S. W. (2d) 916 (Mo. 1942).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1943

89

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 4 [1943], Art. 3

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

had attacked the petition on the ground that it did not state a cause of
action in that plaintiffs did not allege that they furnished the consideration.
The court held that the petition did state a cause of action and contained
sufficient allegations that the consideration for the property was furnished
by the deceased, under whom the plaintiffs claimed title.
Scktneider v. Sclrneider'2 was a suit brought by the life tenant in three
pieces of real estate to cancel certain instruments purporting to affect title
to the property. The property had been devised by plaintiff's mother to
plaintiff for life, then to his brother as trustee for plaintiff's children. In
this action plaintiff sought to cancel the instruments under which the brother
and his wife claimed an interest in the property, his theory being that the
brother had commingled his funds and those of his mother, and that the
property in question was the mother's at the time of her death. Title to one
tract had been taken in the name of the mother, and the defendant admitted
that she might have had money in the deeds of trust under which he claimed
an interest in the other property.
The chancellor found for the plaintiff and the supreme court affirmed
that finding except as to one tract in which the interest of the testatrix
was concededly subject to a prior deed of trust. The court stated that the
chancellor was warranted in finding a fiduciary relationship existed between
the testatrix and her son, in whom she placed her trust and confidence, that
he commingled his funds and hers, and that he failed to sustain his burden
of going forward with the evidence in establishing his interest.
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
THOMAS E. ATKINSON:*'
The 1942 cases' which somehow touch upon the law of succession contribute something to the advancement of the law. A few of them fill gaps
12. 161 S. W. (2d) 650 (Mo. 1942).
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B., University of North Dakota,
1925; LL.B., University of Michigan, 1917; J.S.D. Yale, 1926.
1. In addition to the cases hereafter reviewed the following may be said
to relate to the board subject matter treated herein: Adams v. Othenin's Estate,
161 S. W. (2d) 415 (Mo. 1942) recovery for care of deceased limited to agreed
wages, though work later became more arduous; Broz v. Hegwood, 349 Mo. 920,
163 S. W. (2d) 1009 (1942) unsuccessful pecuniary claim for services commencing
in 1918 is not a bar to a claim upon contract made in 1927 to give claimant a
farm on decedent's death where the consideration was in part different; Woodbury
v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 166 S. W. (2d) 552 (Mo. 1942) funds or property misappropriated by an executor cannot be traced or recovered from the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value without notice.
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in the pre-existing law; others clarify points or imbed old principles deeper
into our jurisprudence. However, more than by any single adjudged point
or the sum total of the new law, the writer was struck by the fact that
almost half of the cases to be reviewed are reminiscent of Jarndyce v.
Jarndyce in the number and duration of proceedings which have taken or
will take place before the entire matter is closed.2 To considerable extent
this inheres in the nature of the process of settlement of estates, but there is
grave danger in a callous professional attitude which accepts the present
situation as the best that can be attained, or which even permits estate litigation to become more expensive and dilatory than it is now. Here, as in
other fields, the legal profession is too little inclined to self-examination and
to reform of its household. There is need for comprehensive improvement
in the field of probate procedure. Courts should allow a broader operation
of the declaratory judgment principle and the bar should make more frequent
use of it. The provisions of the new "Civil Code" for intervention and interpleader must be construed broadly. A freer consolidation of trials aid of
appeals should not only be allowed but made mandatory. A simpler and
more flexible system of court organization and jurisdiction is demanded.
Over and above these matters there is need for efficiencies not yet formulated, which will come out of a new attitude toward the administration of
law, and not entirely out of legalistic experience. It will take all of these
things to reconcile the people who fear the cost and delays of the law.
Often they are willing to risk the most dangerous sorts of home remedies to
avoid contact with lawijers and the courts.
With this general background sketched vaguely and somewhat pessimistically, the writer will now attempt to sharpen-not to say ornament-the
picture by detailing the decisions which fall within the field.
CONTEST OF WILLS

Fletcher v. Ringo3 was a case in which a probated will was contested
in circuit court upon the ground of mental incapacity and fraud. The will
2. Bates v. Clark, 349 Mo. 1087, 163 S. W. (2d) 975 (1942); Kennard v.
Wiggins, 349 Mo. 283, 160 S. W. (2d) 706 cert. denied 63 S. Ct. 47 (1942);
State ex rel. Yale University v. Sartorius, 349 Mo. 1039, 163 S. W. (2d) 981
(1942); State ex rel. Madden v. Sartorius, 349 Mo. 1054, 163 S. W. (2d) 987
(1942); State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Sartorius, 164 S. W. (2d) 356
(Mo. 1942); State ex rel. Gnekow v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 349 Mo.
528, 163 S. W. (2d) 86 (1942); Long v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 159 S. W. (2d) 619
(Mo. 1942); In re Thommasson, 159 S. W. (2d) 626 (Mo. 1942) and perhaps
others. In connection with the latter case, see Laughlin v. Boatmen's Nat. Bank
of St. Louis, 163 S. W. (2d) 761 (Mo. 1942) and In re Thomasson's Estate, 171
S. W. (2d) 553 (Mo. 1943).
3. 164 S. W. (2d) 904 (Mo. 1943).
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was signed by three witnesses but only two of them gave testimony in probate court. This was held to be immaterial because the appeal from probate
court had the effect of vacating the original probate and gave the circuit
court jurisdiction to probate the will in solemn form on the testimony of all
three witnesses, which was done. Evidence of statements made by testatrix
to her attorney upon the execution of a will a year and a half earlier than
the one in question was held properly admitted on the issue of mental
capacity. The court reiterated its former position that the burden of proof
upon undue influence is ordinarily on contestant. The giving of cautionary
instructions to the effect that if testatrix possessed mental capacity and
was not unduly influenced she could make such disposition as she chose,
that kinship gave no right to share property against the will, and that the
jury should not substitute their judgment for the judgment of testatrix as
to the proper distribution of her estate was held discretionary with the
trial court.
In Breedivg v. Pack4 a will executed in 1938 was pr6bated. Within the
time allowed, a contest was filed in circuit court seeking to establish a later
will which was claimed to revoke the first. The contestant's petition was
held to state no cause of action over which the circuit court had jurisdiction
inasmuch as the second will was never exhibited in probate court, the
tribunal which has exclusive original jurisdiction over probate. The proper
course would have been to have' offergd the later will to the probate court
for probate.5
CoNsTRUcTIoN OF WILLS

The case of Graves v. Graves holds that A's adopted child cannot take
under a will as the "heir of the body" of A, and furthermore is not "issue" of
A. While the present adoption laws go a long way toward putting the
adopted child "into the blood stream" of the adoptive parents, 7 by express
statutory provision" the adopted child is not capable of inheriting property
limited to the heirs of the body of the parent by adoption.
4. 164 S. W. (2d) 929 (Mo. 1943).
5. As to the propriety of consolidation of several suits to establish or reject
different wills of the decedent, see Buchholz v. Cunningham, 340 Mo. 302, 100
S. W. (2d) 446 (1937) discussed in (1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 494.
6. 349 Mo. 722, 163 S. W. (2d) 544 (1942).
7. But the present law applies only to adoptions which have taken place
since 1917. Weber v. Griffiths, 340 Mo. 145, 159 S.W. (2d) 670 (1941); McIntyre
v. Hardesty, 347 Mo. 805, 149 S.W. (2d) 334 (1941), discussed in (1942) 7
Mo. L. REv. 447.
8. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 9614.
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Dean'sEstate9

holds that testator's widow to whom the bulk of his
In re
estate, consisting entirely of personalty, was left was not obliged to pay
inheritance tax upon that share which she would be entitled to claim by
statute against the will. The case involves not only a construction of the
tax laws which exempt her marital right from the tax, but also examination
as to the nature of the interests which the law gives the widow in her husband's estate as well as a construction of the bequest in this case. Here she
did not renounce the will nor elect to take against it, but rather claimed
half of the property under the statute and the remainder under the will. The
court held that the statutes do not require election in the case of personalty
as they do in case of realty, and that as to personalty the spouse is not required to elect between the will and the statutory share unless the will
shows an intention to require an election. The language of the will was
neutral in this respect and hence the widow could take an untaxed marital
portion and at the same time the balance of her interest under the will.
The opinion mentions the fact that here the widow was also the testator's
sole heir at law but it is not apparent that this was a material factor in the
result reached.
Standley v. AlleizP holds that the donee of a power of appointment does
not exercise the power by making a residuary bequest of his own property.
The opinion relies upon the Restatement of Property and Missouri cases.
The holding should be a warning to draftsmen of wills to make inquiry as to
whether the testator- possesses a power which he is entitled to exercise by
will, and, if so, to make suitable provisions for the exercise if that is desired.
A stereotyped provision included in the residuary clause would take care
of the situation in the case of most general powers, though no attempt should
be made to exercise a special power until the instrument creating it has been
carefully studied.
The will involved in Bates v. Clark" created a trust of $300,000 for the
benefit of testator's wife for her life and provided that on her death the
principal "shall be by my trustees given to and divided among such of the
parties named in Paragraph Eight (8)

as may then be living . . . in the

proportions named in said paragraph eight (8)." The eighth paragraph was
the residuary clause and gave certain proportions absolutely to two brothers

9. 166 S. W. (2d) 529 (Mo. 1942).
10. 349 Mo. 1115, 163 S. W. (2d) 1012 (1942).
11. 349 Mo. 1087, 163 S. W. (2d) 975 (1942).
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and another share to plaintiff in trust for life. It was held that plaintiff
took his share of the $300,000 in trust for life only, as in case of other property which he received under the residuary clause. The will also provided
that plaintiff's son was entitled to plaintiff's share of the trust upon termination thereof. Though the son had died, plaintiff was held not entitled to
the principal as the heir of his son because the latter's remainder was not
vested. The court refused to be swayed in these holdings by evidence of
the fact that testator was on good terms with plaintiff.
Testator in Kenward v. Wiggins"2 created a trust in favor of his three
daughters for their lives with remainder over to the heirs of the body of each
and provided further that if any of the daughters died without issue her portion should go to the survivor and survivors in equal portions for life, with
remainder over to the heirs of the body of such as should die leaving issue.
In 1925 the supreme court on suit for construction of the will held that the
daughters took only a life interest. All interested persons were made parties
to this suit, including the present plaintiff, then a minor, who was represented
by her father as guardian ad litem. Included in the decree finally determining the 1925 action there was a provision that upon the death of one sister
without issue, an undivided half of the deceased's share should vest in each
of the surviving sisters for life and upon the death of either of them go to
the survivor for life. The court in the present suit to set aside the 1925
decree had no difficulty in finding that the decree should have provided that
on the death of the second sister to die, the interest which came to her from
the first sister to die should be vested in the heirs of the body of the former.
Plaintiff was one of these heirs. However, more difficulty was encountered
in giving relief contrary to the terms of a final decree rendered several years
before institution of the present suit. No fraud was found on the part of the
guardian ad litem or of anyone else. Relief was granted upon the ground
that the guardian ad litem did not fully represent his ward's interest in preparing the decree rendered in the former case, wherein the court's attention
was directed mainly to the contentions of the three sisters that they were
entitled to a fee. The opinion does not state whether the vacation of the
decree will also operate in favor of an adult daughter of the second sister
to die.
The case raises interesting questions as to what will be necessary in
order to set aside a decree consented to by a guardian ad litem. Is it suf12. 349 Mo. 283, 160 S. W. (2d) 706 (1942).
13. 166 S. W. (2d) 1085 (Mo. 1942).
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ficient that the guardian failed to represent fully the interests of his ward,

or is it also necessary that the court's attention should not be called to the
matters which are opposed to the ward's interest? Would a bona fide purchaser be protected if he relied on the first decree as determining the interests?
These questions of course are not answered in the Kennard case but we do
know that a final decree in a case in which a minor is involved may not be
quite final, though the minor is represented by a guardian ad litem.
SUBSTITUTES FOR WILLS

Attempts to dispose of one's property after death without making a

will are responsible for three decisions. In State ex rel. Union Nat. Bank
v. Blair"3 decedent purchased a bond, attached thereto a slip of paper endorsed with words to the effect that the bond was the property of claimant,
and put the same in her (decedent's) safety deposit box. In deciding against
the claimant it was held that the transaction failed as a gift for want of
delivery and as a trust for want of declaration of trust. A similar question
arose in Napier v. Eigel,14 where the decedent placed money and bonds in
her safety deposit box in envelopes upon which she wrote legends sufficient
to describe a joint tenancy relationship between her and her sister. There
was no evidence of delivery to the sister, nor even of the sister's knowledge
of the manner in which the property had been treated. The court admits
the possibility of creating a joint estate in personalty but denies that intention alone will create one. As no delivery was made out, the surviving sister
had no interest in her life-time and the decedent's acts constituted simply
an ineffective attempt to make a testamentary disposition.
Much the same question might have been presented in In re Estes'
Estate' 5 where decedent left in his safety deposit box eight envelopes with
names written thereon, containing notes owned by decedent. One envelope
also contained a deed by decedent. A waiver was signed by all the heirs
that the envelopes and their contents should be delivered to the persons
named on the envelopes, and on petition the probate court made an order
to this effect relieving the administrator of the necessity of inventorying this
property. Thereafter three of the heirs brought proceedings in the probate
court to discover assets, seeking to charge the administrator with all the
property contained in the envelopes. The decision in the probate court was
14. 164 S. W. (2d) 908 (Mo. 1942).
15.

166 S. W. (2d) 1061 (Mo. 1942).
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in favor of the administrator and this was affirmed by the circuit court and
by the supreme court. Jurisdiction in the probate court to try the issue of
ownership was held to be not presented in the case. The decision turned on
the effect of the waiver. It appearing that there was no fraud or misunderstanding in connection with the signing thereof, the court proceeded to hold
that the arrangement was not contrary to public policy. Apparently the
rights of creditors were not prejudiced but it does not appear at what stage
of the administration the present proceeding was determined. The makers
of the notes would not be safe in paying the recipients until the estate was
closed. One may wonder also concerning the effect of the undelivered deed
contained in one of the envelopes.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

In Niederberg v. Golluber 6 a widower brought suit in his individual
capacity and as administrator of his wife joining claims for conversion of:
(1) money to which the wife was entitled from her mother's estate, (2) stock
belonging to the mother's estate, (3) stock belonging to the wife's estate,
(4) personal assets of the wife's estate, (5) the wife's shares of rentals in
certain real estate. Demurrer was filed to the petition which was in one
count. It was held that there was a misjoinder of parties plaintiff and that
the several causes of action were improperly united. It is of course clear
that the widower individually was not interested in any of the claims except
for rents accruing after the wife's death. As administrator he would not be
interested in these rents unless there had been an order of the probate
court ordering the administrator to collect them in order to pay debts.
Plaintiff does not seem to have a cause of action in any capacity as to the
stock belonging to his wife's mother's estate. It is interesting to speculate
whether the joinder of parties and of causes here attempted would have been
permissible under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.17
Several mandamus cases, resulting in three opinions, tested the right
of certain persons to appeal from a final decree fixing rights under two trust
16. 162 S. W. (2d) 592 (Mo. 1942).
17. Under F. R. 21 misjoinder of a party is not ground for dismissal but
simply for dropping that party by order of the court at any stage. Under F. R.
20 (a) it was seen that there might be joinder of the claims in a single actn as
they arise "out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions and
occurrences." Under F. R. 10 (b) it would probably not be absolutely necessary
to state the claims in separate counts. Quaere: how many claims (or causes of
action) are involved in this case?
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instruments and from orders supplemental to that decree. A general statement of the -background facts is necessary for an understanding of the
matters before the court. In 1877 Robert Campbell and Virginia his wife
conveyed all their property to trustees to be held after their deaths for the
benefit of their children, Hugh, Hazlett" and James until' 1885 when James,
the youngest, attained majority. Robert died in 1879 and Virginia in 1882.
In 1885 the trust property was divided into three parts and the shares of
Hugh and James conveyed directly to them. Hazlett was apparently incompetent and later was put under guardianship. Evidently the deed of
1877 contemplated that a trust might be set up of Hazlett's share when
the division was made in 1885. At any rate a trust of Hazlett's share was
set up in 1885 to terminate on his death, the remainder to be distributed
to his heirs. James died in 1890, Hugh in 1931 and Hazlett in 1938. None
of them ever married or had children.
Upon Hazlett's death the propertr held in trust was over $1,800,000.
An administrator was appointed for his estate but no property came into
the administrator's hands. Claims for funeral expenses and income tax were
ordered paid out of the trust estate. The time for presenting claims expired
before the trust deeds were construed by the trial court. However, the
United States and the State of Missouri claimed estate and inheritance taxes
upon the theory that the remaining trust property was a part of Hazlett's
estate.
Upon Hazlett's death the successor trustees under the instruments of
1885 filed a petition to construe the instruments of 1877 and 1885, and to
determine the validity of their provisions and the persons to whom the trust
property should be distributed. 'More than 1200 persons claimed to be the
heirs of Hazlett. A Special Master was appointed to determine the heirship
and 161 persons were found to be the heirs. These persons, however, did not
claim as distributees of Hazlett's estate but rather as remaindermen undet
the trust deeds of 1877 and 1885. Hazlett's administrator was brought in
as a defendant and filed an answer. Yale University intervened as a defendant, claiming that the reversionary interest in the trust property remained in Robert and Virginia and passed on their deaths to their heirs
and that the University was entitled to half of the remaining trust property
under the will of Hugh.
The trial court in its final decree accepted the report of the Special
Master and found that the 161 persons were entitled to take as remaindermen under the trust deeds. There were two supplemental orders, one orderPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1943
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ing a distribution of $540,000 among the remaindermen, and the other overruling the exceptions of the administrator to the trustee's account filed in
accordance with court order. The administrator filed separate appeals from
the final decree and the two supplemental orders. The trustees and Yale
University each filed appeals from the final decree and the order for partial
distribution. The trial court refused to allow any of the seven appeals upon
the ground that the respective persons were not parties aggrieved by the
action of the trial court. Thereupon the mandamus actions were commenced
in the supreme court to require the trial court to allow the appeals. The
court disposed of these actions in three opinions.
The first opinionl8 deals with the appeals of Yale University. The court
brushes aside the technical argument that mandamus will not lie upon the
ground that there is an adequate remedy by writ of error or special appeal,
a contention which if successful would have disposed of all the mandamus
proceedings. In the appeal from the final decree, it seems too clear for argument that Yale, having become a party to the proceeding below by intervention, would be bound by the decree which denied it any interest in the
property. Obviously, then, Yale is a party aggrieved by the decree and the
court should not enter into an inquiry here as to whether the decree was
correct because that would involve the merits of the appeal sought. Whether
the University was aggrieved by the order of partial distribution is open to
more question. Distribution was ordered of only a little more than onefourth of the estate and it would seem that a sufficient amount would remain
to protect the University's alleged fialf interest. However, the court held
that because the value of the estate might depreciate before the University's
interest was adjudged this appeal also should have been allowed. The court
may have been influenced by the fact that over four years had elapsed since
the termination of the trust and that possibly several more might go by
before final determination of the merits. Then too it should be noticed that
the court allowed the appeals of the trustees and the administrator from
this order; it would do no harm to have the University heard on the same
matter.
Respondent defended the administrator's mandamus suit,1D claiming
that the latter's appeal from the final decree should not be allowed for the
18. State ex rel. Yale University v. Sartorious, 349 Mo. 1039, 163 S. W. (2d)
981 (1942).
19. State ex rel. Madden v. Sartorius, 349 Mo. 1054, 163 S. W. (2d) 987
(1942).
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reason that persons who would take as remaindermen under the decree are
the same persons and would take in the same proportions as those who would
be Hazlett's distributees and that the administrator should not array himself against these persons to establish a tax liability which would not exist
under the decree. Neither the state nor the United States were parties to
the suit below though both claimed that taxes were due and the state treasurer appeared in the mandamus suit as amicus curiae. The court does not
say that the administrator might be personally liable for taxes, if the decree
should stand, but does say that it was the administrator's duty to collect
inheritance and estate taxes and "that relator's right to appeal is affected
with a public interest" and "in that sense he is a party aggrieved." The
court also held that the appeals of the administrator should have been
allowed from the two supplemental orders.
In the opinion2' dealing with the mandamus proceedings by the trustees,
the latter claimed that the 161 persons named in the decree were not all the
heirs of Hazlett. However, here the trial court had jurisdiction in rem to
determine the rights of everyone to the trust property and the decree which
it rendered making this finding would give full protection to the trustees.
Therefore the trustees could not be aggrieved by an erroneous determination
of heirship. However, the court held that the trustees' appeal from the order
of partial distribution should have been allowed because if the final decree
were revised upon appeals of Yale University and the administrator, the
trustees might be subject to conflicting claims of the probate and circuit
courts,
In re Estate of Mills21 clarifies an important point concerning the nature
of appeal from probate to circuit court. The appellant, an interested party,
appealed from the order of final settlement and the administrator also appealed. Appellant's failre to file exceptions in the probate court was held
to be fatal to her right to review by the circuit court. The matter must be
litigated in the probate court before there can be a review in the circuit
court. This result is indicated by the word "anew" contained in the statute
which modifies the circuit court's power to "hear, try and determine," the
cause. However, the administrator also appealed to the circuit court which
allowed him commissions on all sums handled by him, including his receipts

20. State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Sartorius, 164 S. W. (2d) 356

(Mo. 1942).

21. 349 Mo. 611, 162 S. W. (2d) 807 (1942).
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and disbursements of funds obtained from carrying on the intestate's trucking business. This was held improper, and computation of commissions was
directed to be made upon the basis of the assets of the estate as left by
decedent. The court did not pass upon the question as to "whether administrator might be allowed extra compensation for continuing decedent's business or whether he should be surcharged for losses incurred in so doing. It
is regrettable that appellant did not present proper exceptions to the account
for they would have raised the important distinction between performing
contracts made by decedent and carrying on his business generally, both
22
forms of activity being involved in the case.
State ex rel. Gnekow v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. 23 does a great
'deal to clarify the extent of liability on a personal representative's bond.
The administrator here induced an insurance company to pay him the
amount of a policy on decedent's life. Later it was determined that intestate's
divorced wife was the lawful beneficiary of the policy. Upon the administrator's refusal to pay over the entire sum to the divorced wife she brought
suit upon his official bond. The court was confronted with two lines of
authority in Missouri and other states, one declaring that the sureties are
liable only for the representative's failure to account for assets belonging
to the estate and the other holding him liable for all moneys received under
color of his office. The opinion points out that most of the decisions can be
reconciled by recognizing that the law imposes liability whenever the estate
was increased by assets to which it was not entitled, or was decreased by
withholding assets to which it was entitled. This case, falling in the first
category, was held to be a proper one in which to impose liability on the
surety. Quaere, what if the administrator had collected this policy under
color of his office, but had immediately appropriated the proceeds so that
they never became part of the estate?
ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL

Long v. F. W. Woolworth. Co.24 is a thoughtful opinion which represents

a healthy judicial attitude toward non-prejudicial error. The injured wife
brought suit for personal injuries in 1934, obtained judgment which was
22. See Estate of Burke, 198 Cal. 163, 244 Pac. 340, 44 A.L.R. 1341 (1926);
ATKINSON, WILLS

(1937) 618-624.

23. 349 Mo. 528, 163 S. W. (2d) 86 (1942), noted with approval in (1943)

29 VA. L. REV. 951.

24. 159 S. W. (2d) 619 (Mo. 1942).
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reversed in 1937, and died in 1939. Later in 1939 her husband as administrator revived the action and amended the petition in 1940 by simply adding
his name and capacity by interlineation. Defendant sought to reverse a subsequent judgment for plaintiff upon the ground that it was not alleged and
proved that the original plaintiff did not die as the result of the injury for
which the suit was brought. The court recognized the established rule under
the statutes that if she did die from this injury, recovery could not be had
by her administrator in an action brought by intestate for the injury. While
several cases had held that judgment for the administrator cannot stand
unless he assumes the burden of pleading and proof as to the cause of the
death, the court upheld the judgment on the ground that the time of the
injury and of the death, the nature of the amendment, the fact that the
pleadings contained no other reference to the death, and the proceedings at
the trial all indicated that the cause of death was not "a truly controverted
issue" in the case. The decision assigns to pleading its proper function, that
of giving the opposite party and the court general notice of the claim and
defense. It may even open the door to the taking of the position that judgment for a plaintiff should not be reversed when he has been permitted to
prove a cause of action even though he has not alleged all of the elements
25
thereof.
In re Thommrnssoi26 involved the attempt to impose costs in connection
with an insanity proceeding upon the administrator of the alleged insane
person who died pending the insanity proceeding. The trial court abated the
action and rendered judgment against the estate for costs. In holding that
the later part of the judgment should be stricken, the court followed the
rule that costs are purely statutory and found that no statute authorized
the imposition of costs when the insanity proceeding had not terminated
on its merits. It was further declared that the death necessarily abates the
insanity proceeding and that there was no provision whereby the personal
representative could be made a party thereto for any purpose.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
JOHN S. MARSALEK*

The jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission to determine questions of a purely legal nature was the subject of an opinion ren25. See (1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 357.

26. 159 S. W. (2d) 626 (Mo. 1942).
*Attorney, St Louis. LL.B. Washington University, 1910.
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dered by the St. Louis Court of Appeals,' and adopted by the supreme
court, 2 in Lieckty v. Kansas City Bridge Company and the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, a suit for an injunction. Cora A. Liechty,
the plaintiff in the suit, was claimant in a proceeding against the Bridge Company, pending before the commission, in which she was seeking to recover compensation on account of the death of Lewis Liechty who sustained fatal injuries while he was in the Bridge Company's employ. In her petition in the
injunction suit, Mrs. Liechty alleged that Lewis Liechty was her husband
at the time of his death; that the Bridge Company intended to offer in evidence at the hearing of her compensation claim a purported decree of
divorce against her, obtained by her husband in Kansas; that the decree
was invalid, and constituted a fraud on the court by which it was rendered,
for the reason that she had not been notified of the divorce suit, and for
other reasons assigned in her petition. She prayed that the Bridge Company
be enjoined from offering and the commission from receiving the decree as
evidence against her. Judgment went against her in the circuit court. She
appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, where the judgment of the circuit
court was affirmed in an opinion written by Judge Anderson, and concurred
in by the other members of the court.
Mrs. Liechty's right to the injunctive relief sought by her turned on the
question whether the commission, being a ministerial and administrative
body, was vested with jurisdiction, in deciding Mrs. Liechty's claim for compensation, to pass upon the validity of the Kansas divorce decree. The
opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, adopted by the supreme court,
gives an affirmative answer to this question, and rules that while the commission cannot usurp judicial functions contrary to the constitutional inhibition, it has those powers which are incidental and necessary to the proper
discharge of its duties in administering the Compensation Act; and where
the full discharge of its duties requires the commission to determine questions of a purely legal nature, the commission has jurisdiction to do so.
The court deemed its opinion to be in conflict with the opinion of the
Kansas City Court of Appeals in Kelley v. Howard,3 and certified the case
to the supreme court for final determination.
The Kelley case was a compensation proceeding in which the insurer
resisted an award against it on the ground that its policy had been cancelled
1. 155 S. W. (2d) 297 (Mo. App. 1941).
2. 162 S. W. (2d) 275 (Mo. 1942).

3. 233 Mo. App. 474, 123 S. W. (2d) 584 (1938).
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for non-payment of premiums before the accident occurred, and had been
reinstated after the accident as a result of fraudulent representations by the
employer that no accident had occurred in the period between the cancellation and the reinstatement. The commission had ruled that the reinstatement of the policy was void, and entered an award in favor of the injured
employee and against the employer only. On appeal of the employer, the
Kansas City Court of Appeals said that the commission, as an administrative agency, had no power authoritatively to expound any principle of law
or equity, and reasoned that if the commission were empowered to pass upon
such questions as the one involved in the case before it, then all distinctions
between such administrative bodies and the courts would be abolished, and
such administrative bodies would have coordinate jurisdiction with the courts
in all purely judicial controversies where compensation was directly or indirectly involved. The court held that the Workmen's Compensation Commission, in holding the policy void, had exercised a jurisdiction conferred only
upon the courts, and that the commission should have passed upon the
claim as if no such issue had been raised.
The supreme court, after quoting the opinion of the St. Louis Court of
Appeals in the Liechty case, said in an added paragraph 4 that the fundamental question in all compensation cases is whether the claimant is entitled
to compensation, and that the commission is vested with authority to make
the rulings necessary to determine such fundamental question, even though
the function thus performed may be judicial in nature. The court further
said that no conflict existed between the opinions of two courts of appeal,
because it was not necessary for the commission in the Kelley case to decide
whether the policy had been fraudulently reinstated in order to determine
whether or not the claimant employee was entitled to compensation. The
supreme court did, not approve the opinion in the Kelley case, although
approval of the conclusion reached by the court on the facts before it may
be implied.
The Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act provides that if the employer is insured, his liability is secondary and indirect, and his insurer
shall be primarily and directly liable to the injured employee, his dependents, etc. Both the employer and his insurer are required to be parties to
all awards of compensation.5 The Act contemplates an award directly against
4. 162 S. W. (2d) 275, 280 (Mo. 1942).
5. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3715.
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the insurer, if a valid policy exists, naming the employer as the insured, and
applying to the accident. If the insurer contests its liability the determination of the issue is incidental and necessary to the proper discharge of the
commission's duties in administering the Act, and inasmuch as the insurer's
liability, if it is liable, is primary, the issue is fundamental in the same
sense as is the issue whether the employee is entitled to compensation from
the employer. Thus the basis upon which the supreme court distinguished
the Kelley case from the Lieckty case does not appear to be valid.
In Morse v. Consolidated Underwriters,0 the court reaffirmed its rulings
construing the section of the Workmen's Compensation Act excluding from
its provisions persons whose average annual earnings exceed three thousand
six hundred dollars.r The suit was in equity for $18,609 which plaintiffs
claimed was due them as compensation on account of the death of Edward
A. Morse. Defendant was the compensation insurer of the Potosi Tie &
Lumber Company. At the time of his death, Morse was vice-president of
the company and was receiving a salary of $400.00 per month. He had received in excess of $3,600.00 as salary each year for more than ten years
preceding his death. Plaintiffs' petition was dismissed by the circuit court.
The supreme court affirmed the lower court's judgment.
In a prior proceeding instituted before the commission, the claim of
Morse's dependents for compensation had been denied by the commission.
The ruling was affirmed by the supreme court s under the exclusion clause of
the Act above mentioned. In the equity suit Morse's dependents contended
that Morse was under the Act because he was employed on a month-tomonth basis, and was not under a contract of hire for a definite term of one
full year or more. The supreme court held that there was no basis in its
prior rulings on this subject for the contention that one employed on a
monthly salary basis is under the Act regardless of the average annual
amount received over a period of years.
Tokask v. General Baking Company, a compensation case, involved
the application of a number of rules already settled. The Baking Company,
through its general foreman, arranged with one Schuermann to paint the
exterior of its building. Schuermann suggested that two painters were required for the job. The general manager agreed with this suggestion, and
6. 349 Mo. 785, 163 S. W. (2d) 586 (1942).
7. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3695.

8. Morse v. Potosi Tie & Lumber Co., 130 S. W. (2d) 477 (Mo. 1939).
9. 349 Mo. 767, 163 S. W. (2d) 554 (1942).
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Schuermann employed Tokash, the claimant. The Baking Company furnished the paint, putty and brushes, and Schuermann furnished the necessary
ladders and scaffolding. When the work commenced the Baking Company's
manager instructed Schuermann to consult the company's maintenance man,
who would give him the material and tell him what to do. In the course of
the work claimant was injured. Claimant recovered an award against the
Baking Company and its insurer, and the case finally reached the supreme
court on their appeal. Appellants' first point in the supreme court was that
the claimant was not entitled to compensation because Schuermann was an
independent contractor, and claimant was Schuermann's employee. The
court reiterated the rule, frequently stated, that the retention by the employer of the right to interfere in or control the work renders the one engaged
to perform such work a servant rather than an independent contractor. The
court held that under the evidence above outlined the commission was authorized to find that the Baking Company reserved the right of control over
the work; that Schuermann, in engaging the claimant's services, acted as
agent of the Baking Company, and that consequently claimant was the
Baking Company's employee at the time of the injury. The question was
within the realm of fact, and consequently the commission's finding was
conclusive.
Appellants based a second point upon a section of the Compensation
Act which stipulates against its application to employments which are but
casual or not incidental to the operation of the usual business of the employer.' 0 The Baking Company contended that the work of painting the
building was of a casual nature, and as such excluded from the Act. The
court pointed out that the word "casual" as used in the Act referred to the
work the employee was engaged to do, and not to the employee engaged
therein. The evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the Baking
Company maintained its building in the usual course of its business, had
a maintenance department and a painter, regularly employed by the company, assigned to such department, and regularly painted both the interior
and exterior of the building when necessary. The work was not casual in
the sense that it was unforeseen or unexpected, but the need for painting
the building could be reasonably anticipated at certain times. This question
was also within the realm of fact.
The case presented a question of appellate jurisdiction in compensation
10. Mo.

REv. STAT.

(1939) § 3693.
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cases, of which nothing is directly said in the opinion. The court noted that
the final award exceeded $7,500.00. Prior opinions hold that because the continuance of weekly payments in non-fatal cases depends upon contingencies,
the fact that the total sum awarded exceeds $7,500.00 is not sufficient to
cast jurisdiction upon the supreme court." In this case the accident occurred
in September, 1934, but by reason of intervening proceedings,"" the appeal
from the circuit court's judgment affirming the award was not taken until
April, 1941. The total of the compensation installments which accrued in
the meantime, with an allowance for medical expense included in the award,
exceeded $7,500.00. This sum was in controversy when the appeal was
taken, and was not subject to contingencies, although part had been paid
pursuant to a settlement which was held invalid. The circumstances were
unusual, and a similar question is not likely to present itself again except
in case of the commutation of an award under the Act" where the present
value exceeds $7,500.00.
The death of an employee due to tularemia was held not compensable
in Ulman v. Chevrolet-St. Louis Division of General Motors Corporation,in

an award rendered by the commission and affirmed by the supreme court. 4
The evidence established that this condition is an infectious disease caused
by bacilli which enter through the skin, broken and unbroken. The claimants
introduced testimony to show that the portal of entry was a traumatic
laceration on one of the fingers of the deceased employee. They also introduced evidence which was sufficient to support an inference that this injury
arose out of and in the course of the deceased's employment. A physician
who saw the employee a short time after the condition developed testified
that the employee had an infection on the back of his neck and what looked
like the beginning of an abscess on his finger, but that otherwise there was
no lesion of the surface of his skin. The employee's foreman also saw the
condition, and said the employee had a boil or rising on his hand, but saw
no cut or break in the skin. He suggested that the employee go to the
dispensary, but the employee refused to do so. The employee at no time
reported any accident at his place of employment.
In affirming the award of no compensation, the supreme court adverted
11. Marsalek, The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1941
(Workmen's Compensation) (1942) 7 Mo. L. REv. 457.
12. Tokash v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 346 Mo. 100, 139 S. W.

(2d) 978 (1940).

13. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3736.
14. 349 Mo. 906, 163 S. W. (2d) 778 (1942).
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to the rule that the burden was on the claimants to establish that the employee's death was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment, and the further rule that the awards of the commission
are in the nature of special verdicts, upon appeal from which the courts of
review do not weigh the evidence or pass on the credibility of the witness.
The court noted that the evidence relied upon by claimants, to establish
that the employee suffered a cut on his finger in the course of his employment,
was refuted by other testimony introduced by the employer, and that the
commission could have considered that claimant's evidence on this issue
was not reasonably satisfactory. The court consequently concluded that "t
was not warranted in interfering with the award.
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